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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has become one of the important issues in the business world, 
particularly after the collapses of several notable companies in the beginning of 2000s such as 
Enron and WorldCom in the United States; Barings Bank, Royal Ahold, Parmalat in Europe; 
HIH in Australia; and China Aviation Oil in Asia. According to Mayer (1997), corporate 
governance attempts to align the different interests of investors and managers and to ensure 
that firms are managed for the benefit of investors. It is an adoption of the Code of Best 
Business Practices which encompasses various matters such as rules, independence, 
faithfulness, transparency and so forth (Sapovadia, 2003). It is so important that lacking it can 
lead to corporate collapses, and it can also restore investor confidence (Mallin, 2013). 
Other than for the purpose of survival of a corporation, corporate governance plays 
important role in helping it to attain its corporate objectives (Mallin, 2013). Good corporate 
governance ensures firms sufficiently fulfilling both transparency and accountability which 
are demanded by investors. And in terms of wealth maximisation, not only shareholders, but 
also other stakeholders (i.e. employees, providers of credit, suppliers, customers, local 
communities, interest groups, and government) who benefit from corporate governance 
(Sapovadia, 2003). Corporate governance is essential to any financial system because the 
providers of the funds need assurance that they will reap the rewards which have been 
promised to them (Schmidt, 2003). 
Given its importance, many government regulatory authorities encourage the 
corporations in their jurisdictions to imply good corporate governance by complying with 
corporate governance codes made by them. The code is not legally binding, but in the United 
Kingdom, the reason of deviation of recommendations set out in the code should be explained 
in a designated part of annual report (comply-or-explain principle) (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2014). 
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon system which prioritises the interests of shareholders, the 
German corporate governance system regards corporations as entities that have to serve a 
multitude of other interests as well (Schmidt, 2003). The shareholders are but one of a wider 
set of stakeholder interest with the employees and customers being given more emphasis 
(Mallin, 2013). The employees’ interest is also safeguarded in the form of seats for employee 
representatives in supervisory board. In comparison, Indonesian corporate governance system 
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adopts both the features of Anglo-Saxon and German system. Corporations in Indonesia are 
required by law to establish a dual board, i.e. board of directors and board of commissioners 
(National Committee on Governance, 2006). These boards respectively have similar nature 
with management board and supervisory board of German system, where the board of 
directors executes the day-to-day management and the board of commissioners oversees the 
board of directors. However, employee representatives are not present in the two boards, 
hence making it similar to Anglo-Saxon system. 
Most corporations are profit-oriented. Therefore, economic or business players might 
raise a question: do corporate governance practices partially and simultaneously influence 
firm performance? In relation to Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia, the question 
that might be asked is: Do the different organisational contexts in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia influence the effectiveness of corporate governance practices in those 
countries?   
The research topic is the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. In other words, this research 
will investigate how determinative corporate governance is on firm performance in those 
countries. The corporate governance-firm performance relationship has been extensively 
researched by many scholars. However, most of the research only addresses either the context 
of developed economies or developing ones. Comparative studies on corporate governance-
firm performance relationship between developed and developing economies are currently 
still in rarity. It is expected that this research promotes better understanding on how corporate 
governance influences firm performance in countries with different organisational and 
economic context. 
The selection of Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia is motivated by the fact 
that they have distinctive corporate governance system and features. Corporations in Germany 
are subject to codetermination law which regulates the employees’ representation on the 
corporate board. In addition, Germany is also well known as having a high level of share 
ownership concentration with banks as prominent shareholders. 
Unlike Germany which has dual board structure, executive and non-executive directors 
in corporations in the United Kingdom work together in one board (single board structure) 
without employees’ representation. In terms of ownership structure, corporations’ shares in 
this country are widely held by shareholders with relatively low percentage. Prominent 
shareholders are mostly the institutional ones. Meanwhile, Indonesia has dual board structure 
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without employees’ representation on the corporate board. Share ownership in this country is 
concentrated with family groups as the most prominent shareholders. 
   This research will contribute to the literature of comparative studies addressing the 
corporate governance-firm performance relationship between developed (represented by 
Germany and the United Kingdom) and developing countries (represented by Indonesia). 
Indonesia is representative for developing countries because it has enjoyed a high economic 
growth recently and been regarded as one of the ‘economic miracles’ in East Asia 
(Lukviarman, 2004). In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), Indonesia is the sixth largest 
economy in Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Germany and the United Kingdom are 
representative for developed countries because Germany is the largest economy in Europe, 
while the United Kingdom is the second largest in the same region (International Monetary 
Fund, 2016). 
 
A. A Brief Overview of the Economy of Germany 
Germany plays an important role in European economy. It is a founding member of the 
European Union (formally established in 1993) and the Eurozone (established in 1999). In 
terms of world trade, Germany exported goods to the value of 1,193.6 billion euros in 2015 
(Statistiches Bundesamt, 2016) and hence it is the third largest exporter in the world behind 
China and the United States (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers make the highest proportion of trading goods with the value of 227 billion euros 
in 2015 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). The high export rate is presumably supported by the 
strong industrial base and the fact that German economy produces approximately 1/3 of its 
gross domestic product for export (Siebert, 2005). 
Since the end of World War II, the economic policy of Germany has been based on a 
concept labeled as Social Market Economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) that was promoted by 
Ludwig Erhard, Germany’s first minister of economic affairs. This concept stresses the 
importance of the protection of the freedom of all market participants on both the supply and 
demand sides as well as the provision of a strong safety net (Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy, 2017).   
German economy is open to competition. However, many areas of the German economy 
are protected by the state, especially in the form of protection of the individual (e.g. social 
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security for unemployment, health care, nursing care, old-age pensions). In addition, the 
allocation for “social budget” makes up to a third of gross domestic product (Siebert, 2005).     
 Germany is not bestowed with plentiful natural resources except for coal, wood, and 
other few minerals. Therefore it still has to import raw materials and energy (Siebert, 2005). 
In terms of companies, 28 of 500 world’s top listed companies measured by revenue are 
headquartered in Germany (Fortune, 2016a). Nevertheless, Siebert (2005) argued that the 
performance of the German firms is not identical with the status of the German economy 
since the large part of the German multinationals’ value added generated abroad is not 
included in the German GDP (unlike foreign firms in Germany whose production counts 
towards the German GDP). This is also the case for employment of German firms and 
employment in Germany which are also not identical. 
 
B. A Brief Overview of the Economy of the United Kingdom 
Historically, the United Kingdom was one of the most prosperous economies in Europe 
between 17th and 18th centuries (Baten, 2016). The Industrial Revolution began in the United 
Kingdom, making this country dominated the world economy mostly throughout 19th century 
(Economy Watch, 2013b). However, after The Great Exhibition in 1851, other countries such 
as United States and Germany who have more abundant supply of energy and raw materials 
began to challenge the domination of the United Kingdom (Hudson, 2011).  
As an EU member, the United Kingdom is part of a single market where the free 
movement of people, goods, services and capital within member states is ensured. However, it 
is not a member of Eurozone as it still maintains its own economy and continues to use the 
Pound Sterling as its national currency (Economy Watch, 2013a). 
According to The Heritage Foundation (2016), the United Kingdom since 2010s has 
experienced the strongest growth in G20. This is made possible through the contribution of 
the sectors of services, manufacturing and construction. The Economy Watch (2013b) stated 
that the most dominant business sector in this country is service which counts for 
approximately 78% of GDP. The United Kingdom does not have abundant economically 
valuable mineral resources. On the other hand, the supply of its energy resources (e.g. oil, 
natural gas, coal) is the largest in the European Union (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017) 
although its oil and natural gas reserves are in decline which makes this country a net 
importer of energy since 2005 (Central Information Agency, 2017). Cars, gold, crude and 
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refined petroleum, and packaged medicaments are the top exports of the United Kingdom 
(MIT Media Lab, 2017). In terms of companies, 25 of 500 world’s largest companies listed by 
the Fortune Global 500 are headquartered in the United Kingdom (Fortune, 2016b). 
 
C. A Brief Overview of the Economy of Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of important economies in Southeast Asia and a founding member of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is also a member of G20 major 
economies and classified as emerging economies (International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
Traditionally, Indonesia relies on raw commodity exports in its economy, but in recent years 
the central government has provided strong support to raise the role of manufacturing industry 
(Van der Schaar Investments, 2017). 
In contrast to Germany and the United Kingdom, Indonesia is endowed by abundance 
and variety of commodities which account for approximately 60% of exports. Indonesia’s 
most important commodity is palm oil which accounts for 51.7% of global palm oil 
production. Its domestic economy is dominated by privately-held large business groups and 
state-owned enterprises (Van der Schaar Investments, 2017). 
Indonesia has a mixed economic system where the state plays dominant role despite 
market orientation. This nature is clearly reflected in the Article 33 (2) and (3) of 1945 
Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, which states (translated from 
Indonesian language according to Indonesia’s Ministry of State Secretariat): 
(2)  Production branches which are important for the state and which affect the livelihood of 
the people at large shall be controlled by the state. 
(3)     The land and water and the natural resources contained therein shall be controlled by 
          the state and shall be used for the greatest prosperity of the people. 
  
D. Organisation of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II describes the 
underlying theories of corporate governance. In Chapter III the literature on corporate 
governance features in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia is reviewed. Chapter IV 
develops the hypotheses proposed in this research. Chapter V describes the research variables 
and methodology. Chapter VI presents the summary of the empirical results. Chapter VII 
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discusses the empirical results, and Chapter VIII concludes this research, describes its 
limitations and suggests some recommendations. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A. Overview of Corporate Governance 
The term “corporate governance” did not exist in the English language until 1977, 
although corporate governance issue has already gained a widespread attention when Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means wrote the historical “The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property” in 1932 (Zingales, 1997). The theories on the corporate governance development 
and areas already emerged much earlier than the last twenty years or so and are derived from 
various disciplines such as finance, economics, accounting, law, management, and 
organizational behaviour (Mallin, 2013). 
There is no universally agreed definition of corporate governance defined by scholars. 
For instance, Demb and Neubauer (1992) argued that the question of corporate governance 
was always related to performance accountability, particularly prior to World War I. 
According to Mayer (1997), corporate governance attempts to align the different interests and 
objectives of investors and managers and ensures that firms are run for the investors’ benefit. 
Turnbull (1997) stated that corporate governance describes all the influences affecting the 
institutional processes which include appointment of controllers and/or regulators, and it is 
also involved in organising the production and sale of goods and services. 
According to John and Senbet (1998), corporate governance is based on a principle 
that the shareholders elect the board of directors who subsequently selects the top 
management. Corporate governance deals with mechanisms of control exercised by corporate 
stakeholders over corporate insiders and management to protect the stakeholders’ interests. In 
this sense, shareholders are part of stakeholders along with parties who supply capital, as well 
as employees, consumers, suppliers, and the government. Monks and Minow (2003) described 
corporate governance as a relationship between various participants in determining the 
corporate direction and performance. Tirole (2001) argued that apart from maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth, the firm should also take into account the interest of “stakeholder 
society” that consists of employees, customers, suppliers, communities around the firm’s 
plants, potential pollutees, etc.    
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the fundamental objective of corporate 
governance is to assure financiers that they will receive a return from their financial 
investments. The objectives of corporate governance system are as follows (Zingales, 1997): 
a. To maximise the incentives for enhancing the investments value while minimising 
power seeking in a firm 
b. To minimise inefficiency in “ex-post bargaining” (i.e. a bargaining over the 
“quasi-rents” generated by a firm) 
c. To minimise any “governance” risk and allocate the residual risk to the least risk-
averse parties 
 
Mayer (1997) argued that the degrees of product market competition may influence 
the effectiveness of different types of governance systems and forms of corporate governance. 
In terms of application of policies which adopts specific forms of governance, the product and 
labour market context within which the policies are being contemplated has to be taken into 
account. 
In order to create good corporate governance systems, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
emphasised the importance of legal protection of investors and some form of concentrated 
ownership. The United States and the United Kingdom are the examples of countries whose 
systems base rather more heavily on stronger legal protection, while Germany and Japan have 
weaker legal protection but more concentrated equity ownership (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
Corporate governance also plays an important role in on the economy of a country. As 
the finding of Johnson et al. (2000) suggested, corporate governance in general matters 
considerably for Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, particularly on the exchange rate 
depreciation and stock market crash. This means that corporate governance is not only 
important for corporate shareholders, but also for the country as a whole. 
Scholars disagree on how corporate governance should be treated or perceived. On the 
one hand, as Hart (1995) put it, ‘Chicago’ view believes that statutory corporate governance 
rules are unnecessary. Efficient corporate governance can be achieved through a market 
economy without government intervention. Moreover, the statutory rules adversely affect 
corporations since they will limit the corporate founders’ ability to tailor specific corporate 
governance appropriate with the corporations’ own individual circumstances. Therefore, the 
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best things the government can do are educating and encouraging corporations to implement 
changes, but not interfering in final decision made by the corporations. 
However, unlike ‘Chicago’ view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that corporate 
governance needs particular attention from the government in order to ensure that the capital 
owners or financiers will get back the return on their capital. They also claimed that it is 
essential to have legal protection of investor rights as part of the approaches to corporate 
governance. 
Corporate collapses and scandals of many large US corporations such as Enron and 
Worldcom have revived the interest in corporate governance issues. As a response to these, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by the US government in 2002 as an effort to restore 
public confidence in corporate governance. This act incorporates many reforms to improve 
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures intended to protect investors (Petra, 
2005). 
 
B. Underlying Theories: Agency Theory and Institutional Theory 
Over the past few decades, scholars have proposed many theories of corporate 
governance such as agency theory, resource dependence theory, stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, and institutional theory among others. According to Daily et al. (2003), 
agency theory explains “how the public corporation could survive and prosper despite the 
self-interested proclivities of managers.” Resource dependence theorists argue that the 
directors’ role in the provision of resources needed by a firm enhances organisational 
functioning, firm performance, and survival. Stewardship theory assumes that executives and 
directors protect their reputations through actions that maximise firm performance and this 
hence aligns their interests with those of shareholders. According to Mallin (2013), 
stakeholder theory focuses on a wider group of constituents (not only shareholders) and hence 
“the overriding focus on shareholder value becomes less self-evident”.  On the other hand, 
Aguilera et al. (2008) posited that interdependencies between the organization and diverse 
environments influence corporate governance practice (institutional theory). 
In this research, only two basic theories are used, namely agency theory and 
institutional theory. I decide to use agency theory because it is, to the best of my knowledge, 
the most cited theory in corporate governance studies. In addition, I also use institutional 
theory in this research due to differences of institutional contexts and/or environments 
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between Germany, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia. In this research, institutional theory 
also acts as a “counterbalance” to agency theory which somewhat neglects the environment 
where a firm operate and tends to generalise the behaviour of managers and shareholders 
regardless the differences of institutional context. 
 
B. 1. Agency Theory    
 As Mallin (2013) put it, agency theory identifies the agency relationship between the 
principal and the agent, where the former delegates work to the latter. The issues in agency 
relationship are related to the opportunism or self-interest of the agent and also the problem of 
information asymmetry where the agent has more information. The roots of agency 
relationship are related to economic utilitarianism (Ross, 1973) and it postulates that rational 
individuals seek to enhance their own utility through favourable alternatives (Cuevas-
Rodriguez et al., 2012). According to Hart (1995), agency problem or conflict of interest 
which involves members of the organisation is one of conditions causing corporate 
governance issues, along with transaction costs. 
 Those who approach corporate governance issues from principal-agent perspective see 
governance arrangements as devices to protect the interests of financiers in a world of 
imperfectly verifiable actions (Keasey et al., 2005). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that if 
the principal and the agent in a corporation are utility maximisers, it is highly likely that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal due to their divergent interests. 
These divergent interests will lead to ‘agency conflict’ between the principal and the agent. 
The effectiveness of corporate governance practice in a corporation therefore depends on how 
this agency conflict is managed. According to Jensen (1994), the central proposition of 
agency theory is that rational self-interested people always have incentives to reduce or 
control conflicts of interest. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) argued that such conflict occurs 
when managers, for example, seek to consume excessive perquisites at shareholders’ expense, 
make decisions beneficial to them but detrimental to stockholders, and make decisions to 
reduce their personal risk which oppose the shareholders’ risk preference.  
According to Lubatkin et al. (2007), agency problems develop because agents can hide 
information and/or act in favour of their own interest. Therefore, principal has incentive to 
invest in monitoring and incentives, and agents have reason to postperformance bonds to 
protect against potential losses. 
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 Lubatkin et al. (2007) also argued that agency theory has three normative assumptions: 
a. Opportunism is an ever-present threat since executives are naturally opportunistic; 
b. Executives’ opportunistic tendencies are driven solely by their single-minded desire to 
maximise a single utility because they are rationally economic; and 
c. Public firms are characterised by information asymmetry caused by the absence of 
principals in day-to-day control and their rational boundedness. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that when contracts are not costlessly written and 
enforced, agency problems will arise. The costs incurred by agency problems include the 
costs of three activities, namely structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among 
agents with conflicting interests. The governance structures (i.e. the mechanisms that regulate 
the explicit and implicit contracts between principals and agents) that will survive are those 
that economise on these costs. In summary, the focus of agency theory is identifying the most 
efficient contract to align the interests of an agent with those of the principal. 
 Going further, Fama and Jensen (1983) disagreed with the usage of the term 
‘separation of ownership and control’ which most literature uses and call it ‘somewhat 
imprecise’. Instead, they use the term ‘separation of decision management from residual risk 
bearing’, implying that the managers do the decision management and the shareholders bear 
the residual risk incurred by the managers’ decision. The agency problems resulted from such 
separation are controlled through separation of management (initiation and implementation) 
and control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions, where the higher level agents ratifying 
and monitoring the decision initiatives of lower level agents and evaluating their performance. 
Thanks to this hierarchical partitioning of the decision process, it will be more unlikely for 
decision agents to act for their own benefit at the expense of residual claimants. 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) also emphasised the importance of outside directors in the 
separation of top-level decision management and control since they have incentives to carry 
out their tasks and do not collude with managers to expropriate residual claimants. They also 
play an important role in the handling of disagreements among internal managers and serious 
agency problems between internal managers and residual claimants. 
 Eisenhardt (1989) argued that there are two problems that can occur in agency 
relationship which agency theory is concerned to resolve, namely agency problem and 
problem of risk-sharing. Agency problem arises when there is a conflict between desires and 
goals of the principal and agent, and the principal can hardly verify the actual action of the 
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agent or it is expensive to verify it. Problem of risk-sharing arises when the principal and 
agent have different attitudes towards risk. Agency theory focuses on determining the most 
efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people, 
organisations and information. 
 The agency problem described above mainly pertains to firms with widely-dispersed 
ownership. For firms with highly-concentrated ownership, Lemmon and Lins (2003) believed 
that conflict of interest which leads to agency problem occurs between corporate insiders 
(controlling shareholders and managers) and outside investors. Corporate insiders who have 
control over firm assets can potentially expropriate outside investors through resources 
diversion for their private use or by commitment of fund to unprofitable projects that give 
private benefits.  
 Some scholars propose specific mechanisms to reduce agency loss and improve firm’s 
efficiency and financial performance. For instance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested 
share ownership for senior executives as well as stock options. This mechanism is expected to 
match financial interests of executives and those of shareholders. In addition, it is also 
possible to threaten the executives of dismissal if the income is low. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also proposed the use of more debt financing, because it reduces total equity financing 
which in turn also reduce the level of conflict between stockholders and managers. However, 
this mechanism creates conflict between stockholders and creditors (debt agency cost) since it 
is possible that stockholders seek to expropriate the wealth of creditors through risky 
corporate investment decisions. Similarly, Donaldson and Davis (1991) proposed tying 
executive compensation and levels of benefits to shareholders returns and deferring a part of 
executive compensation to the future in order to reward long term corporate value 
maximisation and preclude harmful short term executive actions. 
Rozeff (1982) suggested that dividend is one of the devices to reduce agency cost. The 
idea behind it is that paying out dividend is usually assumed to be accompanied by raising 
external capital. By so doing, managers are monitored by the new lenders and/or equity 
suppliers. Due to such monitoring, managers will be induced to take actions more linear with 
the interests of capital providers. 
As Ross (1973) put it, the optimal incentive contract is determined by three factors, 
namely the manager’s risk aversion, the importance of managerial decisions, and the 
managerial ability on the upfront payment of cash flow ownership. Agency theory emphasises 
the importance of separating the role-holders of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman 
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positions as well as using incentive to align the interests of CEO and shareholders in order to 
control the ‘managerial opportunism’ (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
According to Lubatkin et al. (2007), corporate governance plays a central role as the 
mechanism to restrain executives’ opportunistic nature by enforcing compliance, e.g. 
monitoring their conduct, gaining access to the firm’s internal information flows, providing 
incentives to agents to ensure that they act in the principal’s best interest, and legal sanctions 
(if necessary). 
 
B. 2. Institutional Theory 
In contrast to agency theory which exclusively focuses on the relationship between the 
divergent interests of shareholders and managers, Aguilera et al. (2008) argued that the 
performance impact of corporate governance practices appears to differ with respect to 
organisational contexts. They believe that the high or low governance effectiveness is 
determined by the combination of certain corporate governance practices which depends on 
the costs, contingencies and complementarities associated with different environments. Costs 
refer to the value of inputs to corporate governance. Contingencies refer to the interrelation 
between corporate governance with variations in internal and external strategic resources that 
shape a firm’s interdependence with market, sectoral, regulatory, or institutional 
environments. Complementarities refer to the overall bundles of practices aligned to mutually 
enhance the ability to achieve effective corporate governance. In addition, Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) in their study on variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist 
economies explained that corporate governance diversity across countries is influenced by 
significant dimensions of variation in three key stakeholder groups’ (i.e. capital, labour and 
management) relationships to the firm and the institutional domains shaping these 
relationships. 
Agency theory views agent as opportunistic or self-interested person. On the contrary, 
Lubatkin et al. (2007) argued that agent’s behaviour, whether self-serving or owner-serving, is 
embedded or partially-determined by the firm’s social context and sub-cultures. This also 
applies to the boundedness of principal’s rationality. In explaining the difference in 
governance practices between nations, Lubatkin et al. (2007) proposed that nationwide 
preferences for monitoring and rewarding managerial actions influence the propensity of 
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managers to behave opportunistically, the expression of it, the principals’ perception to it, and 
the principals’ effort to govern it. 
Aguilera et al. (2008) argued that the study of corporate governance needs to give 
greater attention to the broader environmental context. This view contrasts agency theory 
which focuses only to the management of principal-agent problem between shareholders and 
managers. In summary, institutional theorists argue that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices depends on the environments surrounding the firm. Or, as Aguilera et al. 
(2008) put it, institutional theory helps to explain why effective corporate governance can be 
best achieved through many ways. 
 The cross-national convergence of corporate governance practices is facilitated by the 
diffusion of “best practice” recommendations. This diffusion occurs after the 
recommendations are adapted to local contexts of countries who adapt those (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) and it is thereby in line with institutional theory. 
Other fact which supports institutional theory is that as argued by Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) the interactions among stakeholders in corporate governance are different 
depending on the configurations of institutions of countries in question.  The stakeholders 
consist of capital, labour, and management. 
According to Aguilera and Jackson (2003), agency theory views capital as 
shareholders who have homogenous interests related to risk and return, while institutional 
theory argues that different types of capital have different identities, interests, time horizons, 
and strategies. Labour is regarded by agency theory as a party whose interests are treated as 
an exogenous parameter, while institutional theory takes into account the labour’s ability in 
influencing corporate decision making and controlling firm’s resources. Management is 
viewed by agency theory as, given the opportunity, tending to “rationally maximize their own 
utility at the expense of their principals” (Davis et al. (1997). On the other hand, institutional 
theory argues that the dimensions of management are influenced by a variety of institutions 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
 
C. Corporate Governance Systems: Convergence or Divergence? 
Recently there have been debates among scholars as to whether corporate governance 
systems across the globe will converge (to the Anglo-Saxon model) or diverge. Gilson (2000) 
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argued that the impact of the force of competition would cause the adoption by national 
systems to a single efficient form. According to Gilson (1996), recent empirical research on 
corporate governance systems of Germany, Japan and the United States found that the type of 
convergence is functional, not formal. Such convergence is likely the first response to 
pressure inflicted by competition. One form of convergence is the adoption of the best 
practices of the existing systems. During convergence, competitive advantage can be gained 
by altering firm governance structures (both in emerging and established economies) to 
incorporate elements desired by global stakeholders (Rubach & Sebora, 1998). 
However, there is also a view that the convergence in corporate governance occurs not 
in the global context. As Branson (2001) believed, such convergence may take place in 
discrete areas such as financial accounting or disclosure standards; however it is very likely 
that the convergence happens in regional rather than “global” sphere. On the contrary, 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argued that a nation’s corporate governance is shaped by its 
institutional context and therefore remains divergent and resistant to the force of convergence 
(or converges in limited scale). This is also voiced by Aguilera and Jackson (2003) who 
asserted that institutional configurations and stakeholder interactions of a nation influence its 
corporate governance. 
La Porta et al. (2000) posited that functional convergence is likelier to occur than legal 
convergence because legal convergence needs numerous changes which are politically 
difficult to be realised. Unlike legal convergence which depends on government policies, 
functional convergence is induced by individual investors or firms who adapt in ways that 
create stronger governance despite poor or unsupportive legal environment. Meanwhile, 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) believed that a convergence towards a single governance 
model which emphasises that managers should act in the interests of all shareholders 
(controlling and non-controlling) is very likely to occur. The convergence is driven by several 
forces, including the internal logic of efficiency, competition, interest group pressure, 
imitation, and the need for compatibility. However, they acknowledged that a convergence in 
corporate law is expected to proceed more slowly. 
In summary, Denis and McConnell (2003) argued that market forces will affect the 
level of convergence although there are impedances for the market forces to operate 
throughout the world. On the one hand, it is not clear whether convergence towards stronger 
legal protection of investors will occur, or how quickly it will occur. On the other hand, 
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convergence in corporate governance practices (such as board composition and ownership 
structure) is evident in some countries.      
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter, the literature review on corporate governance of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia is elaborated. In addition, the variables of corporate governance used 
in this dissertation are also explained in detail. 
 
A. Corporate Governance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia 
A. 1. Germany 
German stock corporations are prescribed by law to establish two boards (dual board 
system), namely management board (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The law 
on this two-tiered board is mainly regulated by Public Corporations Act 1965. Over time, this 
law has undergone many revisions; particularly by the Law on Furthering Control and 
Transparency in Public Corporations 1998 which focused on internal corporate governance 
and reformed the supervisory board in particular (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). The responsibility of 
management board is to independently manage the enterprise in the interest of the enterprise, 
thus taking into account the interests of the shareholders, its employees and other 
stakeholders, with the objective of sustainable creation value. On the other hand, supervisory 
board’s duty is to advise regularly and supervise the management board in the management of 
the enterprise. The members of management board are appointed and dismissed by 
supervisory board, and the members of supervisory board are elected by shareholders and 
employees. The chairman of the supervisory board is a representative of the shareholders 
(German Corporate Governance Code, 2015) and its deputy is the representative of 
employees. Management board remuneration is also determined by supervisory board 
(Schmidt, 2003). In addition, supervisory board is also tasked with networking with 
stakeholders and business partners and the balancing of interests in the firm. Firm size and 
shareholder structure considerably affect its control efficiency and the depth of its advisory 
role (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). In a firm with equal numbers of labour and owners’ 
representatives on supervisory board (with more than 2000 employees), the 1976 
codetermination law gives the chair of the supervisory board an extra vote to break a tie in 
case of deadlock (FitzRoy & Kraft, 2004). 
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The legal maximum term of supervisory board members is usually five years, but they 
may be reappointed at the end of the term (Goergen et al., 2005). Schmidt (2003) argued that 
shared and divergent or even conflicting interests are mixed at the work of supervisory 
board’s members. This occurs due to their dual obligation: they are obliged to act in the best 
interests of the firm, and at the same time they have a limited freedom to further their specific 
constituencies’ interests.   
Members of management board cannot be elected as members of supervisory board, and 
vice versa. Other than managing company’s affairs, management board also sets up long term 
goals and guidelines (Jungmann, 2006). The management board has autonomous 
responsibility and its management authority is practically unlimited, unless there are 
provisions in the articles which call for approval by supervisory board. In addition, 
supervisory board cannot undertake the management tasks and instruct the management board 
on what to do (Kühne & Fuss, 2003), but management board is required to report to the 
supervisory board regularly (Schmidt, 2003). Even the shareholders meeting or majority 
shareholder do not have a legal right to instruct the management board to take a specific 
action within its management responsibilities (Schilling, 2001). Nevertheless, the company 
articles or supervisory board has to specify the types of transactions that subjects to its 
approval (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
Other than statutory rules, corporate governance in Germany is also regulated (albeit 
“softly”) by the German Corporate Governance Code. This consolidated code is presented for 
the first time by the governmental commission Regierungskommission Corporate Governance 
Kodex in 2002 and its approach is self-regulatory comply-or-explain, meaning that public 
corporations are expected to comply to the code or explain the noncompliance if otherwise 
(Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
Other than the two-tiered board, German corporate governance system is also distinctive 
in at least three other characteristics, namely the inclusion of employee representatives on the 
supervisory board (codetermination), significant bank role, and ownership concentration. The 
codetermination is regulated by three laws, namely 1951 legislation, Codetermination Act of 
1976, and Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Gorton & Schmid, 2002). 
 According to 1951 legislation, coal and steel industry (Montan co-determination) is 
required to have equal representation between employees and shareholders. The Co-
determination Act of 1976 stipulates that a corporation which has more than 2,000 employees 
must have one-half of the supervisory board members elected by employees. Works 
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Constitution Act of 1952 requires a corporation which has 500 to 2,000 employees to have 
one-third employee representation (Gorton & Schmid, 2002). Private corporations 
(Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, abbreviated GmbH) with more than 500 employees 
and all stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaft, abbreviated AG) are subject to codetermination 
laws (Gorton & Schmid, 2000) except for stock corporations that have fewer than 500 
employees and are established after 10 August 1994 (Petry, 2009). Despite the highly 
noticeable presence of employee representatives in the supervisory board, the casting vote of 
the chairman gives a slight additional power to shareholders (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
The large German banks play an influential role in the German corporate governance 
system. This can be seen on their blocks of shares, the proxy votes which they command, their 
traditional role as lenders to German corporations (Steger & Hartz, 2006), and their seats in 
the supervisory board of most large German corporations (Hackethal et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, German banks also often serve as financial advisers to their business customers 
(Cheffins, 2001). 
Other typical characteristics of the German corporate governance system are the highly 
concentrated ownership (Jackson et al., 2002) and it is a more important feature of German 
corporate governance system compared to banks role (Edwards & Nibler, 1999). In regards to 
ownership structure, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) found that the single largest shareholder 
has 68% of ownership of their research sample firms. The most important type of these “core” 
shareholders is families (Faccio & Lang, 2000). However, according to Schmidt (2003), the 
important blockholders of firms in Germany are other business enterprises, wealthy families, 
and financial institutions (written in order of importance).  
The reason as to why corporate ownership in Germany is highly concentrated may lie 
on the fact that the amount of German firms going public is low. As La Porta et al. (1997) 
reported, Germany only had 5 publicly quoted companies per one million people, far below 
the United States and the United Kingdom (30 and 36 per one million people respectively) in 
1996. The other reason is that publicly quoted companies in Germany have “core” 
shareholders which can exercise their influence, therefore ownership dispersion is reduced 
(compared with the United States and the United Kingdom) (Cheffins, 2001).  
Instead of putting the shareholders’ wealth maximisation at the central aim (as normally 
companies in Anglo-Saxon countries do), companies in Germany traditionally aim to balance 
the interests of various constituencies linked with them (Cheffins, 2001). In summary, 
German corporate governance system has had a broader, egalitarian focus – the protection of 
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stakeholders’ interests rather than having a focus on shareholder concerns (Tuschke & 
Sanders, 2003). The influential stakeholders groups are blockholders, employee and/or union 
representatives, and banks (Schmidt, 2003). 
In summary, the characteristics of German corporate governance is described as an 
insider control system based on stakeholder orientation whose functioning rests on internal, 
non-public information (Schmidt, 2003). 
 
A. 2. United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK corporate governance system prescribes a single board system comprising 
executive and non-executive directors who are normally elected and dismissed by the 
shareholders. While the function of day-to-day management falls in the responsibilities of 
executive directors, non-executive directors are responsible for monitoring the management 
(Jungmann, 2006). As stated in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), the duty of non-
executive directors is to “scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals 
and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance.” One of their functions is judgement 
on strategy, key appointments and standards of conducts. In contrast to German system, the 
distinction between the functions of executive and non-executive directors is not clearly 
straightforward (Jungmann, 2006). The Higgs review emphasises that the tasks of non-
executive directors are not limited only at monitoring, but they also should contribute to the 
strategy development. Managerial power in larger companies is devolved revocably to 
committees which contain directors below board level (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
Labour participation similar to German codetermination is not an issue in the United 
Kingdom’s corporate governance as it is not regulated in the company law. The company law 
in the United Kingdom has been largely unaffected by employee concerns since the Bullock 
Committee’s proposals on labour representation at the board level failed in the mid 1970s 
(Hopt & Leyens, 2004).   
Unlike German supervisory board which is restricted to post-decision approval, non-
executive directors can also take part in management decisions. Corporate governance in the 
United Kingdom relies more on the danger of removal by ordinary shareholder resolution (in 
particular as a consequence of a change of corporate control) than on enforcing managerial 
care by directors’ personal liability (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
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In addition, the company should appoint a senior independent director who should be 
one of the independent non-executive directors. Independence generally means that there are 
no relationships or circumstances that might affect the director’s judgement. The 
independence would be questioned in the situations such as: the director was a former 
employee of the company or group within the last five years; additional remuneration (apart 
from the director’s fee) was received from the company; the director had a material business 
relationship with the company in the last three years; the director represented a significant 
shareholder (Mallin, 2013). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) stipulates that the 
combination of executive and non-executive directors (in particular independent non-
executive directors) should be appropriate to ensure that the board’s decision taking cannot be 
dominated by individual or small group of individuals.  
There are essentially two dimensions of the non-executive director’s role (Mallin, 
2013), namely: 
- As a control or counterweight to executive directors, therefore helps to ensure that 
an individual person or group cannot unduly influence the board’s decision. 
- To contribute to the overall leadership and development of the company. 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) recommends the clear separation between 
chairman and chief executive, as stated in Section A.2.1 as follows: 
“The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same 
individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should 
be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board.” 
The responsibility for the running of the board is at the hand of the chairman whilst the 
responsibility for the running of the business is at the hand of chief executive (Mallin, 2013). 
  Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) argued that the British corporate governance system is 
characterised by relatively passive shareholders, boards of directors that are not always 
independent of managers, and active market for corporate controls. In terms of ownership 
structure, shares in most large firms are relatively widely held, such that the largest 
shareholder holds a modest stake in the company. The largest shareholders are increasingly 
institutions (institutional investors) which invest on behalf of individuals and hence play an 
influential role in the corporate environment. 
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 Institutional investors in the United Kingdom comprise mainly pension funds and 
insurance companies (Mallin, 2013). The UK financial authority pays a great attention to 
institutional investors. It can be seen in the publication of the “The UK Stewardship Code” in 
July 2010, which sets out good practice for institutional investors in engaging with invested 
companies. This code is complementary to the UK Corporate Governance Code for listed 
companies and, like that Code, should be applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. ‘Comply or 
explain’ means that the company are expected to comply with the provisions of the code, 
otherwise it can explain why it is unable to comply. 
 In implementing their influential role, institutional investors usually use tools of 
corporate governance (Mallin, 2013), namely: 
- One-to-one meetings, where a company will usually arrange to meet with its largest 
institutional investors on a one-to-one basis during the course of the year. The issues 
that are most discussed at these meetings are areas of the company’s strategy and 
how the company is planning to achieve its objectives, whether objectives are being 
met, the quality of the management, etc. 
- Voting, which the right to vote is a basic prerogative of share ownership, and is 
particularly important given the division of shareholders and directors in the modern 
corporation. The voting right may be implemented by institutional investors on all 
issues that may be raised at their invested company’s annual general meeting. 
- Shareholder proposal/resolutions, which a company in the United Kingdom has a 
duty to circulate it. It is also intended to be moved at an annual general meeting if a 
certain number of shareholders request it. 
- Focus lists, which are established by a number of institutional investors to target 
underperforming companies and include them on a list of companies that have 
underperformed a main index (e.g. Standard and Poor’s). 
 
In the United Kingdom, the general purpose of a company is to maintain or enhance 
long-term shareholder value. There are no provisions made either in the legal or the corporate 
governance systems for employee representation and also for representation of other 
stakeholder groups such as providers of finance (Mallin, 2013).  
A company in the United Kingdom is required by the Listing Rules to state in its 
annual report how it has applied the principles contained in the UK Corporate Governance 
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Code and as to whether it has complied with the provisions of the code (Hopt & Leyens, 
2004). 
 
A. 3. Indonesia 
The Indonesian corporate governance system is adopting a two-tiered board system 
which comprises the board of directors (Direksi) and the board of commissioners (Dewan 
Komisaris). Both the directors and the commissioners are elected, expelled and held 
responsible to shareholders through the annual general meeting. Therefore, both boards are 
under direct scrutiny from shareholders (Lukviarman, 2004). 
Board of directors is responsible collegially for the management of the company, 
whereas the board of commissioners is responsible collectively for overseeing and providing 
advices to the board of directors and ensuring that the company implements the good 
corporate governance. Board of commissioners is prohibited from participating in making any 
operational decisions. Its membership consists of the so-called ‘affiliated’ and ‘non-affiliated’ 
(or independent) commissioners. The commissioners are considered to be affiliated if they 
have business and family relations with controlling shareholders, the directors and other 
commissioners, and with the company itself (Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate 
Governance, 2006). In addition, there are no legal provisions which grant seats for employee 
representatives in the board of commissioners, and multi-membership in more than one board 
of the same company is prohibited (Lukviarman, 2004). 
According to Wulandari and Rahman (2004), board of commissioners of Indonesian 
companies has been facing many criticisms due to the absence of required competence and 
failure to maintain independence. Possibly these shortcomings occur because the members of 
the board are usually selected based on their share ownership, close relationship with major 
shareholders, or due to their previous position in the government bureaucracy. 
Wulandari and Rahman (2004) found in their survey on the top 100 listed companies in 
Indonesia that most of the companies’ shares (62.39% on average) are owned by institutional 
investors, while individual shareholders only own 30.92% of the shares. The corporate 
governance structure in Indonesia is characterised by the fact that the majority of companies 
are managed and owned principally by founding family members which in turn leads to little 
separation between ownership and control. In other words, the ownership structure of 
companies is highly concentrated and family-based, and most of the founding families are 
also involved in the boards (Lukviarman, 2004). This is supported by Claessens et al. (2000) 
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who found that 72% of public listed firms in Indonesia are controlled by families. Moreover, 
85% of controlling shareholders in Indonesia appointed their family members to the 
management or board of directors (Asian Development Bank, 2000). 
The concentrated ownership in the hands of family in Indonesia makes it difficult for 
hostile takeovers to occur. With regard to banks role, the influence of banks on the listed 
companies is not as strong as in Germany because banks are prohibited by law to hold shares 
in a company and therefore their representatives are absent in board of directors (Lukviarman, 
2004). 
Another main feature of Indonesian firms is the high reliance on bank loans as external 
sources of financing (Lukviarman, 2004). Wulandari and Rahman (2004) also argued that 
despite the Indonesian companies’ heavy reliance on debt financing from banks, banks in 
Indonesia do not have strong monitoring capacity. This happens because many banks in 
Indonesia are controlled by families who also control the companies which are financially 
supported by the banks. Therefore, it is argued that family control plays an important role in 
Indonesian corporate governance.  
Other typical features of Indonesian corporate governance are interlocking directorship 
and reciprocal ownership arrangement. Interlocking directorship is a situation where an 
individual holds a position as commissioner or decision maker in more than one company. 
This phenomenon occurs because there are no legal provisions in Indonesia which limit the 
directorship in different listed companies. Reciprocal ownership arrangement is the arranged 
share ownership so that a company owns the share of other companies who reciprocally also 
own the share of their owner. This phenomenon usually is the case for companies which are 
members of the same group (Wulandari & Rahman, 2004).  
Das (2000) argued that the principle of widely held ownership is generally never 
accepted by Asian corporations. The corporate governance structure in Indonesia is 
characterised by the fact that the majority of companies are managed and owned principally 
by founding family members which in turn leads to little separation between ownership and 
control. In other words, the ownership structure of companies is highly concentrated and 
family-based, and most of the founding families are also involved in the boards (Lukviarman, 
2004). As Asian Development Bank (2000) found, five largest shareholders of public listed 
companies in Indonesia own 68% of shares in average. Similarly, Carney and Gedajlovic 
(2002) claimed that public companies in Indonesia is dominantly owned by family who may 
utilises them as sources of personal and family wealth enhancement. 
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A. 4. Corporate Governance of Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia: A Brief  
    Comparison 
From the above description, it can be concluded that Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Indonesia are distinctive in their corporate governance. Germany is characterised as a country 
with substantial bank’s influence and employee participation. Corporate ownership in this 
country is concentrated with banks as large shareholders. Corporations in the United Kingdom 
are generally subject to the tight monitoring conducted by institutional shareholders who 
normally have large shareholding on them. Unlike their counterparts in Germany, corporate 
ownership in the United Kingdom is more dispersed and therefore the market for corporate 
control is more active. Meanwhile in Indonesia, high family corporate ownership is salient for 
most stock corporations. 
Stock markets in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia are also distinctive to 
each other. German stock market lacks hostile public takeover bids (Hackethal et al., 2005); 
while in the United Kingdom, the threat of being hostilely taken over is one of disciplining 
tools on management (Scharfstein, 1988). Such threat is also a rarity in Indonesian market due 
to the prominence of family corporate ownership.  
The main differences between the features of corporate governance in Germany, the 
The United Kingdom and Indonesia are summarised in the table below: 
Table 1 Summary of the main differences between the features of corporate governance in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia 
No. Corporate Governance 
Features 
Germany United 
Kingdom 
Indonesia 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership structure concentrated, 
with banks as 
large 
shareholders 
dispersed, with 
institutional 
shareholders 
(mainly pension 
funds and 
insurance) as 
large 
shareholders 
concentrated, 
with family as 
large 
shareholders 
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2. Board structure dual board with 
employee 
participation 
(codetermination) 
single board 
without 
employee 
participation  
dual board 
without 
employee 
participation 
3. Market for corporate control Weak Strong weak 
  
 B. Corporate Governance Variables 
 Corporate governance variables used in this research are ownership structure (consists 
of ownership concentration, directors’ ownership, and family ownership), shareholder 
protection, executive remuneration, codetermination (for firms in Germany), corporate 
leadership structure (for firms in the United Kingdom), and former executives serving as non-
executive directors. The selection of these variables is based on underlying theories (agency 
and institutional). Variables based on agency theory are ownership structure, executive 
remuneration, corporate leader structure and former executives serving as non-executive 
directors. Shareholder protection and codetermination are derived from institutional theory. 
      
B. 1.  Ownership Structure 
B. 1. 1. Ownership Concentration 
I decide to use ownership concentration as one of corporate governance variables in 
this dissertation due to the fact that there is a noticeable difference in terms of this variable in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. As Table 1 has shown, the share ownership in 
Germany and Indonesia is concentrated (with banks and family shareholders as most 
prominent shareholders respectively) while it is dispersed in the United Kingdom. The 
influence of different level of ownership concentration on firm performance in different 
countries is investigated in this dissertation.   
 In his explanation of the difference of ownership structures around the world, Berglöf 
(1988) postulates that a country’s financial system determines its ownership structure. 
Countries with bank-oriented financial system generally have more concentrated holdings of 
debt and equity, whereas the opposite is the case for countries with market-oriented financial 
system. Other scholars such as La Porta et al. (2002) argued that higher cash flow ownership 
is more needed in countries with poor shareholder protection as a commitment to limit 
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expropriation. In other words, the equilibrium ownership structure in a country is determined 
by its legal environment (La Porta et al., 2000). 
 Since the financial system in Germany is bank-oriented, it is unsurprising to learn the 
fact that equity ownership of firms in Germany is more concentrated than in the United 
Kingdom whose financial system is market-oriented and its equity ownership is widely 
dispersed. As a matter of fact, La Porta et al. (1999) reported that widely-dispersed ownership 
is common only for large firms in the richest common law countries such as the United States, 
whereas the firms in countries with poor shareholder protection usually have controlling 
shareholders (founding family (or its descendants) or state). 
 Corporations with dispersed ownership are common in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and in Japan, while corporate ownership in Western Europe and the rest of Asia is 
generally concentrated (Andres, 2008). As La Porta et al. (1998) documented by measuring 
the sum of ownership of three largest shareholders, average corporate ownership in Germany 
is 48%. Similarly, average corporate ownership in Indonesia is 58%. The United Kingdom 
has the lowest level of ownership concentration (in comparison with Germany and Indonesia) 
with 19%.  
Corporate ownership in East Asia is highly concentrated in the hands of large 
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002), and this is also the case for Indonesia as found by 
Claessens et al. (2000) where the dominant form of ownership is family ownership (Driffield 
et al., 2007). Claessens et al. (2000) also found that in Indonesia, control is enhanced through 
pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. Moreover, due to such typical ownership 
structure, numerous controlling owners possess more control than their actual equity 
ownership (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
 
  B. 1. 2. Directors’ Ownership 
Directors in Germany and Indonesia are placed into two separate boards: management 
and supervisory. On the other hand, corporations in the United Kingdom have a unitary board 
structure where all directors (executive and non-executive) are placed into one board. Due to 
this difference, I decide to use directors’ share ownership as one of corporate governance 
variables in this dissertation and therefore it is expected that the ownership’s influence on 
firm performance can be known.   
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Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that firms with greater uncertainty will have greater 
directors’ ownership. This uncertainty includes instability of prices, technology, market 
shares, and so forth. Himmelberg et al. (1999) found that managerial ownership is explained 
by main variables in the contracting environment, namely firm size, scope for discretionary 
spending, managerial risk aversion (i.e. observable firm characteristics). These variables 
influence managerial ownership in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent 
models. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) also argued that in order to become the optimal incentive 
arrangement for the firm, the levels of directors’ ownership should be adjusted with the scope 
for perquisite consumption. Meanwhile, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that directors’ 
ownership is determined by the firm riskiness (measured by stock price volatility). 
 
B. 1. 3. Family Ownership 
Family share ownership is dominant in Germany and Indonesia and less so in the 
United Kingdom. The difference in the dominance of family shareholding makes it interesting 
to see how the family share ownership influences firm performance in those three countries. 
Anderson et al. (2003) posit that founding families “represent a special class of large 
shareholders that potentially have unique incentive structures, a strong voice in the firm, and 
powerful motives to manage one particular firm.” In addition, Anderson et al. also argued that 
two respects distinguish founding families with other shareholders: the family’s interest in the 
firm’s long-term survival and its concern for the firm’s (family’s) reputation. 
Publicly traded firms across the globe commonly are controlled by family 
shareholders (Burkart et al, 2002). Anderson and Reeb (2003a) found that one third of 
Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 firms are owned by families and family ownership accounts for 
18 percent of outstanding equity. Such controlling families often hold large equity stakes and 
are represented in the corporate board (Maury, 2006). Turnover and recruitment costs in 
family firms are lowered because trust and loyalty are fostered by the working environment 
(Ward, 1988). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003b) posited that founding families have strong incentives to 
minimise firm risk due to the undiversified nature of their holdings and their desire for firm 
survival. Firm risk can be reduced by founding families in two ways. First, firm’s investment 
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decisions may be influenced by families through pursuing projects with imperfectly correlated 
cash flows relative to existing projects (corporate diversification). Second, capital forms that 
bear low probabilities of default may be chosen by families (more use of equity financing or 
less use of leverage in the firm’s capital structure). However, these strategies can impose costs 
on diversified and minority shareholders. 
Family ownership also has potential drawbacks. Fama and Jensen (1985) claimed that 
since the interests of the family are not necessarily in line with those of other shareholders, the 
combination of management and control in the hand of family might lead to sub-optimal 
investment decisions. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that families may pursue 
nonpecuniary private benefits of control. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the family 
executives might remain active in the firm although they are no longer competent 
(entrenchment effect). 
Andres (2008) found that families might be different with other types of large 
shareholders when they serve as board members. Through serving as board members, families 
possibly have a deeper relationship with the firm they own-manage or might even feel 
responsible for other shareholders. 
 Furthermore, it is possible that family shareholders own shares of a firm indirectly. 
Indirect ownership means a shareholder hold the shares through entities that he or she controls 
(Laeven & Levine, 2008). Sacristan-Navarro and Gomez-Anson (2007) argued that indirect 
ownership occurs when the significant shareholders hold the shares through an intermediate 
firm. Thus, family shareholders are considered to have an indirect ownership stake at a firm if 
they hold shares of another firm who is a corporate shareholder of the aforementioned firm. 
    
B. 2. Shareholder Protection 
 La Porta et al. (2000) asserted that the myriad sources of rules protecting shareholders 
include company, security, bankruptcy, takeover, and competition laws, as well as stock 
exchange regulations and accounting standards. In many countries, shareholder protection 
becomes crucial due to its importance in dealing with expropriation of minority shareholders 
and creditors by the controlling shareholders. In addition, a good legal protection on 
shareholders also discourages corporate insiders (managers and controlling shareholders) to 
expropriate minority shareholders since expropriation technology becomes less efficient.  
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La Porta et al. (2000) also believe that the strength of shareholder protection of a 
country is closely related to its legal structure and laws origin. In general, two legal systems 
are used by countries across the globe, namely common law and civil law. Common law 
system is used by England and its former colonies, while Continental European countries 
generally use civil law (French and German civil law). Apart from common law and civil law, 
Scandinavian countries have their own legal system. Common law countries are the best at 
protecting outside investors, while French civil law countries are the worst at this particular 
area. Due to the difference of shareholder protection level between Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia, it is interesting to see how influential shareholder protection is on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
One might question as to why common law better protects investors than civil law 
does. According to La Porta et al. (2000), this occurs because the vague fiduciary duty 
principles of common law are more protective of investors than the straightforward line rules 
of the civil law. Corporate insiders in civil law countries can often circumvent such rules, thus 
making investors not well protected from their adverse actions. In addition, the low level of 
investor protection in civil law countries (compared to common law countries) may be one 
manifestation of more interventionist government, particularly in French civil law countries. 
Klapper and Love (2004) found that the average firm-level governance is lower in 
countries which have weaker legal systems, reflecting a positive relationship between the 
quality of a country’s corporate governance and its legal environment. Hence, the importance 
of recommending firms to adopt good governance practices is greater in countries that have 
weak legal systems. 
 
B. 3. Executive Remuneration 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argued that the remuneration contracts awarded to 
management are endogenously determined by the contracting environments which are 
different across firms. According to agency theory, remuneration policy is designed in ways 
that give manager incentives to select and execute actions that facilitate the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Executive remuneration can be a powerful tool 
to reduce the agency conflicts between managers and the firm, while at the same time it also 
can be a substantial source of agency costs if it is not managed properly (Jensen & Murphy, 
2004). 
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According to Bruce et al. (2005), there are three perspectives on executive 
remuneration: principal-agent theory, executive power theory, and stakeholder theory. 
According to principal-agent theory, executive pay arrangements are crafted by shareholders 
that cause a top management team motivated by self-interest to maximise shareholder value. 
Meanwhile in self-serving executive model (also known as ‘executive power theory’ or ‘rent 
extraction theory’), the executive pay arrangements are heavily influenced by socially-derived 
executive power, deliberately designed to secure rent for an executive board member at the 
expense of other corporate stakeholders’ (e.g. customers, suppliers, employees, etc.). Other 
perspective, stakeholder theory which shares a same view with stewardship theory, believes 
that senior managers suspend their own immediate self-interest and therefore their 
remuneration arrangements rely on the relation between firms and stakeholders. 
Bruce et al. (2005) argued that the applicability of each of the above mentioned 
perspectives is determined by the background and formal national institutions. Similarly, 
Filatotchev and Allcock (2010) maintained that differences in organisational contexts and 
their environment cause patterned variation in corporate governance which should be captured 
by corporate governance aspects of executive compensation outlined by the agency and 
stakeholder perspectives. 
In order to control the conflicts of interest that exist in relation to executive 
remuneration, there are at least three basic techniques employed by corporate law (Hill & 
Yablon, 2002), namely: 
1. Self-constraint (with judicial enforcement) via fiduciary duties 
2. Eliminating or controlling conflicts of interest through corporate governance 
techniques, such as the use of independent directors, remuneration committees and 
greater control by shareholders 
3. Accepting the existence of managerial self-interest, but at the same time trying to 
align that self-interest with shareholder interests.  
 
Due to the difference of board structure in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Indonesia, it is interesting to see how executive remuneration influences firm performance 
when executive directors are separated from non-executive directors (in Germany and 
Indonesia) and when they are put into one board (in the United Kingdom). Therefore, I decide 
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to include executive remuneration as one of corporate governance variables in this 
dissertation.   
 
B. 4. Codetermination 
In a strict sense, Furubotn (1988) defined codetermination “as an organizational mode 
that ensures labor of legally sanctioned control rights in the firm.” He also argued that such 
sharing of control rights provides at least some assurance to the members of coalition of 
workers-stockholders that all interests will be considered in decision-making and it will 
prevent unfair allocations of quasi rents. Benelli et al. (1987) defined codetermination as “the 
legislated requirement to seat voting employee representatives on corporate policy-making 
boards and is unrelated to profit-sharing schemes or employee stock ownership plans.” Under 
the German codetermination law, employees are legally allocated control rights (depending 
on the number of staff) over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board, but they 
have no cash flow rights (Gorton & Schmid, 2004). In codetermined firms, ultimate corporate 
power is in the hand of supervisory board. The sharing of this power with labour and union 
representatives represents a radical break with neoclassical model of firm which views 
shareholder value maximisation as the (only) goal of the firm (FitzRoy & Kraft, 2004). 
FitzRoy and Kraft (2004) argued that at least there are two theories concern 
codetermination, namely property rights theory and participation theory. The property rights 
theorists claim that codetermination causes the reduction of innovativeness of an organization 
and may well tend to maintain the status quo in order to avoid any conflict. Conversely, the 
participation theorists believe that codetermination enables the use of information from 
employees and will lead to a more cooperative solution and reduces (if does not solve) the 
conflict between capital owners and workers. As a result, the firm will be more productive 
and successful on the market. Due to the positive and negative view on codetermination, it is 
interesting to see how codetermination affects the firm performance in Germany. Therefore, 
codetermination is included as one of corporate governance variables in this dissertation. 
An interesting viewpoint is made by Furubotn (1988) about two types of 
codetermination: mandatory and voluntary. He claimed that the voluntary codetermined firm 
shows clear superiority over a legally mandated codetermined of the European type. The 
voluntary variant tends to promote productivity-enhancing incentives, relatively lower 
transaction costs, and a more rational allocation of risk. However, there are only a few 
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examples of voluntarily codetermined firms. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is 
that workers prefer the use of political power to freely negotiated contracts in order to have 
best chance for gain.     
Gorton and Schmid (2004) argued that codetermination helps employees in protecting 
their interests against potential opportunistic behavior of shareholders. Furthermore, through 
codetermination, employees may want to use the firm as an intertemporal insurance vehicle, 
resisting restructuring, layoffs, and wage reductions. Codetermination also protects them 
against idiosyncratic or business cycle shocks. 
According to Hansmann (1990), the real value of codetermination does not lie in 
control of the corporation at the board level. Instead, it apparently lies in the access the 
codetermination gives workers to accurate and credible information about the firm. To sum 
up, the workers are primarily benefited from the codetermination solely through some 
informational seats on the board of directors. 
 Von Rosen (2007) believed that the interaction between management board and 
supervisory board is profoundly affected by employee participation in decisions and such 
participation thus also affects a central element of corporate governance. Parity 
codetermination (representatives of shareholders and employees are equal in numbers) is 
applied in majority of large-scale companies (paritätische Mitbestimmung). 
 Von Rosen (2007) also argued that although there is an impression of harmonious and 
conflict-free cooperation in the supervisory board of codetermined firms, the clash between 
company’s and employees’ interests still may occur, for instance when the company’s interest 
calls for shifting production abroad. In addition, employee representatives in the supervisory 
board are required to have high professional qualifications and extensive international 
experience in accordance with the German Corporate Governance Code.  
In addition to the above mentioned issues, Von Rosen (2007) believed that some 
further relevant issues related with codetermination are the presence of company-external 
supervisory board members who are often appointed by the trade union; the large size of 
supervisory board (compared with supervisory boards of other countries); and the situation 
where the employee representatives only speak or act in the interests of the employees of a 
company. Members of supervisory board appointed by the trade union might face problems 
when conflicts of interest between the trade union and the company (e.g. strike) occur. The 
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large size of supervisory board can hamper high quality discussions in the board and 
confidentiality is hard to ensure. 
  
B. 5. Corporate Leadership Structure 
In general, there are two theories that concern the nature of corporate leadership 
structure, namely agency theory and stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
According to agency theory, the impartial monitoring by board of directors on managerial 
actions will occur more fully where the board chairperson is independent of executive 
management (i.e does not hold the chief executive role). When the board chairperson also acts 
as chief executive, managerial opportunism and agency loss will occur. On the other hand, 
stewardship theory promotes the fusion of the incumbency of the roles of chair and chief 
executive as it will bring the benefits of unity of direction and strong command and control 
which will enhance effectiveness and produce superior returns to shareholders as a result. 
According to the proponents of each of two leadership structures, CEO-chair 
separation is perceived as ensuring effective monitoring, while CEO-chair duality ensures 
strong leadership (Daily & Dalton, 1997). In more detailed explanation, Dahya et al. (1996) 
summarised the arguments for CEO-chair separation and CEO-chair duality as follows: 
 
Table 2: Summary of arguments for CEO-chair separation and CEO-chair duality 
No. CEO-chair separation CEO-chair duality 
1. Ensures balance to the board and check 
to the CEO 
Checks and balances may be supplied by 
introducing more non-executive directors to 
the board 
2. Entrenchment is occurred when a 
person holds both CEO and chair 
positions 
If the CEO has outstanding strategic vision, 
it is believed that he will shape the destinies 
of the firm with a minimum of board 
interference  
3. The absence of important check on 
CEO’s actions could place the company 
at risk 
The majority of largest US companies 
prefers CEO-chair duality, indicating no 
significant disadvantage in operational 
performance or in share performance 
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4. Independent chairman may provide a 
valuable ‘outside’ perspective 
Rationalisation of decision-making process 
5. US companies with independent 
chairman is empirically proven to enjoy 
a significant enhancement on 
profitability 
Empirical evidence on the effect of CEO-
chair separation/duality is mixed  
 
Motivated by the arguments which encourage CEO-chairman separation and duality, I 
decide to use CEO-chairman separation as one of corporate governance variables to see how 
it affects firm performance in the United Kingdom. Therefore it is expected to be known, 
which of those theories -agency or stewardship- is supported by this dissertation in terms of 
corporate leadership structure. 
 
B. 6. Former Executives Serving as Non-Executives Directors 
Non-executive directors (in the United Kingdom), supervisory board members (in 
Germany) and commissioners (in Indonesia) are tasked to monitor the executive directors in 
day-to-day management and to ensure that due diligence is observed by them. In order to 
successfully undertake these tasks, a non-executive director is required to be independent and 
simultaneously to have expertise and experience on the corporate matters. 
Oehmichen et al. (2014) suggested that public and regulatory bodies’ attention is 
increasingly focused on the potential conflicts of interest that might arise from a former 
executive director when he or she continues his or her service within the firm in a different 
role. In Germany, the German Stock Corporation Act prohibits the immediate transition (less 
than two years) of management board members to the supervisory board, unless at least 75% 
of shareholders support the appointment of former management board members to the 
supervisory board. Von Rosen (2007) argued that it is a tradition in Germany that members of 
management board become members of supervisory board following their retirement so that 
the company could further make use of their specialist expertise and professional experiences. 
Meanwhile in Indonesia, Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance (2006) 
recommends firms to have sufficient number of independent commissioners. Former affiliated 
(having business and family relations with controlling shareholders, directors, commissioners, 
and with the firm itself) directors and former employees are not (after a certain period of time) 
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considered as independent. Similarly in the United Kingdom, the independence of non-
executive directors might be questioned if he or she has served on the board for more than 
nine years after the date they were elected to the board (UK Code of Corporate Governance, 
2014).          
In the German Corporate Governance Code (2015), it is stipulated that “not more than 
two former members of the Management Board shall be members of the Supervisory Board.” 
Meanwhile the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) does not limit the amount of non-
executive directors who were executives in the same company in the past, but it states that 
“The  board  should  identify  in  the  annual  report  each  non-executive  director  it considers  
to be independent.”  On the other hand, the Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance 
(2006) is somewhat lenient towards the presence of former executives serving as non-
executive directors. It neither limits the amount of such non-executive directors nor stipulates 
a disclosure of their (perceived) independence. Non-executive directors in Indonesia are 
termed “commissioners” and have their seat in Board of Commissioners. 
Given the differing scholarly opinions on whether the presence of former executives as 
non-executive directors brings advantages to a firm, it is interested to see the effect of it on 
firm performance. Therefore I include it as one of corporate governance variables in this 
dissertation.  
 
C. Link between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 Scholars have been investigating since many years whether there is a link between 
corporate governance and firm performance with mixed results. For instance, Nesbitt (1994) 
found that long-term stock price returns are positively correlated to corporate governance for 
CalPERS’ (California Public Employees’ Retirement System) targeted firms. Brown and 
Caylor (2004) argued that better-governed firms are relatively more profitable, more valuable, 
and their shareholders enjoy more cash paid the firms. Padgett and Shabbir (2005) implied 
that the firms which are more compliant to the 2003 Combined Code in the United Kingdom 
earned more return than those who are not. 
 In the context of the United States, Brown and Caylor (2009) found that the 
governance provisions recently mandated by the US stock exchanges are closely related to 
firm operating performance. Meanwhile in transitional economies, Zheka (2006) found strong 
evidence that corporate governance predicts firm performance. 
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 The above mentioned scholars argued that corporate governance is positively related 
with firm performance. In addition, they also found that firms who practice good governance 
outperformed those who do not. Based on these findings, there is a strong reason for 
companies to adopt good practices of corporate governance as recommended by the national 
authorities or institutional shareholders. 
 On the contrary, Weir and Laing (2001) concluded from their research that compliance 
to corporate governance code will not automatically make firms outperform their non-
compliant counterparts. Bauer et al. (2004) found that governance standards are negatively 
related with net-profit-margin and return of equity. In addition, Jog and Dutta (2004) argued 
that good governance seems to have insignificant relation with firm performance. The 
findings which showed negative or insignificant relation between corporate governance and 
firm performance undermine the importance of corporate governance in improving firm 
performance albeit it is important for firm survival and to safeguard the interests of 
shareholders. 
 In the context of emerging markets, the researches on corporate governance-firm 
performance relation also have split results. Klapper and Love (2004) found that good 
governance is positively correlated with firm’s market valuation and operating performance in 
emerging markets. They also suggested that such relationship is stronger in countries with 
weaker legal systems. Wahab et al. (2007) argued that firms which implement 
recommendations of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance enjoy an average increase of 
stock price of about 4.8%. Toudas and Karathanassis (2007) reported that Tobin’s Q of 
democratic companies is higher than that in semi-democratic and dictatorial companies in 
Greece. Contrarily, Alves and Mendes (2004) concluded that the code of best practices 
recommended by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission globally does not have a 
systematic effect on firm returns in Portugal.      
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CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to agency theory, common stock ownership by managers (insider 
ownership) may reduce agency costs because it better aligns their interests with those of 
stockholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) found that director 
ownership appears to slightly reduce the agency conflict between management and 
shareholders in Japan. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argued that increasing the fraction of 
shares owned by corporate insiders will cause the increase in firm value. 
The issue of directors’ ownership draws a particular attention from scholars who argue 
that it affects firm performance. Some scholars argue that directors’ incentive to improve firm 
performance will increase linearly with the amount of their shareholding. In other words, the 
more shares they hold, the more efforts will they put in making the firm more profitable. 
Farrer and Ramsay (1998) argued that there are minimum share ownership requirements for 
directors in some companies in Australia, suggesting that it is also important for non-
executive directors to have incentives to maximise firm performance. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), directors’ shareholding can reduce agency costs because these costs 
would be zero if the owner is also the manager of a company. Corporate value maximisation 
will be achieved if corporate insiders have a large portion of shares in the companies they are 
working for. In other words, directors are motivated to maximise firm value when they 
directly bear financial consequences caused by their decisions (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). 
In similar vein, Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that the removal of managerial ownership 
incurs greater transaction costs, hence managerial ownership is deemed to potentially reduce 
agency conflicts.   
A fundamental reason of the importance of directors’ shareholding, as argued by Core 
et al. (2003), is the firm’s desire to directly link changes in executive wealth to changes in 
stock price. Hence it is expected that this will provide incentives to executives in shareholder 
wealth maximisation. 
On the other hand, Farrer and Ramsay (1998) also argued that when the directors’ 
shareholding becomes excessive and at the same time they do not diversify their wealth, the 
interests of directors may not be aligned with those of outside shareholders because the 
directors become more risk-averse. In addition, with immense voting power derived from 
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excessive shareholding and the minimal market monitoring caused by the reluctance of 
market to take over the companies that dominantly owned by directors, the directors become 
effectively entrenched (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This view is also shared by Sundaramurthy et 
al. (2005) who argued that entrenchment effect appears when directors’ ownership reaches 
certain level and such effect negatively impacts firm performance. This negative impact is the 
manifestation of more complete control obtained by the executives. Therefore, according to 
this argument, the maximisation of firm performance is achieved by relatively low directors’ 
shareholdings (Farrer & Ramsay, 1998). 
There are two notions that support entrenchment effects. First, as argued by Beatty and 
Zajac (1994), the increased ownership of directors will lead to risk-reducing behaviour that is 
undesired by stockholders. Second, high directors’ ownership can gives executives control 
over the length of their tenure (Fredrickson et al., 1988), compensation (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1994) and directors’ selection (Whidbee, 1997).  
The increased directors’ ownership also can reduce the probability of takeover bidding 
and increases the resistance of management towards takeover (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
addition to creating entrenchment effect, Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) are convinced that 
high level of directors’ ownership induces directors to take anti-takeover measures or reject 
share acquisitions so that their positions are secure. This circumstance in turn decreases firm 
value. 
Both arguments which are for and against directors’ ownership are supported by 
empirical works. For instance, Mehran (1995) found that firm performance is positively 
related to managerial equity holding and also to the percentage of equity in managerial 
compensation. Contrarily, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argued that directors’ ownership might 
make managers entrench themselves in company they manage. There are also studies that 
support both arguments: directors’ ownership reduces agency cost and hence improves firm 
performance when the ownership level is relatively low and then it begins to entrench the 
managers and hence decreases firm performance when the level exceeds certain point (e.g 
Morck et al. (1988), Schooley & Barney Jr. (1994)). There is also a view that tries to reconcile 
both arguments as argued by Denis and McConnell (2003). They believe that the ultimate 
effect of managerial ownership on firm value is dependent on the tradeoff between the 
alignment of interests (of shareholders and management) and entrenchment effects. 
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Han and Suk (1998) found that stock returns increase along with insider ownership. 
Their finding suggests that management’s interests coincide more closely with those of 
shareholders. However, they warn against excessive insider ownership since it rather hurts 
firm performance due to possible managerial entrenchment. In line with Han and Suk’s 
(1998) finding, Farrer and Ramsay (1998) argued that directors of Australian companies who 
have excessive insider shareholdings and are not diversified may adopt an overly conservative 
approach which suppresses shareholder returns. In addition, high director shareholdings also 
may cause entrenchment on directors accompanied with immense voting power and minimal 
market monitoring. Fama and Jensen (1983) posited that managerial entrenchment and wealth 
expropriation of minority shareholders will occur when managerial ownership exceeds a 
certain level. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) found that the relationship between insider ownership 
and corporate value (measured with Tobin’s q) is curvilinear. Insider ownership positively 
influences corporate value until the ownership level reaches approximately 40% to 50%, and 
beyond this level the influence turns into negative. Similarly, Chen et al. (1993) and Morck et 
al. (1988) found that the relation between management ownership and corporate value is 
nonmonotonic. A research by Short and Keasey (1999) also concluded a nonlinear 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership in the United Kingdom. On 
the contrary, Himmelberg et al. (1999) could not econometrically conclude that changes in 
managerial ownership influence firm performance.  
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that stock ownership of board members is 
significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating 
performance. Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) found that insider ownership has a positive 
impact on corporate performance for German firms. 
Based on the literature mentioned above, it appears that the majority of scholars agree 
that share ownership by a firm’s directors improves firm performance as long as the 
ownership level is not excessive. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: Directors ownership influences firm performance in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia in an inverted U-shaped relationship. Initially, directors ownership 
positively influences firm performance, but then the former negatively influences the latter. 
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Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that economic incentives to monitor managers and 
decrease agency costs are stronger in concentrated shareholders. According to Klein et al. 
(2005), agency theory suggests that more effective monitoring is achieved through 
concentrated ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) claimed that ownership concentration is 
positively correlated to the degree to which benefits and costs are borne by the same owner. 
Ownership concentration has both benefits and costs. Gul et al. (2010) argued that due 
to entrenchment effect, controlling shareholders have an incentive to cover up their self-
serving behaviours or to limit the leakage of related information. Consequently, the 
informativeness of stock prices of firms become reduced and the stock prices become more 
synchronous. 
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) believed that the alignment of interests 
between controlling and minority shareholders can be achieved through ownership 
concentration. Contrarily to Gul et al. (2010), Gomes (2000) argued that controlling 
shareholders may be encouraged by ownership concentration to voluntarily disclose more and 
better firm-specific information for the benefit of minority shareholders. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), concentrated shareholdings raise firm value. 
Ownership concentration may reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and is 
therefore positively related to performance. Large and concentrated investors have substantial 
economic incentives, influence and power to maximise firm performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003a). Claessens and Djankov (1999) found that more concentrated ownership is 
associated with higher profitability for Czech firms. Xu and Wang (1999) found that 
ownership concentration is positively and significantly correlated with profitability for 
Chinese public companies. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) found that ownership concentration 
positively affects shareholder value (measured with market-to-book value of equity) and 
profitability (measured with asset returns) for the largest European companies. Zeckhauser 
and Pound (1990) found that the presence of large shareholders significantly improves 
corporate performance. According to Claessens et al. (2000), firm value increases with the 
cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder in East Asian countries. In the context of 
Korean economy, firms with low ownership concentration show low firm profitability (Joh, 
2003). Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) argued that the beneficial effects of concentrated 
ownership for most types of largest shareholder (greater management monitoring and reduced 
incentives to exploit minority shareholders) are at least in balance with and sometimes 
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outweigh the harmful effect (greater private benefits of control). These findings support 
agency theory which suggests that agency cost is lower when ownership is concentrated. 
On the contrary, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) found that ownership concentration 
has a negative impact on profitability on German firms as measured by the return on total 
assets. Prowse (1992) found that ownership concentration and profitability are unrelated in 
both firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu) and independent firms in Japan. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no significant relationship between ownership concentration 
and accounting profit rates. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no statistically significant 
relation between ownership structure and firm performance. Thomsen (2005) found a 
negative association between blockholder ownership and firm value in Continental Europe 
and that blockholder ownership decreases are associated with increases in the stock market 
value of firms. Cho (1998) found that ownership structure does not affect corporate value. 
Earle et al. (2005) found that the effects of total blockholdings on profitability and efficiency 
are small and statistically insignificant in firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. Leech 
and Leahy (1991) concluded that greater ownership dispersion implies a higher value, profit 
margin and growth rate of net assets for large British companies. 
On the other hand, acknowledging the positive and negative impact of concentrated 
ownership on firm value, Denis and McConnell (2003) argued that the ultimate effect of 
blockholder ownership on measured firm value is dependent on the tradeoff between two 
things; namely the shared benefits of blockholder control and any private extraction of firm 
value by blockholders. Claessens et al. (2001) found that block ownership by corporations is 
negatively related to firm performance, while the positive relationship occurred on firms 
predominantly owned by the government in nine East Asian countries. In addition, ownership 
by institutional shareholders has no relation with firm performance.   
The inconsistent results in investigating the influence of ownership concentration on 
firm performance may be an indication that the effect of ownership concentration depends on 
the type of performance measure. Tobin’s q was used by Anderson and Reeb (2003a), 
profitability was used by Claessens and Djankov (1999), while Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
used E/P ratio. Meanwhile, Thomsen (2005) used net sales, Prowse (1992) used average net 
income to book value ratio, and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used market rate of return and 
value and net income to book value as performance measure. 
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La Porta et al. (2002) found that firms in countries with better protection of minority 
shareholders enjoy higher valuation. After investigating the ownership concentration in Asia, 
Heugens et al. (2009) concluded that ownership concentration can positively affect corporate 
performance in countries lacking legal protection of shareholders. However, this positive 
relationship does not appear in countries where legal protection is well-developed, where 
shareholders can rely on mostly external corporate governance mechanisms to protect their 
investments and assure a reasonable return on investments. Germany is regarded to be 
relatively weaker in protecting shareholders compared to common law countries, i.e. England 
and its former colonies (La Porta et al., 2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003). According to La 
Porta et al. (1998), Indonesia is included in one of French civil law countries, and this 
particular legal system is regarded to have the weakest protection of shareholders. In similar 
vein, La Porta et al. (2000) regarded Indonesia along with Korea, Taiwan and Thailand as 
countries with low legal investor protection. 
Based on the above mentioned literature, it appears that the effect of ownership 
concentration depends on the strength of legal protection of shareholders in a country. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of shareholder protection negatively influences the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Indonesia.  
Hypothesis 3: Ownership concentration positively influences firm performance in Germany 
and Indonesia. 
Hypothesis 4: Ownership concentration does not significantly influence firm performance in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
Mehran (1995) argued that compensation affects CEO incentives to improve corporate 
efficiency. Murphy (1985) found that executive compensation is strongly positively related to 
firm performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) also found a similar result, but the relationship is not significant. Carpenter 
and Sanders (2002) claimed that top management team pay predicts future firm performance. 
According to Cosh and Hughes (1997), executive pay is positively related to profitability, 
share returns and also to size.  Thus, 
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Hypothesis 5: Executive remuneration positively influences firm performance in Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
    
Jensen and Meckling (1979) argued that the fact that stockholders must be forced by 
law to accept codetermination is the best evidence that they are adversely affected by it. They 
also believe that given a choice, potential investors will not voluntarily invest in codetermined 
firms, strongly suggesting that codetermination is less efficient than other alternatives. 
However, although codetermination might not be in the shareholders’ interest, it might be 
socially efficient (Freeman & Lazear, 1994). In similar vein with Freeman and Lazear (1994), 
Smith (1991) argued that codetermination offers advantages for technical efficiency, skill 
development and knowledge generation. According to Kraft (2001), codetermination has 
many unfortunate aspects particularly in relation to investment and finance. Alchian (1984) 
viewed codetermination as synonymous to wealth confiscation.  
Gorton and Schmid (2002) found that firms with equal representation on the 
supervisory board have a significant 26 percent decline in the market-to-book ratio, compared 
to firms with one-third representation. It is assumed that this happened because employees 
concern more on maximising employee utility rather than shareholder value. Benelli et al. 
(1987) found that codetermination does not significantly affect corporate operations and 
performance. It is assumed that this happened because employees cannot agree on wealth 
maximisation since their financial claim on the firm is not tradable. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) 
found the increase of the number of employees representatives in supervisory board to be 
associated with 10 to 20% decline in shareholder value. Petry (2009) found that the initiation 
of codetermination in firms is associated with negative wealth effects of shareholders. In 
terms of abnormal returns, Petry (2009) also found that only the initiation of codetermination 
brought large negative wealth effects. A further increase of the number of employees’ 
representatives in supervisory board does not add significant negative abnormal returns once 
the employees’ representatives are on the board.   
On the contrary, Gurdon and Rai (1990) found that West German firms with near-
parity codetermination are statistically more profitable compared to those with one third and 
no codetermination. Similarly, Renaud (2007) found that switching from one-third to parity 
codetermination seems to increase both productivity and profits. Fauver and Fuerst (2006) 
found that prudent levels of employee representation on corporate boards can increase firm 
efficiency and market value, with the optimal representation likely to be below 50%. Cable 
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and FitzRoy (1980) argued that workplace and or board participation enhances productivity. 
Similarly, FitzRoy and Kraft (2004) found positive productivity effects in large firms which 
apply 1976 extension to parity codetermination. On the other hand, Wagner (2009) found 
neither positive nor negative relationship between one-third codetermination and two core 
performance indicators, namely productivity and profitability in limited-liability companies 
from West German manufacturing industries. A mixed finding on codetermination also exists, 
such as Freeman and Lazear (1994) who found that the firm’s total revenues would increase 
with codetermination, but it would shrink the owners’ share.  
Despite the good performance displayed by codetermined firms as showed in some 
empirical works, we can hardly be sure that it is codetermination which actually causes the 
good performance. As Kraft (2001) put it, the higher profits of the codetermined firms are a 
result of their tendency to being larger than their competitors.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 6: Codetermination negatively influences firm performance in Germany. 
 
Bai et al. (2004) found that CEO-chair duality (CEO and chairman is held by the same 
individual) has negative effects on market valuation. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that 
companies with CEO-chair duality seemed not to perform as well as their counterparts with 
separate board leadership in Malaysian market. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that CEO-
chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and 
subsequent operating performance. 
On the contrary, Weir and Laing (2001) found no clear relationship between CEO-
chair separation and corporate performance on British firms. Brickley et al. (1997) found no 
evidence that CEO-chair duality is associated with inferior accounting and market returns. In 
similar vein, no consistent link between board composition as well as leadership structure and 
firm financial performance was found in a study conducted by Dalton et al. (1998). Baliga et 
al. (1996) argued that the market is indifferent to changes in firm’s CEO-chair duality status 
and there is little evidence that changes in the status cause operating performance changes. In 
the context of developing countries like India, it is found that CEO duality is unrelated to any 
firm performance measure (Arora & Sharma, 2016).  
Donaldson and Davis (1991) made a good comparison between agency theory and 
stewardship theory with regards to dual leadership effect on firm performance. Agency theory 
views the superiority of shareholder return observed among firms with dual leadership role is 
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due to the spurious effects of financial incentives. Contrarily, stewardship theory believes that 
such superiority is not due to the spurious effects of financial incentives. 
 Based on the above mentioned literature, scholars are split on the issue of the 
influence of CEO-chair separation on firm performance. However, as argued by Brickley et 
al. (1997), CEO-chair duality is proven to be efficient for large firms. Thus, 
Hypothesis 7: Firm size negatively influences the relationship between CEO-chair separation 
and firm performance in the United Kingdom.  
Hypothesis 8: CEO-chair separation positively influences the performance of small firms in 
the United Kingdom 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that agency costs should be reduced if the residual 
claimants and the decision agents are the same. Therefore, it is assumed that agency costs are 
minimum in family-controlled companies. Andres (2008) argued that the incentive to monitor 
managers and decrease agency costs should be particularly strong in the case of founding-
family ownership since families usually have invested most of their private wealth in the 
company and are not well-diversified. Maury (2006) found that active and passive family 
control is associated with higher firm valuations for Western European corporations. Martinez 
et al. (2007) found that family-controlled public firms performed significantly better than 
nonfamily public firms in Chile. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) found that family firms perform 
significantly better than nonfamily firms (measured with return on assets and Tobin’s q). 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) found that family-owned and –managed firms exhibit 
performance advantages resulted from the unification of ownership and control.  
On the contrary, Villalonga and Amit (2006) argued that family control in excess of 
ownership reduces shareholder value. When the founder serves as the CEO of family firm or 
as its chairman with a nonfamily CEO, value is added. But when descendants serve as 
chairman or CEO, value is destroyed. Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) found that the high 
concentration of public companies ownership in the hands of family may lead the family to 
control and manage the companies as sources of personal and family wealth enhancement. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) found that firm performance begins to decline when the family 
ownership level is beyond one-third. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) explained why some 
family firms perform well and some others perform badly. Family firms perform well when 
voting control requires significant family ownership, when there is a strong family CEO 
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without complete voting control and accountable to independent directors, when multiple 
family members serve as managers, and when the family intends to keep the business for 
generations. Conversely, family firms perform badly when the concentration or dispersion of 
ownership or control is too high, when control is exercised without much ownership, and 
when too many family members clash or drain resources.  
Based on the above mentioned literature, it appears that scholars are split on the issue 
of influence of family ownership on firm performance. Taking into account the finding of 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Anderson and Reeb (2003a), thus 
Hypothesis 9: Family ownership influences firm performance in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia in an inverted U-shaped relationship. Initially, family ownership 
positively influences firm performance, but then the former negatively influences the latter. 
 
There are generally two views on the presence of former executives in the corporate 
board. One view suggests that non-executives who have served as executives in the past lack 
independence and such situation can create conflicts of interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Such lack of independence combined with misaligned incentives increases agency costs on 
the side of owners (Baliga et al, 1996). Conversely, the other view believes that by having 
non-executives who are former executives, a firm can benefit from their strong firm specific 
experience and knowledge so that they can better advise the executives compared with non-
executives who are completely new to the firm (Oehmichen et al., 2014).  
Grigoleit et al. (2011) found no relation between former executives (members of 
management board) serving as non-executive directors (members of supervisory board) and 
firm performance in Germany. However, the finding of Oehmichen et al. (2014) shows 
negative influence of former executives serving as non-executive directors on firm 
performance in Germany. Thus,  
Hypothesis 10: Former executives serving as non-executives negatively influences firm 
performance of companies in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A. Population and Sample 
The data population is 419 industrial and manufacturing companies listed in the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Germany), 613 industrial and manufacturing companies listed 
in the London Stock Exchange (the United Kingdom), and 140 industrial and 
manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The population comes 
from the websites of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange and an 
independent website about listed firms in the Indonesia Stock Exchange respectively. Of 
the population, 135 companies (43 companies from Germany, 44 companies from the 
United Kingdom and 48 companies from Indonesia) meet the sampling criteria. In order to 
balance the sample size of each country, I decide to determine the number of sampled 
companies of each country to be 43, so one company from the United Kingdom and five 
companies from Indonesia are randomly selected and then excluded from the samples. 
Hence the sample size of this research is 129 companies. 
The sampling criteria are as follows: 
1. Listed in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange and the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange on or prior to 2 January 2008 and remain listed until 31 
December 2012. 
2. Have complete information required in this research. 
3. Financial year end at 31 December from 2008 to 2012. 
 
The sample size is considerably small if compared to the populations. The smallness 
of the sample size is largely a result of the incompleteness of information required from the 
firms. In other words, many firms have incomplete required information and hence they have 
to be removed from the samples. 
  
B. Variables Description 
 In this research, firm performance is measured with return on assets (ROA) and 
market-to-book (MTB) ratio; and corporate governance variables used are directors’ 
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ownership, ownership concentration, directors remuneration, codetermination level (for firms 
in Germany), CEO-chair separation (for firms in the United Kingdom),  family ownership and 
former executives being non-executive directors. ROA and MTB ratio are dependent 
variables, and the corporate governance variables are independent variables. Control variable 
used is sales growth, and moderating variables used are shareholders protection and total 
assets. Further description of the research variables are as follows: 
- Return on Assets is calculated by dividing net income with total assets. 
- Market-to-Book Ratio is calculated by dividing closing stock price with the result 
from total assets minus intangible assets and liabilities. 
- Directors’ ownership is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
the directors (members of management and supervisory board of firms in 
Germany; members of board of commissioners and board of directors of firms in 
Indonesia; executive and non-executive directors of firms in the United Kingdom). 
- Ownership concentration is measured by the total percentage of the largest five 
shareholders of a firm. 
- Executive remuneration (for members of management board in Germany; 
executive directors in the United Kingdom; members of board of directors in 
Indonesia) is measured in Euro for German firms, British pound for British firms 
and Indonesian rupiah for Indonesian firms. 
- Codetermination level is measured by the percentage of employees’ 
representatives in supervisory board, i.e. 0%, 33.33% and 50%. 
- CEO-chair separation is equal to “1” if CEO and chairman are held by different 
individuals and “0” if held by the same individual. 
- Family ownership is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares held by family 
members. 
- Former executives serving as non-executive directors are equal to “1” if they exist 
and “0” if otherwise 
- Total assets are measured by the amount of corporate assets at the end of fiscal 
year (31 December). 
- Sales growth is measured in percentage. 
- Shareholders protection is equal to “1” if it is weak, “2” if it is average and “3” if it 
is strong. 
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C. Data Sources and Analysis Tool 
 The research method used in this dissertation involves the collation of data through the 
analysis of annual reports of 129 manufacturing companies and other data sources. Data 
obtained from annual reports are directors’ ownership, executive remuneration, 
codetermination level and CEO-chair separation. Data on ROA, MTB ratio, ownership 
concentration, family ownership, total assets, and sales growth are obtained from online 
financial databases, i.e. Thomson One and Orbis. The research analysis is conducted with the 
utilisation of IBM SPSS Statistics 22, a software package used for statistical analysis.  
 
D. Methodology 
Pallant (2010) argued that the technique(s) chosen by the researcher depends on 
research questions he or she wants to address and the nature of the collected data. As this 
research is intended to investigate the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables, the method used in this research is pooled multiple linear regression analysis. The 
model is as follows: 
ROA = ß0 + ß1DO + ß2OC + ß3ER + ß4Cod + ß5CCS + ß6FO + ß7 FESNED + ß8TA 
+ ß9SG + u 
MTB Ratio = ß0 + ß1DO + ß2OC + ß3ER + ß4Cod + ß5CCS + ß6FO + ß7 FESNED + 
ß8TA + ß9SG + u  
where: 
ROA = return on assets 
MTB Ratio = market to book ratio 
DO = directors’ ownership 
OC = ownership concentration 
ER = executive remuneration 
Cod = codetermination level 
CCS = CEO-chair separation 
FO = family ownership 
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FESNED = Former Executives Serving as Non-Executives Directors 
TA = total assets 
SG = sales growth 
 
In addition to multiple linear regression, quadratic linear regression is also utilised to 
investigate the curvilinear relationship between directors’ ownership as well as family 
ownership and firm performance.  
  In this dissertation, I intend to analyse the corporate governance practices and firm 
performance of 43 German firms, 43 British firms and 43 Indonesian firms listed on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange and Jakarta Stock Exchange respectively 
from 2008 to 2012. Afterwards, it will be concluded whether there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia 
and also whether the relationship is identical in these countries. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 In this chapter, the empirical results of this research are presented which are based on 
the hypotheses elaborated in the previous chapter. These hypotheses are tested to examine the 
relationship between various corporate governance variables and firm performance (return on 
assets (ROA) and market-to-book (MTB) ratio). 
 Before going further, the table of average values of firm performance measures and 
corporate governance variables in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia is presented 
as follows. 
Table 3: Average values of firm performance measures and corporate governance variables in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia  
No. Firm Performance 
Measures and Corporate 
Governance Variables 
Average Values 
Germany United 
Kingdom 
Indonesia 
1. Return on Assets 2.31% -3.99% 6.61% 
2. Market-to-Book Ratio 9.13% 1.11% 1.5% 
3. Directors’ Ownership 10.51% 9.84% 4.28% 
4. Ownership Concentration 49.38% 44.42% 71.07% 
5. Executive Remuneration EUR 1,147,281.5 GBP 736,805 IDR 9,122,036,200 
6. Codetermination 12.56% n/a n/a 
7. CEO-Chair Separation* n/a 0.93 n/a 
8. Family Ownership 10.9% 8.84% 3.91% 
9. Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors* 
0.25 0.14 0.36 
*) the actual values are either 0 or 1 (0 if not present, 1 if present) 
 
A. Return On Assets (ROA) 
Return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing net income with total assets. This 
particular performance indicator measures how much revenue a firm can generate from its 
assets. 
In average, ROA of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012 is 
2.31%. 2009 was the year that the firms have average lowest ROA (-0.7%) and they have the 
highest average ROA in 2010 (4.3%). For the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, the 
average ROA is negative for the entire observation period (-3.99%). The lowest average ROA 
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occurred in 2012 (-9.59%) and the highest occurred in 2010 (-0.23%). Meanwhile, the firms 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average ROA of 6.61%. The average ROA 
reached the lowest level in 2008 (3.64%) and it reached its highest level in 2011 (7.58%). 
These figures show that the firms listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange were the most 
profitable in terms of return on assets between 2008 and 2012. 
 
B. Market-to-Book (MTB) Ratio 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) is calculated by dividing closing stock price with the 
result from total assets minus intangible assets and liabilities. This particular performance 
indicator compares the share’s market price to its book value. 
In average, MTB ratio of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange from 2008 to 
2012 is 9.13. 2008 was the year that the firms have the average lowest MTB ratio (1.14) and 
they have the highest average MTB ratio in 2010 (39.33). For the firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, the average MTB ratio is 1.11 for the observation period. The lowest 
average MTB ratio occurred in 2012 (-2.52) and the highest occurred in 2010 (2.91). 
Meanwhile, the firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average MTB ratio of 
1.5. The average MTB ratio reached the lowest level in 2008 (0.93) and it reached its highest 
level in 2011 (1.88). These figures show that the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
were the highest valued by the investors in the period between 2008 and 2012.  
 
C. Directors’ Ownership 
Directors’ ownership in this research is measured in percentage of total ordinary 
shares. In average, directors’ ownership of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange from 
2008 to 2012 is 10.52%. 2011 was the year that the directors have the average lowest 
ownership (9.64%) and they have the highest average directors’ ownership in 2008 (11.91%). 
For the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, the average directors’ ownership is 
9.84%. The lowest average directors’ ownership occurred in 2011 (9.13%) and the highest 
occurred in 2008 (10.61%). Meanwhile, the firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
have an average directors’ ownership of 4.28 %. Most of the firms have no directors’ 
ownership, and the highest average of directors’ ownership level occurred in 2012 (4.49%). 
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These figures show that the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange have the highest 
level of directors’ ownership between 2008 and 2012. 
In order to investigate the (curvilinear) relationship between directors’ ownership and 
firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia, the quadratic regression 
analysis is conducted, and the directors’ ownership variable is centred and squared. The 
quadratic regression analysis will be conducted below. 
 
C. 1. Case of Germany 
  
Below is the table when ROA is used as dependent variable: 
Table 4: Regression result of the relationship of directors’ ownership and ROA in 
     Germany 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2,305 ,831  2,773 ,006   
DO_c ,192 ,045 ,279 4,245 ,000 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) -,057 1,196  -,048 ,962   
DO_c -,036 ,095 -,053 -,382 ,703 ,219 4,576 
DO_c_sq ,007 ,003 ,376 2,710 ,007 ,219 4,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 Table 4 shows that the p value of directors’ ownership is smaller than α value (0.007 < 0.05), 
so directors’ ownership significantly and positively influences ROA of firms in Germany. Below is the 
curve of the relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA. 
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 Figure 1: Relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA in Germany 
 
 
Below is the table of regression result with MTB ratio as dependent variable. 
Table 5: Regression result of the relationship of directors’ ownership and MTB ratio 
   in Germany 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9,125 7,540  1,210 ,228   
DO_c ,092 ,409 ,015 ,224 ,823 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 19,061 10,995  1,734 ,084   
DO_c 1,050 ,875 ,176 1,201 ,231 ,219 4,576 
DO_c_sq -,029 ,024 -,182 -1,240 ,216 ,219 4,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Unlike Table 4, Table 5 shows that directors’ ownership does not significantly 
influence MTB ratio (p value > α value; 0.216 > 0.05). So MTB ratio of firms in Germany is 
not significantly influenced by directors’ ownership.  
The above results show that directors’ ownership significantly and positively 
influences ROA in a U-shaped relationship. On the other hand, MTB ratio is not significantly 
influenced by directors’ ownership. Therefore, these results partially confirms the findings of 
scholars who argue that directors’ ownership positively influences firm performance (e.g. Han 
& Suk (1998); Kaserer & Moldenhauer (2008)) and directors’ ownership influences firm 
performance in curvilinear way (McConnell & Servaes (1990) and hence rejects Hypothesis 1 
that directors’ ownership influences firm performance in an inverted U-shaped relationship in 
the case of Germany. 
 
C. 2. Case of the United Kingdom 
 
Below is the table of regression result when ROA is used as dependent variable: 
Table 6: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA 
   in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -3,987 1,756  -2,270 ,024   
DO_c ,025 ,102 ,017 ,250 ,803 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) -4,603 2,463  -1,869 ,063   
DO_c -,063 ,266 -,042 -,235 ,815 ,146 6,829 
DO_c_sq ,002 ,006 ,064 ,357 ,721 ,146 6,829 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 6 shows that the p value of directors’ ownership is greater than α value (0.721 > 0.05), 
so directors’ ownership does not significantly influence ROA of firms in the United Kingdom. Below 
is the table of regression result with MTB ratio as dependent variable. 
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Table 7: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and MTB 
   ratio in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1,113 ,859  1,296 ,197   
DO_c -,008 ,050 -,011 -,164 ,870 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) ,586 1,204  ,487 ,627   
DO_c -,083 ,130 -,115 -,641 ,522 ,146 6,829 
DO_c_sq ,002 ,003 ,112 ,626 ,532 ,146 6,829 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
The p values of directors’ ownership showed in Table 7 (0.532) is greater than α value 
(0.05). This means that directors’ ownership also does not significantly influence MTB ratio 
of firms in the United Kingdom. Therefore, this result contradicts the findings of scholars who 
argue that directors’ ownership positively influences firm performance (e.g. Han & Suk 
(1998); Kaserer & Moldenhauer (2008)) and directors’ ownership influences firm 
performance in curvilinear way (McConnell & Servaes (1990) and hence rejects Hypothesis 1 
that directors’ ownership influences firm performance in an inverted U-shaped relationship in 
the case of the United Kingdom. 
C. 3. Case of Indonesia 
Below is the table of regression results when ROA is used as dependent variable. 
Table 8: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA 
   in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 6,611 ,606  10,904 ,000   
DO_c -,083 ,051 -,111 -1,633 ,104 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 6,888 ,683  10,077 ,000   
DO_c ,015 ,123 ,019 ,119 ,905 ,174 5,760 
DO_c_sq -,002 ,002 -,144 -,879 ,380 ,174 5,760 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 8 shows the p value of directors’ ownership is greater than α value (0.38 > 0.05), so 
directors’ ownership does not significantly influence ROA of firms in Indonesia. Below is the table of 
regression result with MTB ratio as dependent variable. 
 Table 9: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and MTB 
               ratio in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1,501 ,113  13,279 ,000   
DO_c -,019 ,010 -,135 -1,984 ,049 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 1,460 ,127  11,451 ,000   
DO_c -,033 ,023 -,237 -1,455 ,147 ,174 5,760 
DO_c_sq ,000 ,000 ,113 ,693 ,489 ,174 5,760 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
The p value of directors’ ownership showed in Table 9 (0.489) is greater than α value 
(0.05). This means that directors’ ownership also does not significantly influence MTB ratio 
of firms in Indonesia. Therefore this result contradicts the findings of scholars who argue that 
directors’ ownership positively influences firm performance (e.g. Han & Suk (1998); Kaserer 
& Moldenhauer (2008)) and directors’ ownership influences firm performance in curvilinear 
way (McConnell & Servaes (1990) and hence rejects Hypothesis 1 that directors’ ownership 
influences firm performance in an inverted U-shaped relationship in the case of Indonesia. 
 
 
C. 4. Case of Germany & Indonesia 
Since both Germany and Indonesia have dual board system, I decide to do regression 
analysis with combined samples of these countries to see whether the influence of directors’ 
ownership on firm performance with such sample group is similar with that of Germany and 
Indonesia. Below are the tables of such regression analysis.  
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Table 10: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and 
               ROA in Germany and Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 4,524 ,536  8,444 ,000   
DO_c ,080 ,034 ,113 2,356 ,019 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 3,637 ,734  4,956 ,000   
DO_c -,041 ,076 -,058 -,537 ,592 ,195 5,116 
DO_c_sq ,003 ,002 ,191 1,763 ,079 ,195 5,116 
 
Table 11: Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and 
                             MTB ratio in Germany and Indonesia 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 5,398 3,771  1,432 ,153   
DO_c ,104 ,238 ,021 ,438 ,661 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 10,429 5,171  2,017 ,044   
DO_c ,790 ,538 ,160 1,467 ,143 ,195 5,116 
DO_c_sq -,018 ,013 -,155 -1,420 ,156 ,195 5,116 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
The p values of directors’ ownership showed in Tables 10 and 11 are greater than α 
value (0.05) (0.079 when dependent variable is ROA and 0.156 when dependent variable is 
MTB ratio). This means that directors’ ownership does not significantly influence ROA and 
MTB ratio of firms in Germany and Indonesia when the samples are combined, therefore this 
result is similar with that of Indonesia but slightly different from that of Germany. 
The results of analysis using combined samples of Germany and Indonesia contradict 
the findings of scholars who argue that directors’ ownership positively influences firm 
performance (e.g. Han & Suk (1998); Kaserer & Moldenhauer (2008)) and directors’ 
ownership influences firm performance in curvilinear way (McConnell & Servaes (1990). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 that directors’ ownership influences firm performance in an inverted 
U-shaped relationship in Germany and Indonesia is also rejected when the samples of two 
observed countries are combined in the regression analysis. 
Chapter VI: Empirical Results and Data Analysis 
 
60 
 
D. Shareholder Protection 
In order to do a moderation analysis to investigate the moderating effect of 
shareholders protection on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, a moderating variable is created by multiplying the values of ownership 
concentration and shareholders protection. The analysis is conducted using joint samples of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia because it cannot be conducted on separate 
samples due to static values of shareholders protection of each country throughout the 
observation period. Below is the table of the moderation analysis when ROA is used as 
dependent variable: 
Table 12: Regression result of the relationship between ownership concentration and                 
     ROA with shareholders protection as moderator variable   
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,248 6,221  1,165 ,244 
Ownership Concentration ,065 ,094 ,081 ,694 ,488 
Shareholders Protection -4,186 2,817 -,192 -1,486 ,138 
Moderator -,008 ,048 -,020 -,165 ,869 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 13: Regression result of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
                 MTB ratio with shareholders protection as moderator variable 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,721 23,054  ,335 ,738 
Ownership Concentration -,111 ,347 -,039 -,321 ,748 
Shareholders Protection -6,216 10,440 -,079 -,595 ,552 
Moderator ,146 ,178 ,104 ,820 ,412 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
The p values of moderator variable showed in Tables 12 and 13 are 0.869 (for ROA) 
and 0.412 (for MTB ratio). Because both p values are more than α value (0.05), it cannot be 
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confirmed whether shareholders protection moderates the influence of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Therefore this result contradicts the findings of Heugens 
et al. (2009) who argued that ownership concentration can positively affect corporate 
performance in countries lacking legal protection of shareholders and hence rejects 
Hypothesis 2 that the strength of shareholder protection negatively influences the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Indonesia. 
 
D. 1. Case of Germany & Indonesia 
When the regression analysis uses the combined samples of three countries, the 
moderation effect of shareholder protection on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance cannot be confirmed. Next, the regression analysis will 
use the combined samples of Germany and Indonesia. The reason behind this sample 
combination is that the corporate ownership in Germany and Indonesia is concentrated, so it is 
interesting to see whether the effect of shareholder protection on the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance with such sample group is similar with the 
result of analysis using combined samples of Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
Table 14: Regression result of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
 ROA in Germany and Indonesia with shareholders protection as  moderator 
 variable 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,425 6,188  ,715 ,475 
Ownership Concentration ,069 ,087 ,147 ,798 ,425 
Shareholders Protection -2,839 3,437 -,127 -,826 ,409 
Moderator ,001 ,051 ,005 ,027 ,979 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 15: Regression result of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
 MTB ratio in Germany and Indonesia with shareholders protection as   
 moderator variable 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 11,561 44,326  ,261 ,794 
Ownership Concentration -,371 ,622 -,113 -,595 ,552 
Shareholders Protection -11,071 24,618 -,071 -,450 ,653 
Moderator ,385 ,368 ,189 1,046 ,296 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
As can be seen on Tables 14 and 15, the p value of moderator variables are greater 
than α value 0.05 (0.979 when using ROA as firm performance measure and 0.296 when 
using MTB ratio as firm performance measure). This means that shareholder protection is not 
proven to moderate the influence of ownership concentration on ROA and MTB ratio, and 
hence Hypothesis 2 is also rejected when the regression analysis uses the combined samples 
of Germany and Indonesia. 
 
E. Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration in this research is measured in the sum of shares ownership 
of five largest shareholders in percentage. In average, the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange have 49.38% of ownership concentration. The highest average ownership 
concentration occurred in 2010 (51.47%) and 2008 was the year when these firms have the 
lowest average of ownership concentration (47.42%). For the firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, the average ownership concentration is 44.42%. The lowest average 
ownership concentration occurred in 2011 (43.6%) and the highest occurred in 2010 
(45.06%). Meanwhile, the firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average 
ownership concentration of 71.07%. The lowest average of ownership concentration occurred 
in 2008 (69.86%) and the highest occurred in 2011 (72.19%). These figures show that the 
firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange are the firms with the highest ownership 
concentration between 2008 and 2012. 
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The relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Indonesia will be investigated below. 
 
E. 1. Case of Germany 
 
Table 16: Regression result of the relationship between corporate governance 
           variables and ROA in Germany 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -7,497 2,423  -3,095 ,002 
Directors' Ownership ,180 ,055 ,262 3,260 ,001 
Executive Remuneration ,004 ,001 ,251 3,474 ,001 
Codetermination ,106 ,052 ,145 2,050 ,042 
Ownership Concentration ,053 ,035 ,099 1,508 ,133 
Family Ownership ,013 ,051 ,020 ,249 ,804 
Total Assets -,007 ,004 -,119 -1,593 ,113 
Sales Growth ,110 ,030 ,235 3,724 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
1,195 1,865 ,041 ,641 ,522 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
On Table 16, we can see that the p value of ownership concentration (0.113) is greater 
than α value (0.05). Therefore, ownership concentration does not significantly influence ROA 
of firms in Germany. Table 1 in Appendix shows that the value of R square is 0.214, meaning 
that 21.4% of the variation of ROA can be explained by independent variables in the model 
and 78.6% of it is explained by other variables not included in the model. On the other hand, 
the influence of directors’ ownership on ROA of firms in Germany is positive and significant, 
although the relationship is not in inverted U-shaped curve as proposed in Hypothesis 1.  
Table 16 also shows that sales growth significantly and positively influences ROA. To 
further investigate such influence, I divide the sample of firms in Germany according to their 
sales growth and then conduct the regression analysis using samples of growing and non-
growing firms. Firms with sales growth above average fall into growing firms category, and 
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those with sales growth below average fall into non-growing firms category. The average 
sales growth of firms in Germany is 3.39%. Below are the tables of the regression analysis. 
Table 17: Regression result of the relationship between corporate governance 
                variables and ROA in Germany (growing firms, 94 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,634 3,147  -,201 ,841 
Directors' Ownership ,069 ,059 ,154 1,169 ,246 
Executive Remuneration ,004 ,001 ,326 2,763 ,007 
Codetermination ,054 ,065 ,096 ,831 ,408 
Ownership Concentration ,020 ,045 ,050 ,447 ,656 
Family Ownership ,072 ,054 ,170 1,337 ,185 
Total Assets -,008 ,005 -,187 -1,510 ,135 
Sales Growth ,024 ,030 ,078 ,780 ,438 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
1,207 2,458 ,050 ,491 ,625 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 18: Regression result of the relationship between corporate governance 
     variables and ROA in Germany (non-growing firms, 121 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -8,505 3,842  -2,214 ,029 
Directors' Ownership ,314 ,090 ,363 3,483 ,001 
Executive Remuneration ,003 ,002 ,158 1,559 ,122 
Codetermination ,155 ,075 ,193 2,060 ,042 
Ownership Concentration ,063 ,052 ,108 1,225 ,223 
Family Ownership -,037 ,084 -,045 -,434 ,665 
Total Assets -,004 ,007 -,068 -,677 ,500 
Sales Growth ,275 ,097 ,244 2,832 ,005 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
2,199 2,625 ,072 ,838 ,404 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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It appears on Tables 17 and 18 that ownership concentration does not significantly 
influence ROA of growing and non-growing firms in Germany. However, sales growth 
positively and significantly influences ROA of non-growing firms in Germany. This shows 
that non-growing firms in Germany are more sensitive to the sales fuctuation in terms of the 
relationship between sales growth and ROA. 
 
Table 19: Regression result of the relationship between corporate governance 
     variables and MTB ratio in Germany   
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,768 23,618  ,202 ,840 
Directors' Ownership -,283 ,538 -,047 -,525 ,600 
Executive Remuneration -,006 ,012 -,040 -,492 ,623 
Codetermination -,297 ,504 -,047 -,590 ,556 
Ownership Concentration ,350 ,344 ,075 1,018 ,310 
Family Ownership ,329 ,499 ,058 ,658 ,511 
Total Assets -,003 ,042 -,006 -,072 ,943 
Sales Growth -,090 ,288 -,022 -,312 ,755 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-7,984 18,182 -,031 -,439 ,661 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
On Table 19, we can see that the p value of ownership concentration (0.31) is greater 
than α value (0.05). Therefore, ownership concentration does not significantly influence MTB 
ratio of firms in Germany. 
Table 2 in Appendix shows that R-squared of regression analysis when using market-
to-book ratio as firm performance measure is 1.5%, meaning that only 1.5% variation of 
market-to-book ratio of firms in Germany can be explained by the independent variables 
while 98.5% of the variation is explained by other variables not included in the model. 
It can be seen from the results above that ownership concentration in Germany has no 
influence on firm performance. It is interesting to see whether the same situation occurs when 
the regression analysis is conducted using individual samples from each observation year. 
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 When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, ownership concentration does not significantly influence both ROA and 
MTB ratio from 2008 to 2012. The detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in 
the Tables 53-62 in the Appendix. 
From the results of regression analysis above, it can be seen that ownership 
concentration does not significantly influence firm performance (return on assets and market-
to-book ratio) both in combined and individual samples. Therefore, this result contradicts the 
findings of scholars who argue that ownership concentration or more concentrated ownership 
improves firm performance (e.g Shleifer & Vishny (1986); Claessens & Djankov (1999); Xu 
& Wang (1999)) and hence rejects Hypothesis 3 that ownership concentration positively 
influences firm performance in the case of Germany. 
 
E. 2. Case of Indonesia  
 
Table 20: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance 
           variables and ROA in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,029 2,660  ,387 ,699 
Directors' Ownership -,093 ,051 -,123 -1,832 ,068 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,000 ,179 1,686 ,093 
Ownership Concentration ,058 ,035 ,120 1,686 ,093 
Family Ownership ,071 ,062 ,079 1,148 ,252 
Total Assets -,001 ,005 -,027 -,251 ,802 
Sales Growth ,085 ,022 ,253 3,827 ,000 
Former Executives Serving 
as Non Executive Directors 
-2,026 1,279 -,109 -1,584 ,115 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
  
 On Table 20, we can see that the p value of ownership concentration (0.093) is greater 
than α value (0.05). Therefore, ownership concentration only marginally significantly 
influence ROA of firms in Indonesia. Table 5 in Appendix shows that the value of R square is 
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0.133, meaning that 13.3% of the variation of ROA can be explained by independent variables 
in the model and 86.7% of it is explained by other variables not included in the model. 
Table 20 also shows that sales growth significantly and positively influences return on 
assets. To further investigate such influence, I divide the sample of firms in Indonesia 
according to their sales growth and then conduct the regression using samples of growing and 
non-growing firms. Firms with sales growth above average fall into growing firms category, 
and those with sales growth below average fall into non-growing firms category. The average 
sales growth of firms in Indonesia in this research is 12.65%. Below are the tables of the 
regression analysis. 
 Table 21: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance 
     variables and ROA of growing firms in Indonesia (101 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,271 3,083  1,710 ,091 
Directors' Ownership -,161 ,064 -,245 -2,496 ,014 
Executive Remuneration -7,768E-5 ,000 -,116 -,719 ,474 
Ownership Concentration ,077 ,041 ,204 1,868 ,065 
Family Ownership ,060 ,068 ,087 ,880 ,381 
Total Assets ,011 ,006 ,326 2,015 ,047 
Sales Growth -,058 ,035 -,167 -1,662 ,100 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-2,578 1,516 -,173 -1,700 ,093 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 22: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance 
            variables and ROA in non-growing firms in Indonesia (114 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,130 4,129  ,274 ,785 
Directors' Ownership -,092 ,071 -,117 -1,296 ,198 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,000 ,317 2,241 ,027 
Ownership Concentration ,070 ,052 ,125 1,360 ,177 
Family Ownership ,125 ,101 ,119 1,240 ,218 
Total Assets -,012 ,008 -,228 -1,605 ,111 
Sales Growth ,261 ,059 ,385 4,441 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-2,596 1,931 -,126 -1,344 ,182 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
It appears on Tables 21 and 22 that ownership concentration does not significantly 
influence ROA of growing and non-growing firms in Indonesia. However, for growing firms, 
directors ownership negatively and significantly influences ROA, while total assets positively 
and significantly influences the same performance measure. 
Ownership concentration also does not significantly influence ROA of non-growing 
firms in Indonesia. However, sales growth significantly and positively influences their ROA. 
This is similar to non-growing firms in Germany where the firms are more sensitive to the 
change of total assets in terms of the relationship between total assets and ROA. 
The following table shows the regression results for MTB ratio. 
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Table 23: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance and 
     MTB ratio in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,150 ,484  -,310 ,757 
Directors' Ownership -,014 ,009 -,097 -1,489 ,138 
Executive Remuneration -8,342E-6 ,000 -,052 -,498 ,619 
Ownership Concentration ,018 ,006 ,197 2,841 ,005 
Family Ownership -,001 ,011 -,007 -,110 ,913 
Total Assets ,003 ,001 ,386 3,663 ,000 
Sales Growth ,006 ,004 ,098 1,529 ,128 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,207 ,233 -,060 -,891 ,374 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
On Table 23, it can be seen that the p value of ownership concentration (0.005) is 
smaller than α value (0.05). This means that ownership concentration positively and 
significantly influences market-to-book ratio for firms in Indonesia. Table 6 in Appendix 
shows that the value of R square is 0.179, meaning that 17.9% of the variation of market-to-
book ratio can be explained by independent variables in the model and 81.9% of it is 
explained by other variables not included in the model. 
Table 23 also shows that total assets significantly and positively influences MTB ratio 
of firms in Indonesia. To further investigate such influence, I divide the sample of firms in 
Indonesia according to their total assets and then conduct the regression using samples of 
large and small firms. Firms with total assets above average fall into large firms category, and 
those with total assets below average fall into small firms category. The average total assets of 
firms in Indonesia in this research is 157.74 million US dollars. Below are the tables of the 
regression analysis. 
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Table 24: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance         
     variables and MTB ratio in Indonesia (large firms, 69 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,374 ,793  ,472 ,639 
Directors' Ownership -,031 ,055 -,079 -,569 ,571 
Executive Remuneration -7,162E-6 ,000 -,059 -,385 ,702 
Ownership Concentration ,002 ,009 ,028 ,239 ,812 
Family Ownership ,028 ,036 ,117 ,785 ,435 
Total Assets ,003 ,001 ,442 2,659 ,010 
Sales Growth -,012 ,006 -,211 -2,030 ,047 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
1,204 ,427 ,359 2,818 ,006 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 25: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance    
     variables and MTB ratio in Indonesia (small firms, 146 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,148 ,634  -,234 ,816 
Directors' Ownership -,021 ,009 -,179 -2,349 ,020 
Executive Remuneration 1,607E-5 ,000 ,045 ,495 ,622 
Ownership Concentration ,025 ,008 ,260 3,223 ,002 
Family Ownership -,007 ,011 -,048 -,625 ,533 
Total Assets -,003 ,004 -,075 -,846 ,399 
Sales Growth ,014 ,005 ,212 2,841 ,005 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-,813 ,273 -,237 -2,981 ,003 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
It appears on Table 24 that ownership concentration does not significantly influence 
MTB ratio of large firms in Indonesia. However, this particular performance measure is 
sensitive to changes in total assets, sales growth, and former executives serving as non-
executive directors. On the other hand, ownership concentration along with sales growth 
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significantly and positively influence MTB ratio of small firms in Indonesia as shown in 
Table 25. Directors’ ownership and former executives serving as non-executive directors also 
significantly influence market-to-book ratio, but the influence is negative. 
On the last two tables we can see that ownership concentration (generally) positively 
and significantly influences firm performance for firms in Indonesia when the samples from 
2008 to 2012 are used in the regression analysis. It is interesting to see whether the similar 
result will occur if the analysis is conducted separately for each observation year. 
 From 2008 to 2012, ownership concentration only had (marginally) significant effect 
only on market-to-book ratio in 2009 and 2011. The detailed analysis can be seen in Tables 
63-72 in the Appendix.  
From the results of regression above, it can be seen that ownership concentration only 
positively and significantly influences MTB ratio when the regression is conducted on 
samples from 2008 to 2012. When the regression analysis is conducted separately on each 
observation year, the significant influence of ownership concentration on firm performance 
did not exist. The relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is not 
uniform, so this result partially confirms the findings of scholars who argue that ownership 
concentration or more concentrated ownership improves firm performance (e.g Shleifer & 
Vishny (1986); Claessens & Djankov (1999); Xu & Wang (1999)) and hence partially accepts 
Hypothesis 3 that ownership concentration positively influences firm performance in 
Indonesia. 
 
E. 3. Case of Germany and Indonesia 
As we have already seen on the results above when the analysis is conducted 
separately for both countries, the regression analysis on firms in Germany shows 
nonsignificance of relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. In 
the context of Indonesia, such relationship is nonmonotonous. Since corporate ownership in 
Germany and Indonesia is concentrated, it is interesting to see whether the similar result 
occurs when the regression analysis is conducted using combined samples of firms in both 
countries. 
In conducting the regression analysis using the joint samples of firms in Germany and 
Indonesia, the codetermination variable is excluded from the analysis due to the absence of 
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this variable in Indonesian context. In addition, the new variable, executive remuneration in 
US dollars is introduced in the analysis to substitute executive remuneration to uniformise the 
measurement of this variable of firms in both countries. Two country dummy variables 
(Germany and Indonesia) are also introduced in the model. When samples of Germany and 
Indonesia are pooled into one sample group, the regression results are as follows: 
Table 26: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
     variables and ROA in Germany and Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1,231 2,005  -,614 ,539 
Directors' Ownership ,056 ,037 ,079 1,511 ,131 
Ownership Concentration ,066 ,024 ,140 2,746 ,006 
Family Ownership ,054 ,037 ,077 1,471 ,142 
Total Assets -,001 ,003 -,028 -,514 ,608 
Sales Growth ,097 ,019 ,237 5,191 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,432 1,103 -,018 -,392 ,696 
Executive Remuneration in US 
dollars 
,002 ,001 ,212 3,732 ,000 
Germany -4,266 1,237 -,191 -3,449 ,001 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 26 shows that the p value of ownership concentration (0.006) is smaller than α 
value (0.05), meaning that ownership concentration significantly and positively influences 
ROA for firms in Germany and Indonesia. Table 7 in the Appendix shows that the value of R 
square is 0.173, meaning that 17.3% of the variation of ROA can be explained by independent 
variables in the model and 82.7% of it is explained by other variables not included in the 
model. In addition, the T-test results show that the country dummy variable (Germany) is 
significant (0.001), meaning that the difference between Germany and Indonesia in terms of 
corporate governance is significant.  
Another interesting finding from the above table is the significance of sales growth’s 
influence. In order to further investigate the influence of sales growth on ROA of firms in 
Germany and Indonesia, I divide the combined samples of firms in Germany and Indonesia 
according to their sales growth and then conduct the regression using samples of growing and 
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non-growing firms. Firms with sales growth above average fall into growing firms category, 
and those with sales growth below average fall into non-growing firms category. Average 
sales growth of firms in Germany and Indonesia are 3.39% and 12.65% respectively. Below 
are the tables of the regression analysis. 
 
Table 27: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
variables and ROA of firms in Germany and Indonesia (growing firms, 195 
observations):  
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,712 2,065  ,345 ,731 
Directors' Ownership -,017 ,041 -,035 -,411 ,681 
Ownership Concentration ,032 ,029 ,091 1,118 ,265 
Family Ownership ,097 ,040 ,205 2,436 ,016 
Total Assets ,001 ,003 ,023 ,281 ,779 
Sales Growth ,001 ,023 ,005 ,063 ,950 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,753 1,376 -,041 -,547 ,585 
Executive Remuneration in US 
dollars 
,002 ,001 ,197 2,236 ,027 
Indonesia 4,184 1,490 ,254 2,809 ,005 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 28: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
variables and ROA of firms in Germany and Indonesia (non-growing firms       
of Germany and Indonesia, 235 observations) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -6,480 2,644  -2,451 ,015 
Directors' Ownership ,116 ,057 ,137 2,027 ,044 
Ownership Concentration ,090 ,036 ,172 2,492 ,013 
Family Ownership ,018 ,059 ,020 ,298 ,766 
Total Assets -,003 ,005 -,050 -,643 ,521 
Sales Growth ,245 ,055 ,268 4,409 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,021 1,596 -,001 -,013 ,990 
Executive Remuneration in US 
dollars 
,002 ,001 ,197 2,469 ,014 
Indonesia 4,051 1,823 ,161 2,222 ,027 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
It appears on Table 27 that ownership concentration does not significantly influence 
ROA of growing firms in Germany and Indonesia. However, this particular performance 
measure is sensitive to changes in family ownership level and executive remuneration. On the 
other hand, ownership concentration as well as directors’ ownership, sales growth and 
executive remuneration significantly and positively influence ROA of non-growing firms in 
Germany and Indonesia as shown in Table 28. In addition, the T-test results show that the 
country dummy variable (Indonesia) is significant (0.005 and 0.027), meaning that the 
difference between Germany and Indonesia in terms of corporate governance of growing and 
non-growing firms is significant. 
Next, the regression analysis on firms in Germany and Indonesia with MTB ratio as 
firm performance measure will be conducted. 
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Table 29: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance   
      variables and MTB ratio of firms in Germany and Indonesia  
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -11,157 15,341  -,727 ,467 
Directors' Ownership -,122 ,281 -,025 -,433 ,665 
Ownership Concentration ,228 ,184 ,069 1,241 ,215 
Family Ownership ,267 ,282 ,054 ,949 ,343 
Total Assets -,002 ,022 -,006 -,095 ,925 
Sales Growth -,035 ,143 -,012 -,248 ,804 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-2,890 8,436 -,017 -,343 ,732 
Executive Remuneration in US 
dollars 
-,003 ,005 -,037 -,594 ,553 
Germany 13,038 9,463 ,084 1,378 ,169 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 29 shows that the p value of ownership concentration (0.215) is greater than α 
value (0.05), meaning that ownership concentration does not significantly influence MTB 
ratio for firms in Germany and Indonesia. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that the value of R 
square is 0.011, meaning that 1.1% of the variation of market-to-book ratio can be explained 
by independent variables in the model and 98.9% of it is explained by other variables not 
included in the model. In addition, the T-test results show that the country dummy variable 
(Germany) is insignificant (0.169), meaning that the difference between Germany and 
Indonesia in terms of corporate governance is insignificant. 
Therefore it can be concluded that when the samples of firms in Germany and 
Indonesia are pooled into one group of sample, ownership concentration positively and 
significantly influences ROA (except for growing firms) but not MTB ratio. It is interesting to 
see whether the regression analysis on individual samples between 2008 and 2012 will also 
produce the similar result. 
 When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, ownership concentration positively and significantly influences ROA in 
2009 and 2010. MTB ratio is not significantly influenced by ownership concentration. The 
detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in Tables 73-82 in the Appendix. 
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 The results above show that when the samples of firms in Germany and Indonesia are 
pooled into one sample group, ownership concentration only significantly and positively 
influences ROA, except for growing firms and all firms in 2008, 2011 and 2012. Therefore, 
these results also partially confirms the findings of scholars who argue that ownership 
concentration or more concentrated ownership improves firm performance (e.g Shleifer & 
Vishny (1986); Claessens & Djankov (1999); Xu & Wang (1999)) and hence partially accepts 
Hypothesis 3 that ownership concentration positively influences firm performance in 
Germany and Indonesia.  
 
E. 4. Case of the United Kingdom 
The following tables show the regression results for ROA and MTB ratio of firms in 
the United Kingdom. 
Table 30: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
     variables and ROA of firms in the United Kingdom  
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -29,815 9,937  -3,000 ,003 
Directors' Ownership ,003 ,117 ,002 ,030 ,976 
Executive Remuneration ,012 ,004 ,230 2,719 ,007 
CEO-Chair Separation 4,777 7,353 ,047 ,650 ,517 
Ownership Concentration ,088 ,151 ,047 ,580 ,562 
Family Ownership ,452 ,135 ,248 3,352 ,001 
Total Assets ,025 ,011 ,204 2,314 ,022 
Sales Growth ,001 ,005 ,008 ,114 ,910 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
5,907 4,816 ,080 1,226 ,221 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
  
Table 30 shows that the p value of ownership concentration (0.562) is greater than α 
value (0.05), which means that ownership concentration does not significantly influence ROA 
of firms in the United Kingdom. Table 3 in the Appendix shows that the value of R square is 
0.158, meaning that 15.8% of the variation of ROA can be explained by independent variables 
in the model and 84.2% of it is explained by other variables not included in the model. 
Chapter VI: Empirical Results and Data Analysis 
 
77 
 
 An interesting finding from Table 30 is the significance of total assets’ influence. In 
order to further investigate the influence of total assets on ROA of firms in the United 
Kingdom, I divide the samples of firms in the country according to their total assets and then 
conduct the regression using samples of small and large firms. Firms with total assets above 
average fall into large firms category, and those with total assets below average fall into small 
firms category. The average total assets of firms in the United Kingdom is 165.21 million US 
dollars. Below are the tables of the regression analysis. 
Table 31: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
    variables and ROA of small firms in the United Kingdom (164 observations) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -36,909 10,965  -3,366 ,001 
Directors' Ownership ,011 ,128 ,008 ,086 ,931 
Executive Remuneration ,004 ,006 ,056 ,647 ,518 
CEO-Chair Separation 4,796 7,848 ,050 ,611 ,542 
Ownership Concentration ,105 ,177 ,052 ,592 ,555 
Family Ownership ,545 ,147 ,302 3,698 ,000 
Total Assets ,226 ,053 ,382 4,259 ,000 
Sales Growth ,001 ,005 ,015 ,196 ,845 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-2,381 5,584 -,033 -,426 ,670 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
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Table 32: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
     variables and ROA of large firms in the United Kingdom (51 observations): 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 19,185 9,308  2,061 ,045 
Directors' Ownership -,333 ,322 -,110 -1,035 ,306 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,003 ,025 ,234 ,816 
Ownership Concentration -,375 ,159 -,272 -2,353 ,023 
Family Ownership -,711 ,414 -,192 -1,718 ,093 
Total Assets ,004 ,009 ,050 ,476 ,636 
Sales Growth ,447 ,085 ,583 5,223 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
It appears on Table 31 that ownership concentration does not significantly influence 
ROA of small firms in the United Kingdom. However, this particular performance measure is 
sensitive to changes in family ownership level and total assets.  
Due to static values of coefficients of CEO-chair separation and former executives 
serving as non-executive directors, these two variables are excluded from Table 32. 
Ownership concentration as well as family ownership significantly and negatively influence 
ROA of large firms in the United Kingdom. Sales growth in the United Kingdom also 
significantly influences ROA, and the influence is positive. 
 
The following table shows the regression analysis with MTB ratio as firm performance 
measure. 
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Table 33: Regression results of the relationship between corporate governance  
variables and MTB ratio of firms in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3,083 5,278  ,584 ,560 
Directors' Ownership ,027 ,062 ,037 ,437 ,663 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,002 ,044 ,482 ,630 
CEO-Chair Separation -,484 3,905 -,010 -,124 ,901 
Ownership Concentration -,056 ,080 -,062 -,696 ,487 
Family Ownership -,032 ,072 -,036 -,451 ,652 
Total Assets 5,968E-5 ,006 ,001 ,010 ,992 
Sales Growth ,000 ,003 ,006 ,076 ,939 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
1,129 2,558 ,031 ,441 ,659 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 33 shows that the p value of ownership concentration (0.487) is greater than α 
value (0.05), which means that ownership concentration does not significantly influence MTB 
ratio of firms in the United Kingdom. Therefore, both ROA and MTB ratio of firms in the 
United Kingdom are not significantly influenced by ownership concentration (except large 
firms which are negatively and significantly influenced by ownership concentration). Table 4 
in the Appendix shows that the value of R square is 0.008, meaning that only 0.8% of the 
variation of MTB ratio can be explained by independent variables in the model and 99.2% of 
it is explained by other variables not included in the model. This extremely low R square 
indicates that the independent variables are not relevant in describing the influence of 
corporate governance and MTB ratio.  
 When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, ownership concentration positively and (marginally) significantly influences 
ROA only in 2008. MTB ratio is significantly and negatively influenced by ownership 
concentration in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. The detailed analysis of this regression analysis 
is presented in Tables 83-92 in the Appendix. 
 From the above results, it can be seen that there is nonmonotonous relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance of firms in the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, these results contadicts the findings of scholars who argue that ownership 
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concentration or more concentrated ownership improves firm performance (e.g Shleifer & 
Vishny (1986); Claessens & Djankov (1999); Xu & Wang (1999)) and hence rejects 
Hypothesis 4 that ownership concentration does not significantly influence firm performance 
in the United Kingdom. 
 
F. Executive Remuneration 
Executive remuneration in this research is defined as the remuneration rewarded to 
executive directors (management board in Germany and board of directors in Indonesia). In 
average, the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange reward the members of 
management board in the amount of 1,147,281.5 Euros. The highest average executive 
remuneration was expended in 2011 (€1,222,732) and 2009 was the year when these firms 
have expended the lowest average executive remuneration (€1,012,363). For the firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, the average executive remuneration is 736,805 British 
pounds. The lowest average executive remuneration was expended in 2008 (GBP 648,882.1) 
and the highest was expended in 2012 (GBP 822,461.4). Meanwhile, the firms listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange expended 9,122,036,200 Indonesian rupiahs for executive 
remuneration in average. The lowest average executive remuneration was expended in 2009 
(IDR 7,038,474,000) and the highest was expended in 2012 (IDR 11,909,970,000). 
The relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance in Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Indonesia will be investigated below. 
 
F. 1. Case of Germany  
The relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance of the firms in 
Germany can be seen in Table 16 (for ROA) and Table 19 (for MTB ratio).  When using ROA 
as firm performance measure, the p value of executive remuneration (0.001) is smaller than α 
value (0.05), meaning that executive remuneration significantly influences ROA. Executive 
remuneration’s coefficient value is positive (0.004), so it positively influences ROA. When 
using MTB ratio as firm performance measure, the p value of executive remuneration (0.623) 
is greater than α value (0.05), meaning that executive remuneration does not significantly 
influence MTB ratio. 
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 The results mentioned above reveal the significance of influence of executive 
remuneration on ROA and the nonsignificance of its influence on MTB ratio when the 
regression analysis is conducted using samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to see 
whether the similar result occurs when the analysis is conducted on individual years from the 
same period. 
When the regression analysis is conducted with samples from individual observation 
year, executive remuneration only (marginally) positively and significantly influences MTB 
ratio in 2011. The detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in Tables 53-62 in 
the Appendix. 
As the sales growth significantly influences ROA of firms in Germany, it is interesting 
to see how the influence of executive remuneration on ROA of growing and non-growing 
firms in this country. Table 17 shows that executive remuneration of growing firms in 
Germany significantly and positively influences ROA (p value = 0.007; coefficient = 0.004). 
On the contrary, as Table 18 has shown, executive remuneration does not significantly 
influence ROA of non-growing firms (p value = 0.122). 
From the results of regression analysis above, it can be seen that the influence of 
executive remuneration on firm performance of firms in Germany appears only when ROA is 
used as the performance measure. Since the results are non-monotonous, they partially 
confirm the findings of scholars who argue that executive remuneration is positively related 
with firm performance (e.g Murphy (1985); Cosh & Hughes (1997)) and hence partially 
accept Hypothesis 5 that executive remuneration positively influences firm performance in the 
case of Germany.  
   
 
 
F. 2. Case of the United Kingdom 
The relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance of the firms in 
the United Kingdom can be seen in Table 30 (for ROA) and Table 33 (for MTB ratio).  When 
using ROA as firm performance measure, the p value of executive remuneration (0.007) is 
smaller than α value (0.05), meaning that executive remuneration significantly influences 
ROA. Executive remuneration’s coefficient value is positive (0.012), so it positively 
influences ROA. When using MTB ratio as firm performance measure, the p value of 
executive remuneration (0.63) is greater than α value (0.05), meaning that executive 
remuneration does not significantly influence MTB ratio.  
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The results above are similar with the results of the analysis on the firms in Germany 
where the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance depends on the 
firm performance measure used in the analysis. Executive remuneration of firms in the United 
Kingdom positively and significantly influences ROA but does not significantly influence 
MTB ratio. It is interesting to see whether the similar result occurs when the analysis is 
conducted separately on individual samples from 2008 to 2012. 
When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, executive remuneration does not significantly influence firm performance in 
the entire observation period on firms in the United Kingdom. The detailed analysis of this 
regression analysis is presented in Tables 83-92 in the Appendix. 
Table 30 also shows that total assets significantly influences ROA of firms in the 
United Kingdom. In order to know further the influence of executive remuneration on ROA of 
small and large firms, we can see in Tables 31 and 32 that executive remuneration of small 
and large firms in the United Kingdom does not significantly influence ROA (p values = 
0.518 and 0.816 respectively). 
The results above reveal that executive remuneration (generally) significantly and 
positively influences only ROA of firms in the United Kingdom. The regression analysis on 
individual observation years shows nonsignificance of influence of executive remuneration on 
firm performance. Because the significant positive influence of executive remuneration does 
not occur in all regression analyses, the results above partially confirm the findings of 
scholars who argue that executive remuneration is positively related with firm performance 
(e.g Murphy (1985); Cosh & Hughes (1997)) and hence partially accept Hypothesis 5 that 
executive remuneration positively influences firm performance in the case of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
F. 3. Case of Indonesia 
The nature of influence of executive remuneration on firm performance of the firms in 
Indonesia can be seen in Table 20 (for ROA) and Table 23 (for MTB ratio).  The p value of 
executive remuneration (0.093) is slightly greater than α value (0.05) and the coefficient of 
executive remuneration is 0, meaning that the influence of executive remuneration on ROA is 
negligible. When using MTB ratio as firm performance measure, the p value of executive 
remuneration (0.619) is greater than α value (0.05), meaning that executive remuneration does 
not significantly influence MTB ratio. 
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When the regression analysis uses the samples of 2008 until 2012, the significance of 
executive remuneration on firm performance of firms in Indonesia does not exist. It is 
interesting to see whether the similar result occurs when the analysis is conducted separately 
on individual samples from 2008 to 2012. 
When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, executive remuneration only positively and significantly influences ROA of 
firms in Indonesia in 2008. The detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in 
Tables 63-72 in the Appendix. 
Because Table 20 shows that sales growth significantly influences ROA, further 
analysis is conducted to investigate the influence of executive remuneration on ROA of 
growing and non-growing firms in Indonesia. In addition, as a follow-up of the finding of 
total assets’ significance on MTB ratio in Table 23, further analysis is also conducted to 
investigate the influence of executive remuneration on MTB ratio of large and small firms in 
Indonesia. 
Table 21 shows that executive remuneration does not significantly ROA of growing 
firms in Indonesia (p value = 0.474). Similarly for non-growing firms, Table 22 shows that 
executive remuneration does not significantly influence ROA (p value = 0.027) because its 
coefficient is 0. When the regression analysis is conducted on samples of large and small 
firms, executive remuneration also does not significantly influence MTB ratio (shown in 
Table 24 and 25). 
 The above results show that the relationship between executive remuneration and firm 
performance of firms in Indonesia is nonmonotonous, therefore the results above partially 
confirm the findings of scholars who argue that executive remuneration is positively related 
with firm performance (e.g Murphy (1985); Cosh & Hughes (1997)) and hence partially 
accept Hypothesis 5 that executive remuneration positively influences firm performance in 
case of Indonesia. 
 
F. 4. Case of Germany & Indonesia 
Since Germany and Indonesia have similar corporate board structure (dual board), it is 
interesting to see how the influence of executive remuneration on firm performance is when 
the samples of firms in Germany and Indonesia are combined. On Table 26, it is shown that 
executive remuneration significantly and positively influences ROA. ROA in both growing 
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and non-growing firms are also significantly and positively influenced by executive 
remuneration (shown in Tables 27 and 28). On the contrary, as Table 29 has shown, executive 
remuneration does not significantly influence MTB ratio. Therefore, these results partially 
confirm the findings of scholars who argued that executive remuneration is positively related 
with firm performance (e.g Murphy (1985); Cosh & Hughes (1997)) and hence partially 
accept Hypothesis 5 that executive remuneration positively influences firm performance in 
Germany and Indonesia when the samples of firms of those countries are pooled into one 
group of samples. 
 
G. Codetermination (for firms in Germany) 
The firms in Germany in this research are mostly without employee representatives on 
the supervisory board. Of 43 observed firms, 28 of them are without employee representatives 
(27 firms in 2009). Thirteen firms are one-third codetermined (14 firms in 2009), and 2 firms 
are half-codetermined. 
            The relationship between codetermination and firm performance of the firms in 
Germany can be seen in Table 16 (for ROA) and Table 19 (for MTB ratio).  When using ROA 
as firm performance measure, the p value of codetermination (0.042) is smaller than α value 
(0.05), meaning that codetermination significantly influences ROA. Codetermination’s 
coefficient value is positive (0.106), so the influence is positive. When using MTB ratio as 
firm performance measure, the p value of executive remuneration (0.556) is greater than α 
value (0.05), meaning that codetermination does not significantly influence MTB ratio. 
 Due to the significance of sales growth on ROA, I am interested to conduct the 
regression analysis using the divided samples based on their sales growth. Table 17 shows 
that codetermination does not significantly influence ROA of growing firms (p value = 
0.408), but the opposite occurs on the non-growing firms where codetermination significantly 
and positively influences their ROA as shown in Table 18 (p value = 0.042). 
           The results above reveal that the influence of codetermination only exists on return on 
assets when the regression analysis uses joint samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to 
see whether the similar result occurs when the analysis is conducted on individual samples 
from each observation year. 
The regression analyses conducted with individual samples from 2008 to 2012 shows 
that none of the regression analyses show a result which show negative influence of 
codetermination on firm performance. The detailed analyses can be seen in Tables 53-62 in 
the Appendix. 
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            The results above show that codetermination only significanty and positively 
influences ROA of firms in Germany when joint samples from 2008 to 2012 is used in the 
analysis. Therefore, they partially confirm the findings of scholars who argue that 
codetermination positively influences firm performance (Gurdon & Rai (1990); Renaud 
(2007); Fauver & Fuerst (2006)) and hence reject Hypothesis 6 that codetermination 
negatively influences German firm performance. 
 
H. CEO-Chair Separation (for Firms in the United Kingdom) 
Most of the firms in the United Kingdom in this research separated the positions of 
CEO and chairman. Of 43 observed firms, only 4 of them combined the positions of CEO and 
chairman on one person (except for 2010 (2 firms) and 2009 (1 firm). The high number of 
firms which appointed different individuals on the positions of CEO and chairman implies 
that most of the sampled firms in the United Kingdom followed the recommendation set by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) to separate those positions in the board. 
 Table 34: Number of firms with CEO-duality in the United Kingdom 
Year Number of firms who combined CEO & chairman position in one 
person 
2008 4 
2009 1 
2010 2 
2011 4 
2012 4 
           
In order to investigate the moderating effect of firm size on the relationship between 
CEO-chair separation and firm performance, a moderating variable (multiplication of values 
of CEO-chair separation and total assets) is created. Below is the table of the moderation 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VI: Empirical Results and Data Analysis 
 
86 
 
Table 35: Regression results of the relationship between CEO-chair separation and  
     ROA (moderated by total assets) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -11,993 9,870  -1,215 ,226 
CEO-Chair Separation 2,627 10,130 ,026 ,259 ,796 
Total Assets ,132 ,234 1,082 ,565 ,573 
Moderator -,100 ,234 -,823 -,426 ,670 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 36: Regression results of the relationship between CEO-chair separation and  
    MTB ratio (moderated by total assets) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,123 5,004  ,025 ,980 
CEO-Chair Separation ,614 5,135 ,012 ,119 ,905 
Total Assets ,002 ,119 ,025 ,013 ,990 
Moderator ,001 ,119 ,018 ,009 ,993 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
  
Tables 35 and 36 show that the p values of moderator variable are 0.67 (for ROA) and 
0.993 (for MTB ratio). Both p values are greater than α value (0.05), which means the 
moderator variable (firm size) does not significantly influence the relationship between CEO-
chair separation and firm performance. Therefore, these results reject the finding of Brickley 
et al. (1997) which implies that the efficiency of CEO-chair separation in improving firm 
performance depends on firm size and hence also reject Hypothesis 7 that firm size negatively 
influences the relationship between CEO-chair separation and firm performance in the United 
Kingdom. 
 Table 31 shows that CEO-chair separation does not significantly influence ROA of 
small firms (p value = 0.542). The relationship between CEO-chair separation and firm 
performance of large firms cannot be investigated because all large firms separate the 
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positions of CEO and chairman. In order to be able to investigate the influence of CEO-chair 
separation on MTB ratio of small firms in the United Kingdom, the following table shows the 
regression result for this purpose. 
Table 37: Regression result of the influence of CEO-Chair separation on MTB ratio of  
    small firms in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,571 6,309  ,407 ,684 
Directors' Ownership ,026 ,074 ,035 ,353 ,725 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,003 ,006 ,059 ,953 
CEO-Chair Separation -,334 4,516 -,007 -,074 ,941 
Ownership Concentration -,048 ,102 -,047 -,473 ,637 
Family Ownership -,028 ,085 -,030 -,330 ,742 
Total Assets ,010 ,031 ,033 ,327 ,744 
Sales Growth ,000 ,003 ,007 ,085 ,932 
Former Executives to Non 
Executives 
,754 3,213 ,020 ,235 ,815 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 It can be seen on Table 37 that separating the title of CEO and chairman also does not 
significantly influence MTB ratio of small firms (CEO-Chair separation p value (0.941) > α 
value (0.05). Now it has already revealed that separating the position of CEO and chairman 
does not significantly influence both ROA and MTB ratio of small firms in the United 
Kingdom when the analysis uses the entire samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to see 
whether the regression analysis with individual samples from 2008 to 2012 also shows the 
same result. 
When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, CEO-chair separation does not significantly influence firm performance 
except in 2008 when it significantly and positively influences ROA. The detailed analysis of 
this regression analysis is presented in Tables 93-102 in the Appendix. 
The results of the regression analyses show both the significance and non-significance 
of CEO-chair separation in influencing firm performance of small firms in the United 
Kingdom. Therefore, they partially confirm the finding of scholars who argue that CEO-chair 
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separation improves firm performance (e.g Bai et al. (2004); Haniffa & Hudaib (2006); 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008) and hence partially accept Hypothesis 8 that CEO-chair separation 
positively influences the performance of small firms in the United Kingdom. 
 
I. Family Ownership 
Family ownership in this research is defined as share ownership of family or founding 
family members. In average, the level of family ownership of firms listed on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange is 10.9%. The highest average of family ownership occurred in 2010 
(11.51%) and the lowest occurred in 2009 (10.53%). For the firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, the average family ownership is 8.84%. The lowest average family ownership 
occurred in 2008 (8.57%) and the highest occurred in 2009 (9.09%). Meanwhile, the firms 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have family ownership of 3.91% in average. The 
lowest average family ownership occurred in 2009 (3.39%) and the highest occurred in 2012 
(4.34%). These figures show that the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange have the 
highest level of family ownership between 2008 and 2012. 
One particular attention needs to be paid to family ownership in Indonesia. The sample 
of firms in Indonesia shows low level of average family ownership (less than 10%), however 
it is not as clear-cut as it appears. As it is already explained in Chapter III, the ownership 
structure of firms in Indonesia is highly concentrated and family-based. Of 43 sampled firms 
in Indonesia, only one of them which does not have corporate shareholders. It is strongly 
suspected that the family ownership in Indonesia is “disguised” by the presence of corporate 
shareholders which means firms which hold shares of another firm are owned and/or 
controlled by a family.   
In order to check the inverted U-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance, the quadratic regression analysis is conducted, the variable of family 
ownership is squared and then both the variable and squared variable is mean-centred. Only 
the mean-centred variables are included in the analysis. 
 
I. 1. Case of Germany  
Below is the table when ROA is used as dependent variable. 
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Table 38: Regression results of the relationship between family ownership and ROA  
     of firms in Germany 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2,306 ,842  2,740 ,007   
FO_c ,152 ,043 ,235 3,524 ,001 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) -1,407 1,588  -,886 ,377   
FO_c -,137 ,114 -,211 -1,203 ,230 ,140 7,141 
FO_c_sq ,010 ,004 ,481 2,741 ,007 ,140 7,141 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 38 shows that p value of family ownership squared is smaller than α value 
(0.007 < 0.05), so this variable significantly influences ROA of firms in Germany. In order to 
see the pattern of the relationship between family ownership and ROA, the curve of this 
relationship is presented below. 
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Figure 2: Regression results of the relationship between family ownership and ROA  
    of firms in Germany 
 
 
 
Below is the table when MTB ratio is used as dependent variable. 
Table 39: Regression results of the relationship between family ownership and MTB ratio of  
     firms in Germany 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9,125 7,530  1,212 ,227   
FO_c ,304 ,387 ,054 ,784 ,434 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 40,311 14,238  2,831 ,005   
FO_c 2,734 1,021 ,484 2,679 ,008 ,140 7,141 
FO_c_sq -,082 ,032 -,464 -2,568 ,011 ,140 7,141 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
Chapter VI: Empirical Results and Data Analysis 
 
91 
 
On Table 39, it is shown that p value of family ownership squared is smaller than α 
value (0.011 < 0.05), meaning that family ownership significantly influence MTB ratio of 
firms in Germany. In order to see the pattern of the relationship between family ownership 
and market-to-book ratio, the curve of this relationship is presented below: 
Figure 3: Regression results of ther relationship between family ownership and MTB  
     ratio of firms in Germany 
 
 
The results above show that the p values of family ownership in the quadratic 
regression are smaller than 0.05 for return on assets (0.007) and market-to-book ratio (0.011). 
The curve of relationship between family ownership and ROA is U-shaped. Meanwhile, 
inverted U-shaped appears in the relationship between family ownership and MTB ratio. 
Therefore, these results partially confirm the findings of scholars who argue that family 
ownership and control improve firm performance in curvilinear way (e.g Anderson & Reeb 
(2003a); Villalonga & Amit (2006)) and hence partially accept Hypothesis 9 that family 
ownership influences firm performance in Germany in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
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I. 2. Case of the United Kingdom 
 
Below is the table of result when ROA is used as dependent variable: 
Table 40: Regression results of the relationship between family ownership and ROA  
     of firms in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -3,987 1,740  -2,291 ,023   
FO_c ,247 ,124 ,135 1,989 ,048 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) -2,455 2,145  -1,144 ,254   
FO_c ,518 ,255 ,284 2,034 ,043 ,237 4,228 
FO_c_sq -,008 ,006 -,170 -1,220 ,224 ,237 4,228 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 As shown on Table 40, the p value of family ownership is greater than α value (0.224 
> 0.05), so this variable does not significantly influence ROA of firms in the United 
Kingdom. Below is the table of regression result when MTB ratio is used as dependent 
variable:  
 
Table 41: Regression results of the relationship between family ownership and MTB  
     ratio of firms in the United Kingdom 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1,113 ,858  1,297 ,196   
FO_c -,043 ,061 -,048 -,708 ,480 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) ,421 1,058  ,398 ,691   
FO_c -,166 ,126 -,186 -1,320 ,188 ,237 4,228 
FO_c_sq ,004 ,003 ,157 1,116 ,265 ,237 4,228 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 Similarly with Table 40, Table 41 reveals the  nonsignificance of influence of family 
ownership on MTB ratio. This is indicated by the p value of family ownership which is 
greater than α value (0.265 > 0.05). 
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The p values of family ownership in the quadratic regression are greater than 0.05 both 
for ROA (0.224) and MTB ratio (0.265), which means that family ownership does not 
significantly influence both firm performance measures. Therefore, these results reject the 
findings of scholars who argue that family ownership and control improve firm performance 
in curvilinear way (e.g Anderson & Reeb (2003a); Villalonga & Amit (2006)) and hence also 
reject Hypothesis 8 that family ownership influences firm performance in the United 
Kingdom in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
 
I. 3. Case of Indonesia 
Below is the table of regression result when ROA is used as dependent variable:  
Table 42: Regression result of the relationship between family ownership and ROA of  
     firms in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 6,611 ,610  10,837 ,000   
FO_c -,006 ,062 -,007 -,104 ,917 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 6,409 ,752  8,521 ,000   
FO_c -,065 ,141 -,072 -,460 ,646 ,192 5,215 
FO_c_sq ,002 ,004 ,072 ,461 ,645 ,192 5,215 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
Table 42 shows that p value of family ownership (0.645) is greater than α value (0.05), 
which means this variable does not significantly influence ROA of firms in Indonesia. Below 
is the table of regression result when MTB ratio is used as dependent variable. 
Table 43: Regression result of the relationship between family ownership and MTB 
ratio of firms in Indonesia 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1,501 ,113  13,242 ,000   
FO_c -,019 ,011 -,113 -1,658 ,099 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 1,467 ,140  10,497 ,000   
FO_c -,029 ,026 -,171 -1,098 ,273 ,192 5,215 
FO_c_sq ,000 ,001 ,065 ,415 ,678 ,192 5,215 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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On Table 43, we can see the similarity with the result of Table 41 where family 
ownership does not significantly influence MTB ratio (p value > α value; 0.678 > 0.05). So 
both ROA and MTB ratio are not significantly influenced by family ownership in the case of 
firms in Indonesia, therefore these results reject the findings of scholars who argue that family 
ownership and control improve firm performance (e.g Maury (2006); Martinez et al. (2007); 
Daily & Dollinger (1992) and hence also reject Hypothesis 9 that family ownership influences 
firm performance in Indonesia in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
 
J. Former Executives Serving as Non-Executive Directors (FESNED) 
In this research, most of the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange do not have 
former executives serving as supervisory board members (FESNED). Between 2008 and 
2012, the highest amount of firms which have former executives in their supervisory boards 
was 13 (in 2008), and the lowest was 8 (in 2011). Similarly for the firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, the highest amount of firms which have former executives serving as non-
executive directors between 2008 and 2012 was 8 (in 2011), and the lowest was 5 (2008 until 
2010). Meanwhile, the practice of using the service of former executives as non-executive 
directors (in board of commissioners) is more common in Indonesia. In 2012, there were 17 
firms which do such practice (the highest number between 2008 and 2012). The lowest 
amount of such firms was 14 (in 2010). 
 
J. 1. Case of Germany  
The relationship between FESNED and firm performance in Germany can be seen in 
Table 16 (for ROA) and Table 19 (for MTB ratio).  When using ROA as firm performance 
measure, the p value of FESNED (0.522) is greater than α value (0.05), meaning that such 
presence of former executives does not significantly influence ROA. When using MTB ratio 
as firm performance measure, the p value of FESNED (0.661) is greater than α value (0.05), 
meaning that FESNED also does not significantly influence MTB ratio. 
Since sales growth significantly influences ROA of firms in Germany, it is interesting 
to find out how the influence of FESNED on ROA in growing and non-growing firms in 
Germany is. Tables 17 and 18 show that FESNED does not significantly influence ROA of 
growing and non-growing firms of firms in Germany respectively. 
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 The results mentioned above are obtained from the regression analysis which uses the 
samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to see whether the regression analysis using 
individual samples from 2008 to 2012 will exhibit the same result. 
 When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, FESNED does not significantly influence firm performance in any year. The 
detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in Tables 53-62 in the Appendix. 
 As we can see on the above results, none of them shows significant influence of 
FESNED on firm performance. Therefore, these results confirm the finding of Grigoleit et al. 
(2011) who argued that there is no relationship between FESNED and firm performance and 
reject the finding of Oehmichen et al. (2014) who argue that FESNED negatively influences 
firm performance. Hence, in the case of Germany, Hypothesis 10 that former executives 
serving as non-executives negatively influences firm performance of companies in Germany 
is rejected. 
 
J. 2. Case of the United Kingdom 
The relationship between FESNED and firm performance in the United Kingdom can 
be seen in Table 30 (for ROA) and Table 33 (for MTB ratio). When using ROA as firm 
performance measure, the p value of FESNED (0.221) is greater than α value (0.05), meaning 
that such presence of former executives does not significantly influence ROA. Table 31 
shows that FESNED of small firms in UK does not significantly influence ROA (p value = 
0.67). The influence of FESNED on ROA of large firms cannot be investigated due to static 
nature of FESNED in these firms throughout the observation period. When using MTB ratio 
as firm performance measure, the p value of FESNED (0.659) is greater than α value (0.05), 
meaning that FESNED also does not significantly influence MTB ratio. 
The results above are obtained from the regression analysis which uses the joint 
samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to see whether the regression analysis using 
individual samples from 2008 to 2012 will exhibit the same result. 
 When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, FESNED does not significantly influence firm performance in any year. The 
detailed analysis of this regression analysis is presented in Tables 83-92 in the Appendix. 
 As we can see on the above results, none of them shows significant influence 
FESNED on firm performance. Therefore, these results reject the finding of Oehmichen et al. 
(2014) who argued that FESNED negatively influences firm performance. Hence, in the case 
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of the United Kingdom, Hypothesis 10 that former executives serving as non-executives 
negatively influences firm performance of companies in the United Kingdom is rejected. 
 
J. 3. Case of Indonesia 
The relationship between FESNED and firm performance in Indonesia can be seen in 
Table 20 (for ROA) and Table 23 (for MTB ratio). When using ROA as firm performance 
measure, the p value of FESNED (0.115) is greater than α value (0.05), meaning that such 
presence of former executives does not significantly influence ROA. When using MTB ratio 
as firm performance measure, the p value of FESNED (0.374) is also greater than α value 
(0.05), meaning that FESNED does not significantly influence MTB ratio. 
Since sales growth significantly influences ROA of firms in Indonesia, it is interesting 
to find out how the influence of FESNED in growing and non-growing firms in Indonesia is. 
Table 21 show that FESNED (only marginally) significantly and negatively influences ROA 
of growing firms in Indonesia (p value = 0.093; coefficient = -2.578). Conversely, Table 22 
shows that FESNED does not significantly influence ROA of non-growing firms in Indonesia 
(p value = 0.182). 
Total assets appear to significantly influence MTB ratio of firms in Indonesia, 
therefore I decide to investigate the influence of FESNED on MTB ratio of small and large 
firms in this country. Table 24 shows significant and positive effect of FESNED on MTB 
ratio of large firms (p value = 0.006; coefficient = 1.204), but Table 25 tells the opposite in 
regards to small firms (significant but negative; p value = 0.003 and coefficient = -0.813 ).  
The results above are obtained from the regression analysis which uses the joint 
samples from 2008 to 2012. It is interesting to see whether the regression analysis using 
individual samples from 2008 to 2012 will exhibit the same result. 
When the regression analysis is conducted with individual samples from each 
observation year, the results are nonmonotonous in terms of the relationship between 
FESNED and firm performance of firms in Indonesia. From 2008 to 2010, FESNED did not 
significantly influence firm performance. In 2011 and 2012, FESNED only (marginally) 
significantly and negatively influenced ROA. The detailed analysis of this regression analysis 
is presented in Tables 63-72 in the Appendix. 
Chapter VI: Empirical Results and Data Analysis 
 
97 
 
As we can see on the above results, there is generally no significant relationship 
between FESNED and firm performance of firms in Indonesia. Therefore, these results reject 
the finding of Oehmichen et al. (2014) who argued that FESNED negatively influences firm 
performance. Hence, in the case of Indonesia, Hypothesis 10 that former executives serving as 
non-executives negatively influences firm performance of companies in Indonesia is rejected. 
 
J. 4. Germany & Indonesia 
Since both Germany and Indonesia have dual board system, it is interesting to see how 
the appointment of former member of management board to supervisory board (in Germany) 
or former member of board of directors to board of commissioners (in Indonesia) affects firm 
performance in these countries when the samples are combined. Table 26 shows that 
FESNED does not significantly influence ROA of firms in Germany and Indonesia (FESNED 
p value = 0.696). Furthermore, due to the significance of sales growth on ROA of firms in 
these countries, I am interested to investigate the influence of FESNED on ROA of firms 
based on their sales growth. Table 27 and 28 show that ROA of both growing and non-
growing firms are not significantly influenced by FESNED. As shown in Table 29, FESNED 
is also not significant in influencing MTB ratio. Therefore, these results reject the finding of 
Oehmichen et al. (2014) who argue that FESNED negatively influences firm performance and 
hence reject Hypothesis 10 that former executives serving as non-executives negatively 
influences firm performance of companies in Germany and Indonesia. 
 
K. Correlation between Corporate Governance Variables and Firm Performance 
The influence of corporate governance variables on firm performance is already 
described in previous subchapters. The explanation of the correlation is as follows (the 
correlation matrixes can be found in Tables 103-105 in Appendix). 
1. For firms in Germany, ROA significantly and positively correlates with ownership 
concentration. Although ownership concentration does not significantly influence firm 
performance, the research shows that the increase in ownership concentration is 
followed by the increase in ROA. 
2. For firms in the United Kingdom, ROA significantly and positively correlates with 
family ownership. In addition, the multiple linear regression shows that family 
ownership significantly and positively influences ROA. 
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3. For firms in Indonesia, three corporate governance variables, namely directors’ 
ownership, executive remuneration, and ownership concentration significantly 
correlates to firm performance. Ownership concentration correlates significantly and 
positively with ROA and MTB ratio. Executive remuneration positively correlates 
with ROA, and directors’ ownership negatively correlates with MTB ratio. 
 
Of those correlations, the strongest correlation occurs in Indonesia between ROA and 
executive remuneration (correlation coefficient = 0.175). However, this significant and 
positive correlation does not imply a causal relationship since the multiple linear regression 
shows insignificant influence of executive remuneration on ROA.        
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The previous chapter has presented the empirical results of the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia. 
This chapter elaborates and discusses the findings presented in the previous chapter. 
 
A. Directors’ Ownership and Firm Performance 
In previous chapter, it is presented that directors’ ownership only significantly and 
positively influences return on assets of firms in Germany in a U-shaped curve. This finding 
shows that the argument put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which stated that 
managerial ownership better aligns managers’ interest with those of stockholders only applies 
for the context of Germany. In the context of the United Kingdom and Indonesia, the 
fluctuation of managerial ownership level does not appear to affect directors’ incentive to 
devote significant effort to improve firm profitability. The view of Lichtenberg and Pushner 
(1994) that directors’ ownership appears to slightly reduce agency conflict between 
management and shareholders also does not apply in the context of the United Kingdom and 
Indonesia. 
When multiple linear regression analyses are conducted, the significant and positive 
influence of directors’ ownership on return on assets occurs for non-growing firms in 
Germany and also for non-growing firms in Germany and Indonesia when the samples of 
these countries are combined together. On the contrary, directors’ ownership significantly and 
negatively influences return on assets of growing firms in Indonesia. In addition, market-to-
book ratio of small firms in Indonesia is also significantly and negatively influenced by 
directors’ ownership.   
This research implies that the more shares directors in Germany own, their interests 
will coincide more with those of shareholders as argued by Han and Suk (1998) and increases 
firm value as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, this is not the case in the 
United Kingdom and Indonesia. In addition, the entrenchment hypothesis that argues that 
directors become entrenched (where external monitoring and control become less effective 
and firm executives gain more control) at a higher level of ownership (Shleifer & Vishny 
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(1989), Morck et al. (1988), Schooley & Barney Jr (1994) and Chen et al. (1993)) is not 
supported by this research in the context of Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
For the case of the firms in the United Kingdom and Indonesia, the low level of 
directors’ ownership may be attributable to the executive remuneration package that includes 
share grant. That means the directors own company’s shares not because of their own intent to 
be part of shareholders, but the shareholders through general meeting include share grant to 
the executive remuneration package as an incentive for the directors to put great efforts to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
The insignificant and/or negative relationship between directors’ ownership and firm 
performance found in this research signals that the policy of share grant in directors’ 
executive remuneration package does not optimise the efforts of shareholder value 
maximisation. In addition, the fear of entrenchment effect when there is high level of 
directors’ ownership is unnecessary. However, the sufficient directors’ ownership at a firm is 
required in order to avoid the firm from becoming a target of hostile takeover (Shivdasani, 
1993) and increase the resistance of management towards takeover (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
terms of takeover, sufficient ownership is expected to give incentive to directors to fend off 
the takeover from the firm, since it is likely that they lose their directorship if the firm is taken 
over by other parties. 
The insignificant relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance 
contradicts the findings of scholars cited in this research (e.g. Han and Suk (1998), Kaserer 
and Moldenhauer (2008)) that show positive influence of directors’ ownership on firm 
performance, and in particular the finding of McConnell and Servaes (1990) that show 
inverted U-shaped relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance. The 
discrepancy between the results of this research and those of other scholars might be caused 
by the different firm performance measure and research method used. Han and Suk (1998) 
used stock return and McConnell and Servaes (1990) used Tobin’s q, while this research uses 
return on assets and market-to-book ratio as performance measure. Kaserer and Moldenhauer 
(2008) applied 2SLS regression approach, while ordinary least square (OLS) is applied in this 
research. 
In terms of correlation, directors’ ownership significantly and negatively correlates 
with market-to-book ratio in Indonesia at the 0.05 level (see Table 105 in Appendix). This 
means that firm directors in Indonesia keep their shareholding despite the declining market-
to-book ratio. However, I find this phenomenon unsurprising since family ownership is 
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dominant in Indonesia and therefore family members usually sit in the corporate board and 
keep their shareholding regardless the firm performance.   
 
B. Shareholders Protection and Firm Performance 
In previous chapter, it is presented that shareholders protection is not proven to 
moderate the influence of ownership concentration on firm performance regardless the 
strength of the protection in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia. This finding does 
not support the finding of Heugens et al. (2009) which stated that ownership concentration 
can positively affect corporate performance in countries lacking legal protection of 
shareholders and it does not affect corporate performance in countries where legal protection 
is well-developed.  
This may be an indication that ownership concentration itself is a “by-product” of 
shareholders protection and substitutes the role of shareholders protection as a corporate 
governance mechanism to improve firm performance as argued by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
La Porta et al. (1999). Minority shareholders in countries with weaker shareholders protection 
(Germany and Indonesia) rely heavily on the monitoring conducted by large shareholders on 
the corporate executives with which it is expected that the executives strive to maximise 
shareholder value. However, a tight monitoring by them constitutes expropriation threat 
which reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments (Burkart et al., 1997) and 
also market values (Claessens et al., 1999). To increase firm value, votes among large 
shareholders should be equally distributed (Maury & Pajuste, 2005). 
Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, the threat of expropriation by large shareholders is 
not as significant as in Germany and Indonesia due to stronger shareholder protection. In 
addition, the large proportion of institutional share ownership in the United Kingdom (around 
65-80 per cent (Mallin, 2013)) make it somewhat unlikely for expropriation to occur because 
the institutional shareholders are mainly insurance companies and pension funds which 
usually belong to representative bodies who have their own best practice corporate 
governance guidelines. Moreover, these guidelines encompass the recommendations set out in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (Mallin, 2013). 
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C. Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
In previous chapter, it is presented that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Germany, Indonesia and the United Kingdom is 
nonmonotonic. This finding therefore supports partially the finding of Heugens et al. (2009) 
mentioned above and also the findings of scholars who show positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance (e.g Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). Furthermore, the results which show negative 
relationship and insignificance or noncorrelation between these variables (e.g Thomsen, 2005; 
Prowse, 1992; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) are also partially supported by this research. 
This finding also partially supports the view of La Porta et al. (1999) that ownership 
concentration and its effect on firm performance in a country depends on the strength of its 
shareholders protection. Germany and Indonesia are deemed to have weaker shareholders 
protection compared to the United Kingdom, and the high ownership concentration in 
Germany and Indonesia substitutes the role of shareholders protection to protect their 
investment and assure its return. 
Return on assets of firms in Germany and Indonesia is not significantly influenced by 
ownership concentration. Interestingly, when the samples of firms of those two countries are 
combined, the regression results show that return on assets (particularly in non-growing firms) 
are significantly and positively influenced by ownership concentration. On the other hand, 
return on assets of large firms in the United Kingdom is significantly and negatively 
influenced by ownership concentration. Such different effect of ownership concentration on 
return on assets seems to be related with the different level of ownership concentration in 
those countries where corporate ownership in Germany and Indonesia is more concentrated 
than in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, this finding also indicates that large shareholders in 
Germany and Indonesia monitor the firms they own more effectively than large shareholders 
who own large firms in the United Kingdom.     
In terms of market-to-book ratio, only firms in Indonesia (particularly small firms) 
enjoy significant and positive effect of ownership concentration. This finding might indicate 
that the stock market in Indonesia reacts positively towards the monitoring conducted by the 
large shareholders.  
The high concentration of ownership of firms in the United Kingdom (nearly 50%) in 
this research is surprising, because this country is traditionally perceived to have dispersed 
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corporate ownership. This fact may be attributable to the sector of the sampled firms 
(manufacture). Meanwhile for Germany and Indonesia, the high concentration of ownership 
found in this research is consistent with the literature investigating ownership structure in 
Germany and Indonesia.        
 In terms of correlation, ownership concentration in Germany positively and 
significantly correlates with return on assets, and it also positively and significantly correlates 
with return on assets and market-to-book ratio in Indonesia at the 0.05 level (see Table 103 
and Table 105 respectively in Appendix). This means that firms in Germany and Indonesia 
enjoy better performance when ownership concentration gets higher although the causation 
effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is nonmonotonic as shown in the 
regression analyses.  
 
D. Executive Remuneration and Firm Performance 
In previous chapter, it is presented that the relationship between executive 
remuneration and firm performance in Germany, Indonesia and the United Kingdom is 
nonmonotonic. This finding therefore supports partially the finding of Murphy (1985) and 
Cosh and Hughes (1997) which show positive relationship between executive remuneration 
and firm performance. 
Executive remuneration is found to be positively and significantly influencing return 
on assets in Germany and the United Kingdom, but not in Indonesia. This finding indicates 
that the executive directors in Germany and the United Kingdom are stimulated by their 
remuneration package to put their best effort in maximising shareholder value. 
 The non-homogenous nature of relationship between executive remuneration and firm 
performance in this research partially supports agency theory which argues that the 
remuneration gives an incentive to managers to maximise the shareholders’ wealth. Because 
return on assets is significantly influenced on several results and market-to-book ratio is not 
significantly influenced in all results, this finding also supports the literature which claims 
that the influence of executive remuneration on firm performance depends on the type of 
performance measure. For example, Murphy (1985) used shareholder return and growth in 
firm sales, while Cosh and Hughes (1997) used profitability and share return as firm 
performance. 
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 In terms of correlation, executive remuneration is found to significantly and positively 
correlate with return on assets in Indonesia at the 0.05 level (see Table 105 in the Appendix). 
This means that although the influence of executive remuneration cannot be confirmed in 
Indonesia, the firms enjoy higher return on assets when the amount of remuneration is higher 
as well. 
 
E. Codetermination and Firm Performance (for Firms in Germany) 
In previous chapter, it is presented that codetermination positively influences firm’s 
return on assets in Germany. This positive influence also occurs on return on assets of non-
growing firms. This finding therefore supports the findings of Gurdon and Rai (1990), Renaud 
(2007), and Fauver and Fuerst (2006) which show positive influence of codetermination on 
firm performance. When the regression analysis is conducted in individual observation years, 
codetermination does not appear to significantly influence firm performance; therefore 
supporting the findings of Benelli et al. (1987 and Wagner (2009) which neither show positive 
nor negative relationship between codetermination and firm performance. 
Codetermination is found to be positively influencing firm performance for return on 
assets but not for market-to-book ratio. This might imply that workers’ participation in 
important decision-makings is beneficial to company’s internal performance measure despite 
the negative attitude from shareholders towards codetermination as argued by Jensen and 
Meckling (1979). Workers’ participation is proven in this research to facilitate the firms to 
efficiently use their assets. Therefore, this finding is a challenge to Jensen and Meckling 
(1979), Kraft (2001), and Alchian (1984) who assert that workers’ participation will 
necessarily put disadvantages to shareholders. In terms of correlation, codetermination does 
not significantly correlate with firm performance (see Table 103 in Appendix). 
 
F. CEO-Chair Separation and Firm Performance (for Firms in the United 
Kingdom) 
In previous chapter, it is presented that firm size (measured in total assets) is not 
proven to moderate the influence of CEO-chair separation on firm performance. This finding 
does not support Brickley et al. (1997) who found that the combination of CEO and chair in 
one individual is efficient and consistent with shareholders’ interest generally for large firms. 
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The argument that CEO-chair separation increases agency costs of controlling the behavior of 
the chairman, information costs, change of succession processes costs, and other costs 
(Brickley et al., 1997) is also not supported by this finding. 
It is also presented in previous chapter that the relationship between CEO-chair 
separation and firm performance is slightly nonmonotonic. The only positive relationship 
between those variables is found in 2008 with return on assets as firm performance measure. 
Therefore, it can be argued that generally the leadership structure in a firm does not 
significantly influence either accounting (return on assets) or market valuation (market-to-
book ratio) of a small firm. That means regardless combined or separated, the top leadership 
structure is not proven to bring efficiency on assets use and also does not improve stock 
performance of small firms in the United Kingdom. Thus, this finding supports Weir and 
Laing (2001), Brickley et al. (1997) and Baliga et al. (1996) who argue that there is no 
significant relationship between CEO-chair separation or duality and firm performance. On 
the other hand, this finding does not confirm the studies of Bai et al. (2004), Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) who argue that separation or combination of 
top leadership titles significantly influences firm performance. 
This research shows that small firms in the United Kingdom economically do not 
benefit from either combining or separating the top leadership titles. Nevertheless, the 
importance of splitting these positions cannot be neglected because the monitoring of 
managerial actions will be more optimal if the board chair is independent of day-do-day 
management (as explained by Donaldson and Davis (1991) in describing agency theory’s 
view on CEO-chair separation). In terms of correlation, CEO-chair separation does not 
significantly correlate with firm performance (see Table 104 in Appendix). 
 
G. Family Ownership and Firm Performance 
 Previous chapter has shown that inverted U-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance occurred in the case of market-to-book ratio in Germany. 
Family ownership does not significantly influence performance of firms in the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia. Therefore, this finding partially supports Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
and Anderson and Reeb (2003a) who warn against excessive family ownership. As advocated 
by agency theorists, family ownership mitigates owner-manager conflict due to family’s 
greater incentives to monitor managers. However, when the ownership is excessive, the 
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family might use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits which is 
detrimental to small shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
In the context of Germany, when family ownership is too high, firm’s market-to-book 
ratio is negatively and significantly affected, indicating the disapproval by the stock market 
towards excessive family ownership. However, return on assets is significantly and positively 
affected by family ownership which may imply that the owner family adequately monitors the 
management and this improves the effectiveness of the firm in assets utilisation. On the other 
hand, firms in the United Kingdom and Indonesia are neither positively nor negatively 
influenced by family ownership. That could mean that it cannot be confirmed whether the 
quality of monitoring provided by the owner family is adequate or inadequate. 
 Another interesting finding is concerning the influence of family ownership on return 
on assets when the samples of Germany and Indonesia are combined, where family ownership 
is found to significantly and positively influence return on assets. This may be an indication 
that the owner family provides adequate monitoring to the management so that it stimulates 
the management to put due diligence on their managerial task. 
Furthermore, the result of regression analysis on the joint samples of growing firms in 
Germany and Indonesia shows that growing firms in these two countries enjoy the positive 
and significant influence of family ownership on their return of assets. Therefore, it may be 
implied that owner family monitors the management better in growing firms in Germany and 
Indonesia. 
Other interesting finding from the result of linear regression analysis is that return on 
assets of firms (particularly small firms) in the United Kingdom is significantly and positively 
influenced by family ownership. This might imply that the monitoring conducted by owner 
family improves the efficiency of firms in this country in utilising their assets. Furthermore, 
the threat of expropriation by owner family in a firm in the United Kingdom is not confirmed 
by this finding. The significance of family ownership on return on assets does not occur on 
large firms. This might be an indication that the stake of other types of ownership (e.g. 
institutional) dispels the influence of family ownership on return on assets. 
In Germany, banks are traditionally the common large shareholders of public 
companies. This might explain the moderate level of family ownership in Germany (10.9%). 
The low level of family ownership in Indonesia (3.91%) is surprising because most 
companies in Indonesia (as argued by Lukviarman (2004)) are principally managed and 
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owned by founding family members. However, this fact might be explained with the 
dominance of private companies as large shareholders where such companies are usually 
family businesses. Therefore, the cases of indirect family ownership are quite common for the 
firms in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the low level of family ownership in the United Kingdom 
(8.84%) shows its small role in the governance-performance relationship. This is quite 
common in countries which have active and large equity markets where the presence of 
institutional shareholders are most prevalent. 
The non-relationship between family ownership on firm performance in Indonesia 
may suggest that the presence of family ownership is not as important as it is thought to be. 
As a consequence of going public, a firm is not only owned by its “original” owner, but it is 
also owned by other groups of shareholders. This in turn may cause a decline in the influence 
of family ownership in corporate decision making and also (indirectly) in firm performance. 
This finding shows that the influence of family ownership is stronger and more 
prevalent in Germany and the United Kingdom than in Indonesia. This is somewhat surprising 
due to the fact that family ownership is an important feature of corporate governance in 
Indonesia. However, as already explained above, the low strength and prevalence of family 
ownership in Indonesia might be compensated by the presence and influence of private 
companies (which are usually family businesses) as large shareholders. 
In terms of correlation, family ownership positively and significantly correlates with 
return on assets at the level of 0.05 in the United Kingdom. This might imply that firms with 
higher family ownership stake in this country outperform those with lower stake of family 
ownership, although the causation effect of family ownership on firm performance cannot be 
confirmed (except for small firms).         
 
H. Former Executives Serving as Non-Executive Directors 
The previous chapter presents that former executives serving as non-executive 
directors in Germany and the United Kingdom does not significantly influence firm 
performance. Meanwhile for Indonesia, the negative influence of former executives serving as 
non-executive directors on firm performance (return on assets) did occur in 2011 and 2012. 
The finding of Oehmichen et al. (2014) is therefore not supported in the context of Germany 
and the United Kingdom, but it is partially supported in the context of Indonesia. On the other 
hand, the finding in the context of Indonesia supports Grigoleit et al. (2011) who argue that 
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there is no relation between former executives (members of management board) serving as 
non-executive directors (members of supervisory board) and firm performance.  
In Germany and the United Kingdom, the presence of former executives serving as 
non-executive directors does not influence firm performance. It indicates that former 
executives serving as non-executive directors do not affect the monitoring function of 
supervisory board (in Germany) as argued by agency theorists (e.g Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In addition, the resources based on insights and knowledge gained from experience when such 
non-executive directors served as executives as argued by Oehmichen et al. (2014) does not 
seem to play an important role in improving firm performance in Germany and the United 
Kingdom.  
 The influence of former executives serving as non-executive directors on firm 
performance in Indonesia was only marginally significantly negative for return on assets in 
2011 and 2012. In those years, it might be assumed that the presence of former executives in 
board of commissioners in those years slightly decrease the efficiency of the firm in using its 
assets due to the reduced board’s independence and monitoring capability.  
Furthermore, market-to-book ratio of large and small firms in Indonesia is influenced 
by the presence of former executives serving as non-executive directors in different 
directions. Such presence of former executives significantly and positively influences market-
to-book ratio of large firms. Contrarily, market-to-book ratio of small firms suffers from 
significant and negative influence caused by such presence of former executives. This 
indicates that large firms gain advantage from the firm-specific internal knowledge and 
experience possessed by former executives. On the other hand, board’s independence and 
monitoring capability in small firms seem to be decreasing when former executives are 
present on the board. 
In terms of correlation, the presence of former executives serving as non-executive 
directors does not correlate to firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Indonesia.    
 
I. Multicollinearity and Autocorrelation Tests 
Multicollinearity and autocorrelation are two statistical problems that may occur in 
regression analysis. Bryman and Cramer (2011) stated that multicollinearity reflects the 
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instability of regression coefficients; hence it is usually regarded as a problem. According to 
Brooks (2014), multicollinearity occurs when the explanatory variables are very highly 
correlated with each other, while autocorrelation occurs when the errors in the model are not 
uncorrelated with one another. 
All variables included in the regression model should have a tolerance equal to or 
above 0.1 (Field, 2013) or 0.2 (Menard, 1995), hence multicollinearity does not occur. A 
value of 5 or 10 and above for variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates multicollinearity 
(O’Brien, 2007). 
To identify whether positive and/or negative autocorrelation occurs in the regression 
model, Durbin-Watson test is used. Positive autocorrelation is occurs if d is less than dl (lower 
bound), while negative autocorrelation occurs if (4 – d) is less than du. 
In this research, the only statistical problem that occurs is multicollinearity. It occurs 
when quadratic linear regression to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 8 was conducted. This is 
deemed to be normal because the variable and its squared variable are correlated. More details 
on the tests of multicollinearity and autocorrelation can be seen in Appendix (Tables 9-30 for 
multicollinearity test and Tables 31-52 for autocorrelation test). 
 
J. Interpretation of Determination Coefficient 
For the firms in Germany (return on assets as performance measure), the regression 
result shows that the R2 value is 0.214 or 21.4% (see Table 1 in Appendix). This means that 
21.4% of variation of y value is determined by the variation of x values, while 78.6% of it 
may be explained by other variables not included in this model. When market-to-book ratio is 
used as performance measure, the regression result shows that the R2 value is 0.015 or 1.5% 
(see Table 2 in Appendix). This means that 1.5% of variation of y value is determined by the 
variation of x values, while 98.5% of it may be explained by other variables not included in 
this model. 
The higher value of R2 when return on assets is used as performance measure may be 
interpreted that the independent variables in the model have more explanatory power on 
internal performance measure. This power is nearly ignorable when market-to-book ratio is 
used as performance measure, which means that the Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s response on 
the variation of independent variable in the model is nearly non-existent. 
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For the firms in the United Kingdom (return on assets as performance measure), the 
regression result shows that the R2 value is 0.158 or 15.8% (see Table 3 in Appendix). This 
means that 15.8% of variation of y value is determined by the variation of x values, while 
84.2% of it may be explained by other variables not included in this model. When market-to-
book ratio is used as performance measure, the regression result shows that the R2 value is 
0.008 or 0.8% (see Table 4 in Appendix). This means that 0.8% of variation of y value is 
determined by the variation of x values, while 99.2% of it may be explained by other variables 
not included in this model. 
Similarly with Germany, the higher value of R2 when return on assets is used as 
performance measure may be interpreted that the independent variables in the model have 
more explanatory power on internal performance measure. This power is nearly ignorable 
when market-to-book ratio is used as performance measure, which means that the London 
Stock Exchange’s response on the variation of independent variable in the model is nearly 
non-existent. 
For the firms in Indonesia (return on assets as performance measure), the regression 
result shows that the R2 value is 0.133 or 13.3% (see Table 5 in Appendix). This means that 
13.3% of variation of y value is determined by the variation of x values, while 86.7% of it 
may be explained by other variables not included in this model. When market-to-book ratio is 
used as performance measure, the regression result shows that the R2 value is 0.179 or 17.9% 
(see Table 6 in Appendix). This means that 17.9% of variation of y value is determined by the 
variation of x values, while 82.1% of it may be explained by other variables not included in 
this model. 
    Unlike Germany and the United Kingdom, R2 of the firms in Indonesia is greater 
when market-to-book ratio is used as performance measure. This means that the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange is more responsive to the variation of independent variable in the model 
compared to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. In terms of 
return on assets, response level of firms in Germany to the variation of independent variables 
is the highest (21.4%). 
 
K. Summary of the Results 
The following table summarises the results of the investigation of corporate 
governance-firm performance relationship in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
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Table 44: Summary of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia 
No. 
Corporate Governance Firm Performance Measures 
 Variables ROA MTB Ratio 
  Germany UK Indonesia Germany UK Indonesia 
1. Directors' Ownership positive not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant 
2. Shareholder Protection not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant 
3. Ownership Concentration not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant positive 
4. Executive Remuneration positive positive not significant not significant not significant not significant 
5. Codetermination positive n/a n/a not significant n/a n/a 
6. CEO-Chair Separation n/a not significant n/a n/a not significant n/a 
      (small firms)     (small firms)   
7. Family Ownership positive not significant not significant negative  not significant not significant 
    
(quadratic 
regression) 
(quadratic 
regression)   
(quadratic 
regression)     
    not significant positive   not significant     
    (linear regression) (linear regression)   (linear regression)     
8. 
Former Executives Serving 
as Non-Executive Directors not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant not significant 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 
A. Conclusions 
This research addresses the question whether corporate governance influences firm 
performance and whether the corporate governance-firm performance relation is identical 
between Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. 
Directors’ ownership in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia does not 
significantly influence firm performance. This research cannot confirm the curvilinear 
relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance as found by McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and hence neither encourage nor discourage directors to own a portion of 
shares of firms they manage. Therefore, the idea of granting shares to executive directors in 
their remuneration package in order to induce “sense of belonging” on the directors which is 
expected to encourage them to put best effort to maximise shareholder wealth is misleading 
and not supported by this research. 
The results of this research indicate the absence of substantive relationship between 
directors’ ownership and firm performance. Therefore, in contradiction to Sundaramurthy et 
al. (2005), this research suggests that encouraging directors to increase their shareholding on 
the firms they manage may be inappropriate to improve firm performance. 
The strength of shareholders protection is not proven to moderate the influence of 
ownership concentration on firm performance in this research. However, a supportive legal 
environment is required to attract or maintain investors to or in a country. Investors are 
usually more inclined to invest their fund in a country where corporate governance and legal 
environment are well established and maintained. 
In addition to the purpose of attracting and maintaining investors to and in a country, a 
good shareholders protection in a good legal environment is also of paramount importance for 
the economic stability of the country itself. One good example of how legal environment 
relates to economic stability is Indonesia. When financial crisis hit East and Southeast Asia in 
the late 1990s, Indonesia was among the countries which were badly affected by the crisis and 
it recovered slowly. This slow recovery was arguably in part caused by its weak legal 
environment, particularly during the regime of President Suharto. The economic recovery 
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progressed simultaneously with some reforms in legal sector. On the other hand, Germany 
and the United Kingdom which have better legal environment than Indonesia and were also 
hit by financial crisis at the late 2000s recovered faster, although the severity of the crisis was 
slightly lighter than the one which hit East and Southeast Asia.  
Ownership concentration acts as a substitute for shareholders protection in countries 
with weaker shareholders protection like Germany and Indonesia. In Indonesia, the legal 
framework has been reformed and revised by the government after the Asian crisis in 1997 
and the collapse of New Order in 1998, but Indonesia is still lacking quality of law 
enforcement compared to Germany and the United Kingdom. This can be seen in the 
Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International (2015) which ranked 
Indonesia in 88th of 168 countries and territories (higher rank means lesser corrupt). There 
relatively low rank of Indonesia in the index reflects the low quality of law enforcement in 
this country. This argument is supported by Becker and Stigler (1974) who believed that 
corruption is an extreme manifestation of apparently poor enforcement. Therefore the foreign 
investors are generally very cautious in investing in Indonesia and very reactive to issues 
related to economy and law enforcement. 
By having a large amount of shareholding on the hand of large shareholders, it is 
expected that the large shareholders will monitor the management of the firm closely. Such 
monitoring is more difficult to be done in a firm with widely-dispersed ownership since the 
cost of monitoring is high and the benefit of it is enjoyed by both active and passive 
shareholders. 
The inconsistent results of the investigation of the influence of executive remuneration 
on firm performance deserve special attention. The results of this research suggest that 
executive remuneration should not be used as a main tool to encourage directors to maximise 
shareholder wealth. Instead of paying too much attention on the design of executive 
remuneration package, shareholders should encourage the directors to take any required 
business decisions that guarantee a return on shareholders’ investment. 
Executive remuneration system can be based on the general views that the executives 
are paid as a reward for their dedication in managing the firm or merely as a tool given to 
compensate their efforts. There is also a view to align the remuneration to firm performance 
to reduce agency costs, but its effectiveness cannot be concluded in this research because it 
does not investigate the effect of executive remuneration design on firm performance.   
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The negative effect of codetermination on firm performance (as argued among others 
by Jensen & Meckling (1979), Kraft (2001), Alchian (1984), Gorton & Schmid (2002), 
FitzRoy & Kraft (1993), Petry (2009)) in Germany does not appear in this research. 
Conversely, codetermination effect on firm performance is found to be positive for return on 
assets, similar to the studies of Gurdon and Rai (1990), Renaud (2007), Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006), and Freeman and Lazear (1994). This finding shows that the presence of employee 
representatives in supervisory board can be beneficial to firm performance. The benefit of 
having them in supervisory board may be in the form of first-hand advice from workers in the 
production facilities that can improve productivity and also product quality, and this in turn is 
expected to also improve firm financial performance. 
The presence of employee representatives in supervisory board is generally viewed to 
slow the process of decision making in a firm due to the possibly divergent interests of 
shareholders and employees. However, this research suggests that such drawback is well 
compensated by the benefit of codetermination as already mentioned above. 
 Firm size is not proven to moderate the influence of CEO-chair separation on firm 
performance in the United Kingdom. CEO-chair separation only significantly and positively 
influences firm performance (return on assets) in 2008. This may be an indication that in the 
time of financial crisis, unity of command and control in leadership structure is beneficial to 
firm performance as argued by stewardship theory.  
However, the possible detrimental effect of putting the powers of management and 
monitoring in the hand of one person at any time should be taken into account. As famously 
voiced by Sir John Dalberg-Acton, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely…”, a chairman who is also a CEO may be tempted to undertake harmful actions 
which put shareholder interests in danger. Therefore, the non-executive directors should put 
their best efforts in monitoring the management and ensure the CEO/chairman to do his or her 
task properly, either there is CEO-chairman duality or not. 
The curvilinear relationship between family ownership for firms in Germany occurred 
when the performance is measured by market-to-book ratio. In addition, the results of 
quadratic regression which show different effect of family ownership on return on assets and 
market-to-book ratio of firms in Germany are somewhat confusing. Therefore, if these results 
are taken into account, it depends on the firms in Germany whether they prioritise internal 
over market performance or the other way around. A sufficient family ownership is expected 
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to be beneficial for return on assets in Germany, but such ownership should not be excessive 
to prevent expropriation of owner family on minority shareholders.  
On the other hand, curvilinear relationship occurred when the performance is 
measured by return on assets for firms in the United Kingdom. Therefore, there is a strong 
reason to avoid excessive family ownership for the context in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Meanwhile in Indonesia, it seems to be not very important to pay attention to 
family ownership in achieving targeted financial performance. However, minority 
shareholders should be aware of the possibility of being expropriated by majority 
shareholders, including founding family members. 
In Germany and the United Kingdom, the presumed declining of board of directors’ 
independence and monitoring capability caused by the presence of former executives as non-
executive directors does not occur. Therefore having this situation in those countries is neither 
recommended nor discouraged. It depends on the individual need and circumstances of the 
firm. Meanwhile in Indonesia, it is rather discouraged to assign former directors on the board 
of commissioners because the research results show that in some years this situation 
negatively influenced firm performance. 
In my opinion, whether a firm needs former executives on its corporate board is highly 
dependent on certain factors or circumstances, such as firm’s age, current situation of a firm, 
etc. For instance, a newly-established firm may wish to retain its former executives in order to 
obtain valuable advice and insights from him or her after his or her retirement from executive 
duties, so that the firm grows under the guidance of persons who knows the firm well. In 
addition, firms which face difficult challenges may also be in favourable situation if former 
executives present on the board so that the firms can benefit from the experience and expertise 
brought by the former executives during the hard times. The effect of the presence of former 
executives as non-executive directors on the performance of firms with certain circumstances 
is an interesting topic for further researches.           
 Since most of the results of this research conflicts with the scholars’ findings quoted in 
previous chapters, it is assumed that the results are dependent on performance measure(s) and 
the observation period. This discrepancy may be also attributable to methodological issues 
such as variables selection, type of industry of the sampled firms and sample size. For 
instance, the usage of corporate governance index (as an independent variable) and samples 
from all industries may produce different results because the index and such samples 
represent the corporate governance variables and listed firms (respectively) in a more 
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comprehensive manner. Also, the financial crisis occurred in 2007-2008 is thought to be an 
important factor which undermined the influence of corporate governance on firm 
performance, because the majority of listed firms, regardless the quality of corporate 
governance, suffered from deteriorated financial performance during the crisis. 
This research also shows that the nature of relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia is not homogeneous. 
Therefore, it supports institutional theory (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) that argues that 
corporate governance is shaped by social relations and institutional arrangements of a country. 
This means that a “good” corporate governance practice in one country is not necessarily a 
“good” corporate governance practice in other countries. In other words, this research 
concludes that the saying “one size fits all” does not apply in the field of corporate 
governance. 
 
B. Limitations  
This research has some limitations which provide ample avenues for further research. 
1. The samples are collected only from manufacturing industry. In order to better 
investigate the corporate governance-firm performance relationship in publicly 
traded firms, future researchers are advised to include samples from all industries. 
By adding firms of all industries into the sample, it is expected that the result will 
be more reliable and valid. Other possible alternative is to also investigate the 
corporate governance-firm performance relationship in other industries separately. 
By so doing, the researcher will be able to confirm whether the nature of the 
relationship is industry-dependent.    
2. The financial crisis occurred during the observation period, particularly in 2008 is 
likely to undermine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. It is advisable for future researchers to control for this factor so that 
it can be assured that the investigated relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance is “free” from externalities’ effect. Other alternative is to 
also utilise non-financial measures for firm performance since it is assumed that 
such measures are less affected by the financial crisis. By so doing, the nature of 
corporate governance-firm performance relationship is expected to be easier to 
assess especially in 2008. 
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3. The sample size in this research is relatively small. Increasing the sample size may 
improve the validity and reliability of the research. This can be done by, for 
instance, adding firms of other all industries as already explained above. The 
sample size can also be increased by collecting information directly from the 
companies in addition to the annual reports. This is important since some 
information of several companies, especially their ownership structure, is not 
completely available on annual reports and financial databases. 
4. The inconsistency between the findings on this research and the others occurred 
probably because the research generally does not take into account the interrelation 
between various elements of corporate governance in observed countries (as 
argued by Schmidt (2003)). It is possible that this interrelation affects the influence 
of these elements on firm performance. Therefore future researchers are 
recommended to take into account such interrelation in order to obtain more valid 
and reliable results. 
5. Directors’ ownership in this research does not distinguish the ownership caused by 
stock grant and by voluntary stock purchase. It is possible that the source of 
directors’ ownership affects the directors’ incentive to improve firm performance. 
Therefore it is advisable that future researchers also investigate the influence of 
directors’ ownership on firm performance according to the source of ownership. 
6. The type of shareholders is not taken into account in this research. Institutional 
investors, government, family and individual shareholders have interests which 
might be conflicting to each other. The influence of ownership concentration on 
firm performance might depend on the type of major shareholders. Therefore 
future researchers are recommended to also investigate this influence on firm 
performance with additional attention to the type of shareholders. 
7. Executive remuneration in this research is measured with the total amount of 
money expended to remunerate the directors without paying attention to the 
remuneration design. It is possible that the directors’ incentive is influenced by the 
remuneration design and hence the inclusion of remuneration design in the 
investigation of executive remuneration’s influence on firm performance is 
expected to bring a more reliable and valid result. 
8. The identification of family shareholders in this research does not include 
institutional or corporate shareholders with dominant family ownership. Such 
identification might be essential in determining the level of family shareholding of 
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a firm. Furthermore, the reliability and validity of the research will increase if the 
influence of family ownership on firm performance is also investigated according 
to the status of family shareholders (corporate or individual). Therefore it is 
advisable for future researchers to do deeper investigation on the status of firms’ 
shareholders. 
 
C. Recommendations for Practice          
Based on the findings of this research, I recommend the following to be practiced. 
1. As the findings show that directors’ ownership generally does not significantly 
influence firm performance in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia (only 
ROA in Germany is positively and significantly influenced by directors’ ownership), 
stock grant and voluntary stock purchase are not recommended to improve firm 
performance in these countries. 
2. The findings show that executive remuneration does not significantly influence MTB 
ratio in Germany, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. Hence they imply that 
executive remuneration is not an effective tool to improve firm performance in these 
countries. 
3. As the findings show that family ownership negatively and significantly influences 
MTB ratio of firms in Germany, family shareholders in this country are suggested to 
limit their shareholding level. By limiting the level of share ownership, family 
shareholders of firms in Germany are expected to help keeping the positive market 
response towards the firm they own.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: R and R2 for firms in Germany (ROA as performance measure): 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,463
a
 ,214 ,184 11,44487 2,106 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives serving as Non-Executive Directors, 
Executive Remuneration, Ownership Concentration, Sales Growth, Codetermination, 
Family Ownership & Control, Total Assets, Directors' Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 2: R and R2 for firms in Germany (MTB ratio as performance measure):  
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,124
a
 ,015 -,023 111,56988 1,981 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives serving as Non-Executive Directors, 
Executive Remuneration, Ownership Concentration, Sales Growth, Codetermination, 
Family Ownership & Control, Total Assets, Directors' Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 
Table 3: R and R2 table for firms in the UK (ROA as performance measure): 
           
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,398
a
 ,158 ,126 24,02591 2,107 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Sales Growth, Family 
Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Executive Remuneration, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 4: R and R2 for firms in the UK (MTB ratio as performance measure) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,088
a
 ,008 -,031 12,76031 1,915 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Sales Growth, Family 
Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Executive Remuneration, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 5: R and R2 for firms in Indonesia (ROA as performance measure) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,364
a
 ,133 ,103 8,45088 2,043 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives Serving as Non Executive Directors, Sales 
Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Family 
Ownership & Control, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 6: R and R2 table for firms in Indonesia (MTB ratio as performance measure): 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,423
a
 ,179 ,151 1,53704 1,795 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives Serving as Non Executive Directors, Sales 
Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Family 
Ownership & Control, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 7:  R and R2 table for firms in Germany and Indonesia (ROA as firm performance) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,416
a
 ,173 ,158 10,23714 2,060 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Germany, Former Executives Serving as Non Executive 
Directors, Sales Growth, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets, Ownership Concentration, 
Family Ownership, ER_US DOLLARS 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 8: R and R2 table for firms in Germany and Indonesia (MTB ratio as firm performance) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,104
a
 ,011 -,008 78,32033 1,993 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Germany, Former Executives Serving as Non Executive 
Directors, Sales Growth, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets, Ownership Concentration, 
Family Ownership, ER_US DOLLARS 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 9: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (Germany, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,219 4,576 
DO_c_sq ,219 4,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 10: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,219 4,576 
DO_c_sq ,219 4,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 11: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,146 6,829 
DO_c_sq ,146 6,829 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 12: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,146 6,829 
DO_c_sq ,146 6,829 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 13: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,174 5,760 
DO_c_sq ,174 5,760 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 14: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 1 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
DO_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
DO_c ,174 5,760 
DO_c_sq ,174 5,760 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 15: Collinearity statistics for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA)  
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,590 1,695 
Executive Remuneration ,730 1,369 
Codetermination ,761 1,313 
Ownership Concentration ,887 1,127 
Family Ownership & Control ,614 1,630 
Total Assets ,684 1,462 
Sales Growth ,959 1,042 
Former Executives serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
,931 1,074 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 16: Collinearity statistics for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,590 1,695 
Executive Remuneration ,730 1,369 
Codetermination ,761 1,313 
Ownership Concentration ,887 1,127 
Family Ownership & Control ,614 1,630 
Total Assets ,684 1,462 
Sales Growth ,959 1,042 
Former Executives serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
,931 1,074 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 17: Collinearity statistics for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,925 1,081 
Executive Remuneration ,371 2,696 
Ownership Concentration ,826 1,210 
Family Ownership & Control ,884 1,131 
Total Assets ,357 2,799 
Sales Growth ,960 1,041 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,878 1,139 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 18: Collinearity statistics for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,925 1,081 
Executive Remuneration ,371 2,696 
Ownership Concentration ,826 1,210 
Family Ownership & Control ,884 1,131 
Total Assets ,357 2,799 
Sales Growth ,960 1,041 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,878 1,139 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 19: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 3 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,734 1,363 
Ownership Concentration ,943 1,060 
Family Ownership & Control ,732 1,365 
Total Assets ,641 1,561 
Sales Growth ,980 1,020 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,956 1,046 
ER_USD ,634 1,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 20: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 3 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,734 1,363 
Ownership Concentration ,943 1,060 
Family Ownership & Control ,732 1,365 
Total Assets ,641 1,561 
Sales Growth ,980 1,020 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,956 1,046 
ER_USD ,634 1,576 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 21: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 3, 5, and 10 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,656 1,525 
Executive Remuneration ,571 1,752 
CEO-Chair Separation ,765 1,307 
Ownership Concentration ,614 1,630 
Family Ownership & Control ,749 1,335 
Total Assets ,528 1,894 
Sales Growth ,919 1,088 
Former Executives to Non 
Executives 
,964 1,037 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 22: Collinearity statistics for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,656 1,525 
Executive Remuneration ,571 1,752 
CEO-Chair Separation ,765 1,307 
Ownership Concentration ,614 1,630 
Family Ownership & Control ,749 1,335 
Total Assets ,528 1,894 
Sales Growth ,919 1,088 
Former Executives to Non 
Executives 
,964 1,037 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 23: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 8 (UK (small firms), ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,662 1,511 
Executive Remuneration ,689 1,452 
CEO-Chair Separation ,776 1,289 
Ownership Concentration ,651 1,536 
Family Ownership & Control ,765 1,308 
Total Assets ,635 1,574 
Sales Growth ,917 1,090 
Former Executives to Non 
Executives 
,852 1,174 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
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Table 24: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 8 (UK (small firms), MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,662 1,511 
Executive Remuneration ,689 1,452 
CEO-Chair Separation ,776 1,289 
Ownership Concentration ,651 1,536 
Family Ownership & Control ,765 1,308 
Total Assets ,635 1,574 
Sales Growth ,917 1,090 
Former Executives to Non 
Executives 
,852 1,174 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 25: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (Germany, ROA) 
 
Table 26: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,140 7,141 
FOC_c_sq ,140 7,141 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,140 7,141 
FOC_c_sq ,140 7,141 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 27: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,237 4,228 
FOC_c_sq ,237 4,228 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 28: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,237 4,228 
FOC_c_sq ,237 4,228 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 29: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,192 5,215 
FOC_c_sq ,192 5,215 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
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Table 30: Collinearity statistics for Hypothesis 9 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
FOC_c 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant)   
FOC_c ,192 5,215 
FOC_c_sq ,192 5,215 
a. Dependent Variable: Market -to-Book Ratio 
 
Table 31: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (Germany, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,279
a
 ,078 ,074 12,19053  
2 ,330
b
 ,109 ,100 12,01291 2,075 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (2.075) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.075 = 1.925 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred.   
 
Table 32: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,015
a
 ,000 -,004 110,55725  
2 ,086
b
 ,007 -,002 110,41792 2,009 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.009) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU 
(1.693). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.009 = 1.991 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 33: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,017
a
 ,000 -,004 25,75057  
2 ,030
b
 ,001 -,009 25,80346 2,147 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (2.147) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.147 = 1.853 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred.   
 
Table 34: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,011
a
 ,000 -,005 12,59678  
2 ,044
b
 ,002 -,007 12,61482 1,907 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.907) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU 
(1.693). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
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To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.907 = 2.093 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 35: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (Indonesia, ROA) 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,111
a
 ,012 ,008 8,88951  
2 ,126
b
 ,016 ,007 8,89426 2,035 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.035) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU 
(1.693). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.035 = 1.965 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 36: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 1 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,135
a
 ,018 ,014 1,65716  
2 ,143
b
 ,020 ,011 1,65919 1,751 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DO_c, DO_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.751) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU 
(1.693). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.751 = 2.249 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
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Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 37: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,463
a
 ,214 ,184 11,44487 2,106 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives serving as Non-Executive Directors, 
Executive Remuneration, Ownership Concentration, Sales Growth, Codetermination, 
Family Ownership & Control, Total Assets, Directors' Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.106) is greater than dL (1.592) and dU 
(1.757). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.106 = 1.894 (greater than 1.592 and 1.757) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 38: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,124
a
 ,015 -,023 111,56988 1,981 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives serving as Non-Executive Directors, 
Executive Remuneration, Ownership Concentration, Sales Growth, Codetermination, 
Family Ownership & Control, Total Assets, Directors' Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.981) is greater than dL (1.592) and dU 
(1.757). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.981 = 2.019 (greater than 1.592 and 1.757) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 39: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA) 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,364
a
 ,133 ,103 8,45088 2,043 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives Serving as Non Executive Directors, Sales 
Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Family 
Ownership & Control, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.043) is greater than dL (1.603) and dU 
(1.746). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.043 = 1.957 (greater than 1.603 and 1.746) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
Table 40: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,423
a
 ,179 ,151 1,53704 1,795 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives Serving as Non Executive Directors, Sales 
Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Family 
Ownership & Control, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.795) is greater than dL (1.603) and dU 
(1.746). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.795 = 2.205 (greater than 1.603 and 1.746) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 41: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,387
a
 ,150 ,136 10,36846 2,020 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ER_USD, Sales Growth, Former Executives Serving as Non 
Executive Directors, Family Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Directors' 
Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.02) is greater than dL (1.603) and dU (1.746). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.02 = 1.98 (greater than 1.603 and 1.746) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
Table 42: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 3 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,080
a
 ,006 -,010 78,40365 1,987 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ER_USD, Sales Growth, Former Executives Serving as Non 
Executive Directors, Family Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Directors' 
Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.987) is greater than dL (1.603) and dU 
(1.746). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.987 = 2.013 (greater than 1.603 and 1.746) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 43: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,398
a
 ,158 ,126 24,02591 2,107 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Sales Growth, Family 
Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Executive Remuneration, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (2.107) is greater than dL (1.592) and dU 
(1.757). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.107 =1.893 (greater than 1.592 and 1.757) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
Table 44: Autocorrelation test for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,088
a
 ,008 -,031 12,76031 1,915 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Sales Growth, Family 
Ownership & Control, Ownership Concentration, Executive Remuneration, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.915) is greater than dL (1.592) and dU 
(1.757). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.915 = 2.085 (greater than 1.592 and 1.757) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 45: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 8 (ROA) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,455
a
 ,207 ,166 25,51583 1,958 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Family Ownership & 
Control, Sales Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Ownership Concentration, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.958) is greater than dL (1.515) and dU 
(1.737). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.958 = 2.042 (greater than 1.515 and 1.737) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 46: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,071
a
 ,005 -,046 14,68084 1,905 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Former Executives to Non Executives, Family Ownership & 
Control, Sales Growth, Executive Remuneration, Directors' Ownership, CEO-Chair 
Separation, Ownership Concentration, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d value (1.905) is greater than dL (1.515) and dU 
(1.737). Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if positive autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.905 = 2.095 (greater than 1.515 and 1.737) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 47: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (Germany, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,235
a
 ,055 ,051 12,34097  
2 ,296
b
 ,087 ,079 12,15649 2,095 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (2.095) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.095 = 1.905 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred.   
 
Table 48: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (Germany, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,054
a
 ,003 -,002 110,41083  
2 ,182
b
 ,033 ,024 108,98856 2,023 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (2.023) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.023 = 1.977 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 49: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (UK, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,135
a
 ,018 ,014 25,51835  
2 ,158
b
 ,025 ,016 25,48917 2,070 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (2.07) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). Hence 
there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 2.07 = 1.93 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 50: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (UK, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,048
a
 ,002 -,002 12,58278  
2 ,090
b
 ,008 -,001 12,57551 1,917 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (1.917) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.917 = 2.083 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 51: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (Indonesia, ROA) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,007
a
 ,000 -,005 8,94474  
2 ,032
b
 ,001 -,008 8,96132 1,993 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (1.993) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.993 = 2.007 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
 
Table 52: Autocorrelation test for Hypothesis 9 (Indonesia, MTB ratio) 
 
Model Summary
c
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,113
a
 ,013 ,008 1,66170  
2 ,116
b
 ,014 ,004 1,66494 1,714 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FOC_c, FOC_c_sq 
c. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
According to Durbin-Watson tables, d (1.714) is greater than dL (1.653) and dU (1.693). 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that positive autocorrelation occurred. 
To check if negative autocorrelation occurred, the value of (4 - d) is compared with the values 
of dL and dU.  
4 – d = 4 – 1.714 = 2.286 (greater than 1.653 and 1.693) 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that negative autocorrelation occurred. 
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Table 53: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -7,755 5,351  -1,449 ,156 
Directors Ownership ,028 ,126 ,043 ,225 ,823 
Executive Remuneration ,003 ,002 ,236 1,399 ,171 
Codetermination ,073 ,115 ,105 ,635 ,530 
Ownership Concentration ,034 ,077 ,067 ,439 ,663 
Family Ownership & Control ,117 ,112 ,187 1,047 ,303 
Total Assets ,001 ,009 ,012 ,068 ,946 
Sales Growth ,278 ,101 ,403 2,767 ,009 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
2,633 4,279 ,093 ,615 ,542 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 54: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,768 23,618  ,202 ,840 
Directors' Ownership -,283 ,538 -,047 -,525 ,600 
Executive Remuneration -,006 ,012 -,040 -,492 ,623 
Codetermination -,297 ,504 -,047 -,590 ,556 
Ownership Concentration ,350 ,344 ,075 1,018 ,310 
Family Ownership & Control ,329 ,499 ,058 ,658 ,511 
Total Assets -,003 ,042 -,006 -,072 ,943 
Sales Growth -,090 ,288 -,022 -,312 ,755 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-7,984 18,182 -,031 -,439 ,661 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 55: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,844 4,656  -,181 ,857 
Directors Ownership ,176 ,116 ,319 1,523 ,137 
Executive Remuneration ,003 ,002 ,219 1,237 ,224 
Codetermination ,095 ,101 ,167 ,946 ,351 
Ownership Concentration -,041 ,069 -,101 -,596 ,555 
Family Ownership & Control ,040 ,098 ,080 ,415 ,681 
Total Assets -,005 ,009 -,103 -,537 ,595 
Sales Growth ,098 ,075 ,219 1,318 ,196 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,142 4,015 -,006 -,035 ,972 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 56: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,550 ,896  ,613 ,544 
Directors Ownership ,035 ,022 ,326 1,590 ,121 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,000 ,344 1,990 ,055 
Codetermination ,008 ,019 ,073 ,421 ,676 
Ownership Concentration -,009 ,013 -,115 -,694 ,493 
Family Ownership & Control ,011 ,019 ,112 ,588 ,561 
Total Assets -,002 ,002 -,255 -1,365 ,181 
Sales Growth ,007 ,014 ,085 ,521 ,606 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,661 ,773 ,132 ,856 ,398 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 57: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -5,489 4,755  -1,154 ,256 
Directors Ownership ,155 ,100 ,298 1,549 ,131 
Executive Remuneration ,003 ,002 ,227 1,253 ,219 
Codetermination ,120 ,096 ,214 1,255 ,218 
Ownership Concentration ,100 ,067 ,231 1,483 ,147 
Family Ownership & Control ,005 ,102 ,010 ,049 ,961 
Total Assets -,006 ,008 -,133 -,729 ,471 
Sales Growth ,048 ,069 ,116 ,691 ,494 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-3,922 3,448 -,176 -1,137 ,263 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 58: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio, 2010) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 47,242 133,842  ,353 ,726 
Directors Ownership -2,203 2,822 -,169 -,780 ,441 
Executive Remuneration -,060 ,068 -,180 -,888 ,381 
Codetermination -1,606 2,700 -,114 -,595 ,556 
Ownership Concentration 1,614 1,894 ,149 ,853 ,400 
Family Ownership & Control 2,787 2,862 ,225 ,974 ,337 
Total Assets ,056 ,230 ,050 ,243 ,809 
Sales Growth -1,579 1,939 -,153 -,815 ,421 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-40,612 97,054 -,073 -,418 ,678 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 59: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA, 2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -8,134 4,810  -1,691 ,100 
Directors Ownership ,099 ,112 ,155 ,879 ,385 
Executive Remuneration ,004 ,003 ,215 1,313 ,198 
Codetermination ,018 ,096 ,028 ,189 ,851 
Ownership Concentration ,084 ,074 ,160 1,148 ,259 
Family Ownership & Control ,004 ,107 ,007 ,041 ,967 
Total Assets -,004 ,009 -,082 -,502 ,619 
Sales Growth ,211 ,052 ,546 4,087 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,811 3,603 ,032 ,225 ,823 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 60: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio, 2009) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,969 1,779  1,669 ,104 
Directors Ownership -,011 ,042 -,054 -,261 ,796 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,001 ,039 ,203 ,841 
Codetermination -,032 ,036 -,154 -,899 ,375 
Ownership Concentration -,030 ,027 -,183 -1,117 ,272 
Family Ownership & Control ,062 ,040 ,327 1,558 ,129 
Total Assets -,002 ,003 -,094 -,490 ,627 
Sales Growth -,011 ,019 -,090 -,576 ,569 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
2,245 1,333 ,278 1,684 ,101 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 61: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, ROA, 2008) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -17,432 7,520  -2,318 ,027 
Directors Ownership ,506 ,165 ,552 3,059 ,004 
Executive Remuneration ,005 ,004 ,201 1,261 ,216 
Codetermination ,262 ,164 ,256 1,596 ,120 
Ownership Concentration ,078 ,107 ,108 ,728 ,472 
Family Ownership & Control ,095 ,157 ,105 ,607 ,548 
Total Assets -,011 ,014 -,136 -,819 ,419 
Sales Growth -,072 ,079 -,143 -,911 ,369 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
8,350 5,699 ,217 1,465 ,152 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 62: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 6, 10 (Germany, MTB ratio, 2008) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,230 ,547  ,420 ,677 
Directors Ownership ,020 ,012 ,302 1,661 ,106 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,000 ,177 1,102 ,278 
Codetermination ,009 ,012 ,120 ,743 ,463 
Ownership Concentration -,001 ,008 -,013 -,084 ,933 
Family Ownership & Control ,029 ,011 ,443 2,541 ,016 
Total Assets -,001 ,001 -,111 -,668 ,509 
Sales Growth -,006 ,006 -,176 -1,108 ,276 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,332 ,415 ,119 ,801 ,429 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 63: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,227 6,112  ,692 ,494 
Directors Ownership -,003 ,101 -,004 -,027 ,978 
Executive Remuneration 2,279E-5 ,000 ,034 ,134 ,894 
Ownership Concentration ,034 ,079 ,072 ,424 ,674 
Family Ownership & Control ,123 ,117 ,158 1,059 ,297 
Total Assets ,002 ,008 ,071 ,275 ,785 
Sales Growth ,286 ,079 ,539 3,633 ,001 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-4,995 2,641 -,297 -1,891 ,067 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 64: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,036 1,573  ,023 ,982 
Directors Ownership -,012 ,026 -,067 -,481 ,634 
Executive Remuneration -1,347E-5 ,000 -,075 -,307 ,761 
Ownership Concentration ,017 ,020 ,136 ,846 ,403 
Family Ownership & Control -,028 ,030 -,132 -,927 ,360 
Total Assets ,004 ,002 ,486 1,969 ,057 
Sales Growth ,062 ,020 ,430 3,040 ,004 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-1,094 ,680 -,241 -1,609 ,117 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 65: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA, 2011) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,310 6,118  ,868 ,391 
Directors Ownership -,106 ,113 -,151 -,936 ,356 
Executive Remuneration -4,333E-5 ,000 -,063 -,239 ,812 
Ownership Concentration ,049 ,079 ,106 ,622 ,538 
Family Ownership & Control -,037 ,135 -,045 -,270 ,789 
Total Assets ,009 ,010 ,254 ,928 ,360 
Sales Growth ,006 ,051 ,018 ,110 ,913 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-5,593 2,912 -,324 -1,920 ,063 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 
Table 66: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,553 1,199  -,461 ,648 
Directors Ownership -,026 ,022 -,176 -1,172 ,249 
Executive Remuneration -1,693E-5 ,000 -,117 -,477 ,636 
Ownership Concentration ,030 ,016 ,304 1,915 ,064 
Family Ownership & Control ,021 ,027 ,123 ,790 ,435 
Total Assets ,004 ,002 ,487 1,908 ,065 
Sales Growth -,018 ,010 -,278 -1,788 ,082 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,271 ,571 ,075 ,475 ,637 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 67: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3,937 4,582  ,859 ,396 
Directors Ownership -,108 ,081 -,211 -1,342 ,188 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,000 ,221 ,853 ,399 
Ownership Concentration ,033 ,057 ,103 ,589 ,560 
Family Ownership & Control -,006 ,098 -,009 -,057 ,955 
Total Assets ,004 ,009 ,123 ,479 ,635 
Sales Growth -,001 ,045 -,002 -,011 ,991 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,520 2,104 -,040 -,247 ,806 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 68: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,854 1,357  -,629 ,533 
Directors Ownership -,017 ,024 -,110 -,705 ,485 
Executive Remuneration -2,902E-5 ,000 -,156 -,608 ,547 
Ownership Concentration ,025 ,017 ,257 1,499 ,143 
Family Ownership & Control -,004 ,029 -,022 -,142 ,888 
Total Assets ,004 ,003 ,423 1,663 ,105 
Sales Growth ,019 ,013 ,225 1,447 ,157 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,008 ,623 -,002 -,014 ,989 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 69: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA, 2009) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1,398 4,878  -,287 ,776 
Directors Ownership -,201 ,094 -,312 -2,131 ,040 
Executive Remuneration 3,709E-5 ,000 ,035 ,164 ,870 
Ownership Concentration ,083 ,064 ,201 1,288 ,206 
Family Ownership & Control ,123 ,131 ,147 ,933 ,357 
Total Assets ,008 ,011 ,169 ,793 ,433 
Sales Growth ,092 ,038 ,367 2,439 ,020 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-2,952 2,421 -,186 -1,219 ,231 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 70: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio, 2009) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,202 ,819  -,247 ,807 
Directors Ownership -,018 ,016 -,183 -1,118 ,271 
Executive Remuneration -1,553E-5 ,000 -,097 -,410 ,685 
Ownership Concentration ,019 ,011 ,300 1,721 ,094 
Family Ownership & Control ,009 ,022 ,071 ,404 ,689 
Total Assets ,002 ,002 ,229 ,963 ,342 
Sales Growth ,006 ,006 ,152 ,904 ,372 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,256 ,407 -,107 -,629 ,534 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 71: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, ROA, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2,165 7,837  -,276 ,784 
Directors Ownership -,129 ,157 -,122 -,826 ,414 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,000 ,600 3,018 ,005 
Ownership Concentration ,120 ,100 ,180 1,202 ,237 
Family Ownership & Control ,122 ,210 ,091 ,580 ,566 
Total Assets -,060 ,023 -,529 -2,593 ,014 
Sales Growth ,272 ,134 ,304 2,033 ,050 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,785 3,926 -,030 -,200 ,843 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 72: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Indonesia, MTB ratio, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,239 ,514  ,465 ,645 
Directors Ownership -,002 ,010 -,031 -,185 ,854 
Executive Remuneration 2,396E-5 ,000 ,258 1,153 ,257 
Ownership Concentration ,009 ,007 ,231 1,367 ,180 
Family Ownership & Control ,004 ,014 ,051 ,291 ,773 
Total Assets ,000 ,002 -,070 -,307 ,761 
Sales Growth -,001 ,009 -,019 -,112 ,912 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,211 ,257 -,140 -,820 ,418 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 73: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,114 4,260  ,496 ,621 
Directors' Ownership ,004 ,076 ,006 ,052 ,958 
Ownership Concentration ,030 ,050 ,068 ,601 ,550 
Family Ownership & Control ,115 ,074 ,170 1,544 ,127 
Total Assets -,001 ,006 -,028 -,217 ,828 
Sales Growth ,275 ,062 ,428 4,468 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-1,605 2,240 -,070 -,716 ,476 
ER_USD ,002 ,001 ,195 1,549 ,125 
Germany -5,697 2,442 -,268 -2,333 ,022 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 74: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio,  
    2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,252 ,925  ,272 ,786 
Directors' Ownership ,024 ,016 ,168 1,430 ,157 
Ownership Concentration ,005 ,011 ,059 ,497 ,620 
Family Ownership & Control ,011 ,016 ,083 ,713 ,478 
Total Assets ,001 ,001 ,058 ,431 ,667 
Sales Growth ,038 ,013 ,289 2,848 ,006 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,008 ,486 -,002 -,017 ,986 
ER_USD ,001 ,000 ,275 2,068 ,042 
Germany -,257 ,530 -,059 -,485 ,629 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 75: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,513 4,130  1,335 ,186 
Directors' Ownership ,044 ,077 ,073 ,576 ,566 
Ownership Concentration ,003 ,048 ,009 ,071 ,944 
Family Ownership & Control ,038 ,073 ,065 ,519 ,605 
Total Assets ,003 ,005 ,078 ,595 ,554 
Sales Growth ,051 ,041 ,136 1,235 ,221 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-3,268 2,316 -,157 -1,411 ,162 
ER_USD ,001 ,001 ,150 1,135 ,260 
Germany -5,569 2,471 -,298 -2,254 ,027 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 76: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio,  
     2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,742 ,812  ,914 ,363 
Directors' Ownership ,007 ,015 ,060 ,485 ,629 
Ownership Concentration ,005 ,009 ,061 ,501 ,618 
Family Ownership & Control ,016 ,014 ,135 1,096 ,277 
Total Assets ,000 ,001 ,021 ,166 ,868 
Sales Growth -,004 ,008 -,058 -,535 ,594 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,643 ,455 ,154 1,412 ,162 
ER_USD ,001 ,000 ,328 2,530 ,013 
Germany -,873 ,486 -,233 -1,798 ,076 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 77: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,874 3,788  -,231 ,818 
Directors' Ownership ,024 ,063 ,046 ,379 ,706 
Ownership Concentration ,092 ,043 ,257 2,142 ,035 
Family Ownership & Control ,065 ,065 ,126 1,001 ,320 
Total Assets ,004 ,005 ,109 ,854 ,396 
Sales Growth ,023 ,041 ,067 ,571 ,569 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-1,730 1,987 -,095 -,871 ,386 
ER_USD ,001 ,001 ,118 ,861 ,392 
Germany -2,957 2,349 -,179 -1,259 ,212 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 78: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio,  
    2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -38,576 84,764  -,455 ,650 
Directors' Ownership -,758 1,405 -,070 -,539 ,591 
Ownership Concentration 1,060 ,961 ,141 1,102 ,274 
Family Ownership & Control 1,486 1,455 ,137 1,022 ,310 
Total Assets ,010 ,115 ,012 ,088 ,930 
Sales Growth -,558 ,911 -,077 -,612 ,542 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-22,919 44,455 -,060 -,516 ,608 
ER_USD -,026 ,025 -,147 -1,010 ,315 
Germany 62,595 52,561 ,181 1,191 ,237 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 79: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA, 2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -4,860 3,814  -1,274 ,206 
Directors' Ownership -,029 ,072 -,043 -,396 ,693 
Ownership Concentration ,092 ,047 ,199 1,955 ,054 
Family Ownership & Control ,069 ,074 ,102 ,938 ,351 
Total Assets -,001 ,006 -,014 -,129 ,898 
Sales Growth ,152 ,032 ,498 4,806 ,000 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,597 2,045 -,027 -,292 ,771 
ER_USD ,002 ,001 ,172 1,400 ,166 
Germany -2,703 2,655 -,129 -1,018 ,312 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 80: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio,  
    2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,330 1,214  1,095 ,277 
Directors' Ownership -,008 ,023 -,046 -,349 ,728 
Ownership Concentration -,006 ,015 -,047 -,381 ,705 
Family Ownership & Control ,031 ,023 ,179 1,340 ,184 
Total Assets -,002 ,002 -,140 -1,049 ,298 
Sales Growth -,001 ,010 -,009 -,067 ,947 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,697 ,651 ,120 1,071 ,288 
ER_USD ,000 ,000 ,142 ,942 ,349 
Germany ,426 ,845 ,078 ,504 ,616 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 81: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, ROA, 2008) 
  
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -9,719 6,143  -1,582 ,118 
Directors' Ownership ,238 ,115 ,256 2,077 ,041 
Ownership Concentration ,127 ,074 ,204 1,706 ,092 
Family Ownership & Control ,097 ,120 ,100 ,810 ,421 
Total Assets -,011 ,011 -,128 -,976 ,332 
Sales Growth -,011 ,066 -,020 -,173 ,863 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
3,454 3,461 ,106 ,998 ,321 
ER_USD ,005 ,002 ,299 2,280 ,025 
Germany -3,909 4,030 -,128 -,970 ,335 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 
Table 82: Regression result for Hypotheses 3, 5, 10 (Germany and Indonesia, MTB ratio,  
     2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,251 ,405  ,620 ,537 
Directors' Ownership ,011 ,008 ,171 1,432 ,156 
Ownership Concentration ,005 ,005 ,126 1,090 ,279 
Family Ownership & Control ,022 ,008 ,327 2,750 ,007 
Total Assets ,000 ,001 -,075 -,592 ,555 
Sales Growth -,005 ,004 -,133 -1,166 ,247 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,051 ,228 -,023 -,222 ,825 
ER_USD ,000 ,000 ,285 2,246 ,028 
Germany -,063 ,266 -,030 -,238 ,812 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 83: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA, 2012) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -25,488 38,264  -,666 ,510 
Directors Ownership ,096 ,507 ,037 ,189 ,851 
Executive Remuneration ,011 ,015 ,166 ,744 ,462 
CEO-Chair Separation -16,472 27,881 -,118 -,591 ,559 
Ownership Concentration ,080 ,605 ,026 ,131 ,896 
Family Ownership & Control ,515 ,543 ,175 ,948 ,350 
Total Assets ,057 ,046 ,295 1,224 ,229 
Sales Growth -,001 ,010 -,013 -,072 ,943 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
19,631 18,915 ,179 1,038 ,307 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 84: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio, 2012) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -14,692 26,206  -,561 ,579 
Directors Ownership -,169 ,347 -,101 -,487 ,630 
Executive Remuneration ,000 ,010 -,006 -,024 ,981 
CEO-Chair Separation -6,441 19,095 -,072 -,337 ,738 
Ownership Concentration ,330 ,415 ,171 ,797 ,431 
Family Ownership & Control -,162 ,372 -,086 -,437 ,665 
Total Assets ,028 ,032 ,229 ,892 ,379 
Sales Growth ,000 ,007 -,006 -,029 ,977 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
9,986 12,954 ,141 ,771 ,446 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 85: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -14,752 15,093  -,977 ,335 
Directors' Ownership -,071 ,218 -,067 -,326 ,746 
Executive Remuneration ,007 ,006 ,244 1,190 ,242 
CEO-Chair Separation 1,740 9,740 ,031 ,179 ,859 
Ownership Concentration ,036 ,255 ,028 ,141 ,889 
Family Ownership & Control ,255 ,207 ,218 1,229 ,227 
Total Assets ,019 ,017 ,239 1,121 ,270 
Sales Growth -,008 ,020 -,066 -,416 ,680 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
2,252 6,928 ,053 ,325 ,747 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 86: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 11,400 7,255  1,571 ,125 
Directors' Ownership ,128 ,105 ,255 1,221 ,230 
Executive Remuneration ,002 ,003 ,144 ,692 ,493 
CEO-Chair Separation -,601 4,682 -,022 -,128 ,899 
Ownership Concentration -,251 ,123 -,416 -2,044 ,049 
Family Ownership & Control ,008 ,100 ,014 ,080 ,937 
Total Assets -,006 ,008 -,154 -,714 ,480 
Sales Growth -,012 ,010 -,206 -1,282 ,208 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
,165 3,330 ,008 ,049 ,961 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 87: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -12,454 17,915  -,695 ,492 
Directors' Ownership ,128 ,195 ,110 ,656 ,517 
Executive Remuneration ,013 ,009 ,312 1,394 ,172 
CEO-Chair Separation 2,076 13,905 ,022 ,149 ,882 
Ownership Concentration -,190 ,253 -,141 -,751 ,458 
Family Ownership & Control ,429 ,224 ,303 1,918 ,063 
Total Assets ,015 ,020 ,159 ,754 ,456 
Sales Growth ,068 ,035 ,340 1,929 ,062 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
4,183 8,625 ,068 ,485 ,631 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 88: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 8,875 3,867  2,295 ,028 
Directors' Ownership ,050 ,042 ,209 1,182 ,246 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,002 ,158 ,668 ,509 
CEO-Chair Separation ,693 3,001 ,036 ,231 ,819 
Ownership Concentration -,151 ,055 -,549 -2,769 ,009 
Family Ownership & Control -,033 ,048 -,113 -,678 ,502 
Total Assets -,007 ,004 -,370 -1,654 ,107 
Sales Growth ,017 ,008 ,431 2,310 ,027 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-,969 1,862 -,077 -,521 ,606 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 89: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA, 2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -16,455 24,857  -,662 ,512 
Directors' Ownership ,034 ,180 ,033 ,191 ,850 
Executive Remuneration ,021 ,008 ,472 2,672 ,011 
CEO-Chair Separation 5,641 20,870 ,044 ,270 ,789 
Ownership Concentration -,145 ,241 -,105 -,601 ,552 
Family Ownership & Control ,456 ,230 ,341 1,983 ,056 
Total Assets -,008 ,017 -,083 -,452 ,654 
Sales Growth -,165 ,061 -,385 -2,702 ,011 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
,499 8,789 ,008 ,057 ,955 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 90: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio, 2009) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,611 3,168  1,771 ,085 
Directors' Ownership ,040 ,023 ,335 1,756 ,088 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,001 ,204 1,054 ,299 
CEO-Chair Separation ,406 2,660 ,027 ,153 ,880 
Ownership Concentration -,089 ,031 -,552 -2,879 ,007 
Family Ownership & Control -,011 ,029 -,072 -,384 ,703 
Total Assets -,005 ,002 -,429 -2,136 ,040 
Sales Growth -,003 ,008 -,064 -,409 ,685 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-,954 1,120 -,137 -,852 ,400 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 91: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, ROA, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -73,408 18,867  -3,891 ,000 
Directors' Ownership -,237 ,209 -,195 -1,135 ,264 
Executive Remuneration ,010 ,011 ,175 ,926 ,361 
CEO-Chair Separation 30,802 13,658 ,380 2,255 ,031 
Ownership Concentration ,549 ,304 ,332 1,804 ,080 
Family Ownership & Control ,530 ,274 ,315 1,933 ,062 
Total Assets ,025 ,020 ,229 1,255 ,218 
Sales Growth -,275 ,097 -,395 -2,848 ,007 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
1,949 10,112 ,027 ,193 ,848 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 92: Regression result for Hypotheses 4, 5, 10 (UK, MTB ratio, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6,900 1,630  4,234 ,000 
Directors' Ownership ,050 ,018 ,416 2,748 ,010 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,001 ,199 1,192 ,242 
CEO-Chair Separation ,004 1,180 ,000 ,003 ,998 
Ownership Concentration -,132 ,026 -,815 -5,017 ,000 
Family Ownership & Control -,003 ,024 -,017 -,116 ,909 
Total Assets -,006 ,002 -,524 -3,249 ,003 
Sales Growth -,020 ,008 -,298 -2,432 ,020 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non-Executive Directors 
-,182 ,873 -,025 -,208 ,836 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
173 
 
Table 93: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (ROA, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -51,050 43,302  -1,179 ,250 
Directors Ownership ,095 ,555 ,037 ,172 ,865 
Executive Remuneration -,010 ,025 -,103 -,406 ,688 
CEO-Chair Separation -12,820 30,086 -,095 -,426 ,674 
Ownership Concentration ,365 ,697 ,108 ,524 ,606 
Family Ownership & Control ,654 ,597 ,223 1,096 ,285 
Total Assets ,467 ,207 ,567 2,259 ,034 
Sales Growth 3,090E-5 ,011 ,001 ,003 ,998 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
2,048 22,510 ,019 ,091 ,928 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 94: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio, 2012) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -24,222 32,892  -,736 ,469 
Directors Ownership -,186 ,421 -,108 -,441 ,663 
Executive Remuneration -,011 ,019 -,164 -,570 ,574 
CEO-Chair Separation -4,936 22,853 -,054 -,216 ,831 
Ownership Concentration ,471 ,530 ,207 ,889 ,383 
Family Ownership & Control -,110 ,453 -,056 -,243 ,810 
Total Assets ,173 ,157 ,313 1,100 ,283 
Sales Growth ,000 ,009 ,008 ,034 ,973 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
3,905 17,098 ,054 ,228 ,821 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 95: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (ROA, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -23,975 16,553  -1,448 ,160 
Directors Ownership -,005 ,232 -,005 -,022 ,982 
Executive Remuneration -,003 ,008 -,086 -,391 ,699 
CEO-Chair Separation 2,492 10,006 ,047 ,249 ,805 
Ownership Concentration ,132 ,297 ,095 ,442 ,662 
Family Ownership & Control ,295 ,215 ,263 1,369 ,184 
Total Assets ,209 ,078 ,591 2,699 ,013 
Sales Growth -,006 ,021 -,049 -,283 ,780 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-5,583 7,704 -,138 -,725 ,476 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 
Table 96: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio, 2011) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13,474 9,166  1,470 ,155 
Directors Ownership ,142 ,128 ,273 1,104 ,280 
Executive Remuneration ,003 ,004 ,167 ,693 ,495 
CEO-Chair Separation -,812 5,541 -,030 -,147 ,885 
Ownership Concentration -,294 ,165 -,419 -1,788 ,086 
Family Ownership & Control ,013 ,119 ,022 ,106 ,916 
Total Assets -,019 ,043 -,104 -,433 ,669 
Sales Growth -,012 ,011 -,205 -1,077 ,292 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,655 4,266 ,032 ,154 ,879 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 97: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (ROA, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -12,650 20,660  -,612 ,546 
Directors Ownership ,169 ,225 ,146 ,753 ,459 
Executive Remuneration ,007 ,012 ,130 ,613 ,546 
CEO-Chair Separation ,247 15,383 ,003 ,016 ,987 
Ownership Concentration -,274 ,326 -,189 -,840 ,409 
Family Ownership & Control ,507 ,252 ,360 2,010 ,056 
Total Assets ,159 ,090 ,329 1,761 ,091 
Sales Growth ,085 ,041 ,446 2,086 ,048 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-,825 10,122 -,014 -,082 ,936 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 98: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio, 2010) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 10,413 4,431  2,350 ,027 
Directors Ownership ,055 ,048 ,228 1,131 ,269 
Executive Remuneration ,002 ,003 ,144 ,649 ,522 
CEO-Chair Separation 1,195 3,299 ,064 ,362 ,720 
Ownership Concentration -,171 ,070 -,571 -2,444 ,022 
Family Ownership & Control -,035 ,054 -,119 -,641 ,528 
Total Assets -,033 ,019 -,336 -1,727 ,097 
Sales Growth ,018 ,009 ,452 2,026 ,054 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,051 2,171 ,004 ,024 ,981 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 99: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (ROA, 2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -15,185 28,089  -,541 ,594 
Directors Ownership ,067 ,208 ,066 ,323 ,750 
Executive Remuneration ,015 ,011 ,264 1,375 ,182 
CEO-Chair Separation 5,258 23,373 ,043 ,225 ,824 
Ownership Concentration -,275 ,305 -,188 -,900 ,377 
Family Ownership & Control ,537 ,265 ,406 2,028 ,054 
Total Assets ,140 ,099 ,287 1,419 ,169 
Sales Growth -,167 ,069 -,394 -2,418 ,024 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
-6,358 11,411 -,109 -,557 ,583 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 100: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio, 2009) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,766 3,411  1,691 ,104 
Directors Ownership ,041 ,025 ,352 1,626 ,117 
Executive Remuneration ,001 ,001 ,188 ,928 ,363 
CEO-Chair Separation ,686 2,838 ,049 ,242 ,811 
Ownership Concentration -,078 ,037 -,463 -2,096 ,047 
Family Ownership & Control -,020 ,032 -,129 -,610 ,548 
Total Assets -,026 ,012 -,461 -2,165 ,041 
Sales Growth -,004 ,008 -,087 -,508 ,616 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,320 1,386 ,048 ,231 ,819 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 101: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (ROA, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -77,197 21,307  -3,623 ,001 
Directors Ownership -,271 ,236 -,231 -1,149 ,262 
Executive Remuneration ,002 ,016 ,022 ,118 ,907 
CEO-Chair Separation 33,400 15,400 ,434 2,169 ,040 
Ownership Concentration ,605 ,368 ,350 1,643 ,113 
Family Ownership & Control ,593 ,315 ,365 1,884 ,072 
Total Assets ,073 ,132 ,124 ,554 ,585 
Sales Growth -,283 ,113 -,429 -2,503 ,020 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
,337 13,786 ,005 ,024 ,981 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
Table 102: Regression result for Hypothesis 8 (MTB ratio, 2008) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6,184 1,646  3,758 ,001 
Directors Ownership ,049 ,018 ,413 2,678 ,013 
Executive Remuneration ,002 ,001 ,271 1,862 ,075 
CEO-Chair Separation ,512 1,189 ,066 ,430 ,671 
Ownership Concentration -,113 ,028 -,650 -3,987 ,001 
Family Ownership & Control -,014 ,024 -,083 -,560 ,581 
Total Assets -,036 ,010 -,600 -3,493 ,002 
Sales Growth -,029 ,009 -,438 -3,337 ,003 
Former Executives Serving as 
Non Executive Directors 
1,741 1,065 ,246 1,635 ,115 
a. Dependent Variable: Market-to-Book Ratio 
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Table 103: Pearson Correlation Matrix of firms in Germany (N= 215) 
 ROA MTB Ratio DO ER Cod OC FO TA SG FESNED SP 
ROA 1 -0.093 0.279 0.265 0.049 0.134* 0.235 0.076 0.254 -0.032 c 
MTB 
Ratio 
-0.093 1 0.015 -0.054 -0.052 0.085 0.054 -0.054 -0.02 -0.038 c 
DO 0.279 0.015 1 0.123 -0.317 0.21 0.564 0.086 0.082 -0.206 c 
ER 0.265 -0.054 0.123 1 0.16* -0.112 0.195 0.465 0.092 -0.018 c 
Cod 0.049 -0.052 -0.317 0.16 1 -0.002 -0.186 0.313 -0.061 0.065 c 
OC 0.134* 0.085 0.21 -0.112 -0.002 1 0.227 -0.123 -0.041 -0.031 c 
FO 0.235 0.054 0.564 0.195 -0.186 0.227 1 0.004 0.141* -0.237 c 
TA 0.076 -0.054 0.086 0.465 0.313 -0.123 0.004 1 0.009 -0.018 c 
SG 0.254 -0.02 0.082 0.092 -0.061 -0.041 0.141* 0.099 1 -0.078 c 
FESNED -0.032 -0.038 -0.206 -0.018 0.065 -0.031 -0.237 -0.018 -0.078 1 c 
SP c c c c c c c c c c c 
 
Table 104: Pearson Correlation Matrix of firms in the United Kingdom 
 ROA MTB Ratio DO ER CCS OC FO TA SG FESNED SP 
ROA 1 0.229 0.017 0.286 0.04 -0.003 0.135* 0.265 -0.017 0.045 c 
MTB 
Ratio 
0.229 1 -0.011 0.054 0.021 -0.055 -0.048 0.045 0.002 0.023 c 
DO 0.017 -0.011 1 -0.148* 0.009 0.559 0.259 -0.235 -0.038 0.073 c 
ER 0.286 0.054 -0.148* 1 0.226 -0.171* -0.266 0.631 0.01 -0.117 c 
CCS 0.04 0.021 0.009 0.226 1 -0.093 -0.375 0.174* -0.228 0.058 c 
OC -0.003 -0.005 0.559 -0.171* -0.093 1 0.253 -0.361 0.071 0.036 c 
FO 0.135* -0.048 0.259 -0.266 -0.375 0.253 1 -0.252 -0.023 -0.068 c 
TA 0.265 0.045 -0.235 0.631 0.174* -0.361 -0.252 1 -0.057 -0.145* c 
SG -0.017 0.002 -0.038 0.01 -0.228 0.071 -0.023 -0.057 1 -0.031 c 
FESNED 0.045 0.023 0.073 -0.117 0.058 0.036 0.068 -0.145* -0.131 1 c 
SP c c c c c c c c c c c 
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Table 105: Pearson Correlation Matrix of firms in Indonesia 
 ROA MTB Ratio DO ER OC FO TA SG FESNED SP 
ROA 1 0.399 -0.111 0.175* 0.146* -0.007 0.115 0.247 -0.103 c 
MTB 
Ratio 
0.399 1 -0.135* 0.281 0.157* -0.113 0.347 0.144* -0.014 c 
DO -0.111 -0.135 1 -0.114 0.082 0.214 -0.154* -0.025 -0.071 c 
ER 0.175* 0.281 -0.114 1 0.168* -0.188 0.75 0.015 0.063 c 
OC 0.146* 0.157* 0.082 0.168* 1 -0.14* -0.088 -0.042 -0.226 c 
FO -0.007 -0.113 0.214 -0.188 -0.14* 1 -0.153* 0.009 0.143* c 
TA 0.115 0.347 -0.154* 0.75 -0.088 -0.153* 1 0.141* 0.219 c 
SG 0.247 0.144* -0.025 0.015 -0.042 0.009 0.141* 1 0.032 c 
FESNED -0.103 -0.014 -0.071 0.063 -0.226 0.143* 0.219 0.032 1 c 
SP c c c c c c c c c c 
 
Description: 
ROA: Return On Assets 
MTB: Market-To-Book 
DO: Directors’ Ownership 
ER: Executive Remuneration 
Cod: Codetermination 
CCS: CEO-Chair Separation 
OC: Ownership Concentration 
FO: Family Ownership 
TA: Total Assets 
SG: Sales Growth 
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FESNED: Former Executives Serving as Non-Executive Directors 
SP: Shareholders Protection 
c: cannot be computed because the variable is constant 
*: correlation is significant at the level of 0.05 level
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Table 106: Descriptive statistics of samples of firms in Germany 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Return On Assets 215 -42,80 65,09 2,3063 12,66593 
Market-to-Book Ratio 215 -7,03 1618,75 9,1257 110,31158 
Directors' Ownership 215 ,00 71,55 10,5148 18,46051 
Executive Remuneration 215 128,00 4300,00 1147,2815 747,37924 
Codetermination 215 ,00 50,00 12,5571 17,34978 
Ownership Concentration 215 ,00 94,83 49,3822 23,53092 
Family Ownership & Control 215 ,00 63,78 10,9029 19,50807 
Total Assets 215 12,15 959,02 252,5518 218,70868 
Sales Growth 215 -62,40 213,82 3,3898 27,03486 
Former Executives serving 
as Non Executive Directors 
215 ,00 1,00 ,2512 ,43469 
Valid N (listwise) 215     
 
Table 107: Descriptive statistics of samples of firms in the United Kingdom 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Return On Assets 215 -223,59 29,26 -3,9874 25,69409 
Market-to-Book Ratio 215 -167,53 25,49 1,1130 12,56811 
Directors' Ownership 215 ,12 83,91 9,8395 17,31079 
Executive Remuneration 215 ,00 2791,26 736,8050 511,19314 
CEO-Chair Separation 215 ,00 1,00 ,9302 ,25535 
Ownership Concentration 215 17,19 91,01 44,4156 13,89998 
Family Ownership & Control 215 ,00 63,02 8,8375 14,06067 
Total Assets 215 2,36 863,20 165,2123 210,57189 
Sales Growth 215 -100,00 4747,79 32,5132 332,56076 
Former Executives serving 
as Non Executive Directors 
215 ,00 1,00 ,1395 ,34731 
Valid N (listwise) 215     
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Table 108: Descriptive statistics of samples of small firms in the United Kingdom 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Return on Assets 164 -223,59 29,26 -6,8986 27,94202 
Market-to-Book Ratio 164 -167,53 25,49 ,8421 14,35248 
Directors' Ownership 164 ,23 83,91 12,1179 19,12852 
Executive Remuneration 164 ,00 2562,12 573,7195 413,49847 
CEO-Chair Separation 164 ,00 1,00 ,9085 ,28915 
Ownership Concentration 164 22,25 91,01 47,1674 13,96742 
Family Ownership & Control 164 ,00 63,02 10,7222 15,51844 
Total Assets 164 2,36 162,07 57,2840 47,22123 
Sales Growth 164 -100,00 4747,79 43,1930 380,30454 
Former Executives Serving 
as Non-Executive Directors 
164 ,00 1,00 ,1829 ,38779 
Valid N (listwise) 164     
 
 
Table 109: Descriptive statistics of samples of firms in Indonesia 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Return On Assets 215 -46,45 39,56 6,6109 8,92404 
Market-to-Book Ratio 215 -5,75 9,57 1,5008 1,66848 
Directors' Ownership 215 ,00 70,00 4,2779 11,88589 
Executive Remuneration 215 228,42 59200,00 9122,0362 10309,48639 
Ownership Concentration 215 33,64 99,74 71,0734 18,36821 
Family Ownership & Control 215 ,00 49,68 3,9054 9,90288 
Total Assets 215 4,84 977,47 157,7360 196,42918 
Sales Growth 215 -54,21 146,63 12,6462 26,66002 
Former Executives Serving 
as Non-Executive Directors 
215 ,00 1,00 ,3628 ,48193 
Valid N (listwise) 215     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
183 
 
Table 110 Sampled companies from Germany 
No. Company 
1 AAP Implantate AG 
2 Adva Optical Networking SE 
3 Basler AG 
4 Berentzen-Gruppe AG 
5 BHS Tabletop AG 
6 Biotest AG 
7 Brilliant AG 
8 Centrotec Sustainable AG 
9 Creaton AG 
10 Curasan AG 
11 Data Modul AG 
12 Dürkopp Adler AG 
13 Einhell Germany AG 
14 Elmos Semiconductor AG 
15 Evotec AG 
16 First Sensor AG 
17 Geratherm Medical AG 
18 Grammer AG 
19 Herlitz AG 
20 Höft & Wessel AG 
21 Init Innovation in Traffic Systems AG 
22 Intica Systems AG 
23 Jenoptik AG 
24 Kontron AG 
25 Leifheit AG 
26 LPKF Laser & Electronics AG 
27 Manz AG 
28 Maschinenfabrik Berthold Hermle AG 
29 Masterflex SE 
30 Neschen AG 
31 Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology 
32 Progress-Werk Oberkirch AG 
33 Pulsion Medical Systems SE 
34 PVA Tepla AG 
35 R Stahl AG 
36 Rational AG 
37 Schaltbau Holding AG 
38 Singulus Technology AG 
39 Stratec Biomedical AG 
40 Süss Microtec AG 
41 UMS United Medical Systems AG 
42 Washtec AG 
43 Westag & Getalit AG 
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Table 111 Sampled companies from the United Kingdom 
No. Company 
1 Advanced Medical Solutions Group plc 
2 AGA Rangemaster Group plc 
3 Alliance Pharma plc 
4 Ark Therapeutics Group plc 
5 Bioquell plc 
6 British Polythene Industries plc 
7 Churchill China plc 
8 Corac Group plc 
9 Crimson Tide plc 
10 Cyprotex plc 
11 Deltex Medical Group plc 
12 Devro plc 
13 Dialight plc 
14 Elementis plc 
15 Hill & Smith Holdings plc 
16 Hydro International plc 
17 Inditherm plc 
18 IQE plc 
19 Macfarlane Group plc 
20 Marshalls plc 
21 Michelmersh Brick Holdings plc 
22 Molins plc 
23 Nichols plc 
24 Oxford Biomedica plc 
25 Plant Health Care plc 
26 Portmeirion Group plc 
27 Proteome Sciences plc 
28 Puricore plc 
29 PV Crystalox Solar plc 
30 Rotork plc 
31 Skyepharma plc 
32 Stadium Group plc 
33 Surgical Innovations Group plc 
34 Symphony Environmental Technologies plc 
35 Telit Communications plc 
36 Tex Holdings plc 
37 TF & JH Braime (Holdings) plc 
38 The Vitec Group plc 
39 Toye & Company plc 
40 TT Electronics plc 
41 Verona Pharma plc 
42 Vislink plc 
43 Xaar plc 
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Table 112 Sampled companies from Indonesia 
No. Company 
1 Akasha Wira International Tbk 
2 Alakasa Industrindo Tbk 
3 Arwana Citramulia Tbk 
4 PT Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk 
5 PT Asia Pacific Fibers Tbk 
6 Astra Otoparts Tbk 
7 Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk 
8 Budi Starch & Sweetener Tbk 
9 Champion Pacific Indonesia Tbk 
10 PT Citra Tubindo Tbk 
11 Duta Pertiwi Nusantara Tbk 
12 Ekadharma International Tbk 
13 PT Ever Shine Tex Tbk 
15 Indal Aluminium Industry Tbk 
19 Jaya Pari Steel Tbk 
20 PT Kalbe Farma Tbk 
21 Kedawung Setia Industrial Tbk 
22 Kimia Farma Tbk 
23 KMI Wire & Table Tbk 
24 Langgeng Makmur Industri Tbk 
25 PT Lion Metal Works Tbk 
26 Lionmesh Prima Tbk 
27 Mayora Indah Tbk 
28 Merck Tbk 
29 PT Multi Strada Arah Sarana Tbk 
30 Mustika Ratu Tbk 
31 Nipress Tbk 
33 Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk 
34 Prima Alloy Steel Universal Tbk 
35 Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk 
36 Pyridam Farma Tbk 
37 Ricky Putra Globalindo Tbk 
38 Sat Nusapersada Tbk 
39 Sekar Laut Tbk 
40 Selamat Sempurna Tbk 
41 PT Sepatu Bata Tbk 
42 PT SLJ Global Tbk 
43 Suparma Tbk 
 
